The Ilisu Dam, the World Commission on Dams and Export Credit Reform
The Final Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to the Ilisu Dam Region

by Ilisu Dam Campaign; the Kurdish Human Rights Project; The Corner House; World Economy, Ecology and Development; Eye on SACE Campaign and Pacific Environment Research Center

first published 16 October 2000

The proposed Ilisu Dam on the River Tigris in the Kurdish region of Southeast Turkey has generated immense international controversy. Turkey’s largest planned hydroelectric project would affect an estimated 78,000 people, mainly ethnic Kurds.

The companies that want to build the dam have sought financial backing from the export credit agencies (ECAs) of their countries, including Britain, Switzerland and the USA. In January 1999, the ECAs attached four conditions (relating to resettlement, water quality, downstream flows and archaeological preservation) to be met before they would issue export credits.

From 9-16 October 2000, an international Fact Finding Mission of Non-Governmental Organisations from the UK (including The Corner House), the USA, Germany and Italy went to the region of the planned Ilisu Dam to assess the Turkish government’s progress meeting the four conditions. This report presents their findings.

Contents

Acknowledgements

This report is based on an international Fact-Finding Mission to the region of the planned Ilisu Dam in Southeast Turkey between 9th and 16th October 2000.

The authors of this report are:

Nicholas Hildyard, The Corner House, UK

Antonio Tricarico, Campaign "An Eye on SACE", Italy

Sally Eberhardt, Kurdish Human Rights Project, UK

Heike Drillisch, World Economy, Ecology and Development, Germany

Douglas Norlen, Pacific Environment Research Center, USA

The Fact-Finding delegation would like to thank all those within Turkey who assisted with Mission, providing accomodation, interpretation and information about the Ilisu project. Thanks are due to the many individuals, including local officials, journalists, civil servants, historians and lawyers, and to local and national organisations, including the Human Rights Association of Turkey (IHD) and GÖÇ-DER. In the UK and US, we would like to thank Angela Barber, Dean Bialek, Harun Duzgoren, Koray Duzgoren, Kate Geary, Rebecca Wood and the Center for Inetrnational and Environmental Law (Washington, DC). Finally, we would especially like to thank the many refugees and villagers who shared their concerns and experiences with us.

For more information on the Ilisu Dam Campaign, see www.ilisu.org.uk.

For more information on the international campaign to reform export credit agencies, see www.eca-watch.org.

The price of this publication (£5) covers printing and other costs associated with its production and distribution. If you would like to order additional copies, please contact the Kurdish Human Rights Project (UK) at khrp@khrp.demon.co.uk or by telephone at +44 207 287 2772.

Summary

Few infrastructure development projects have caused as much international controversy in recent years as the proposed Ilisu Dam in the Kurdish region of Southeast Turkey. Scheduled for construction on the River Tigris, some 65 kilometres from the Syrian border, the dam is intended to generate 3,600 gigawatt-hours of peak hour electricity a year and is Turkey's largest planned hydroelectric project. The dam forms part of the giant Southeastern Anatolia Project (known as GAP after its Turkish name, Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi), a network of 22 dams and 19 power plants: it would be built by a consortium of European and US companies for the Turkish government's State Hydraulics Works Department (DSI). Financial backing is being sought from the export credit agencies (ECAs) of the companies' respective national governments, with Britain, Switzerland and the USA signalling provisional approval. Once constructed, the $2 billion dam would be transferred from DSI to the State electricity company, TEAS, which would then be responsible for its operation.1

Concerns

Concern over Ilisu has centred largely on the failure of the project to meet international standards for infrastructure projects involving forcible resettlement and shared rivers. As planned, the dam would flood an area the size of Manchester, submerging or partially submerging some 183 villages and hamlets2 and the ancient town of Hasankeyf, a site of international archaeological significance. Yet, at the time that the project was provisionally approved by supporting ECAs, no resettlement plan had been drawn up for the estimated 78,000 people, mainly ethnic Kurds, who will be potentially affected by the dam. Nor had there been any consultation whatsoever with affected people or their elected representatives: indeed, until late 1999, local Mayors had not even been informed that the project was going ahead. The dam's environmental impacts were also largely unassessed: although the companies seeking contracts for the dam had commissioned an Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA], independent reviews had revealed it to be wholly inadequate. Moreover, despite fears that the dam could adversely affect the water quality of the River Tigris, disrupt downstream wetlands and irrigated agriculture, and exacerbate the potential for regional conflict over water between Turkey and its neighbours, Syria and Iraq, there had been no consultation with downstream states, as required under international law.

The Four Conditions

In response to growing pressure from the public, NGOs and parliamentarians, the ECAs attached four conditions to their support for the project which the Turkish government must meet before export credits are issued. The four conditions, announced in December 1999, are as follows:

  1. Draw up a resettlement programme which reflects internationally accepted practice and includes independent monitoring;
  2. Make provision for upstream water treatment plants capable of ensuring that water quality is maintained;
  3. Give an assurance that adequate downstream flows will be maintained at all times;
  4. Produce a detailed plan to preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible.

Whilst, on paper, these conditions would go some way to meeting the concerns of critics, there are considerable doubts whether they can or will be met in practice. One concern, highlighted in a recent report by a World Bank consultant hired by the ECAs to assess the Turkish authorities' draft resettlement plan, lies in the lack of institutional capacity within Turkey to undertake a resettlement programme to international standards. Another relates to the ability - and will - of the ECAs themselves to monitor compliance, the rigour with which they will do so, and the political leverage available to them should the Turkish authorities renege on the conditions.

More intractable are the implications for compliance of Turkey's well-documented repression of the Kurdish majority in the region, its abject failure to abide by previous commitments to curb human rights abuses against the local population and its racist policies of enforced assimilation of ethnic Kurds into mainstream Turkish society. Indeed, continuing human rights abuses are central to the controversy over Ilisu. Human rights violations - relating to intimidation - have already been documented in connection with the dam and whilst intimidation, torture, denial of freedom of expression and repression remain the norm in the area, the prospects of a just outcome to the project remain distant, if not unattainable.

The Fact Finding Mission and its Remit

In October 2000, an international Fact Finding Mission of Non-Governmental Organisations from the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany and Italy was established under the aegis of the Kurdish Human Rights Project and the Ilisu Dam Campaign. The Mission was charged with:

  1. Assessing the progress being made by the Turkish government in meeting the four conditions laid down by the ECAs; identifying the institutional and other problems that remain outstanding; and evaluating the prospects of their being resolved;
  2. Assessing whether or not the conditions, even if met, are sufficient to bring the project into line with evolving international best practice. The Mission was explicitly charged with reviewing Ilisu in light of new guidelines developed by the World Commission on Dams;
  3. Identifying corporate governance failures in the practices and procedures of the supporting ECAs that have contributed to the controversy over Ilisu; assessing the extent to which these failures will be addressed by new procedures under consideration by the OECD's Working Group on Export Credits; and proposing corrective action;
  4. Evaluating whether or not continued support for Ilisu could be justified by the UK government in the light of new procedures being developed by the UK Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD) as well as by the other governments' stated commitments to reform their ECA's guidelines in order to take account of environmental, social and developmental criteria.

The Fact-Finding Mission visited the Ilisu region from 9th-16th October 2000. The Mission met with affected people, prominent municipal officials, lawyers and local professional associations relevant to the project. Throughout its time in the region, the Mission was followed by state security police, who also sat in on one interview uninvited. Security police also attended a press conference held by the Fact-Finding Mission on its return to Istanbul, threatening that the press conference was illegal.

Members of the Mission also attended the launch of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) in November 2000, conducted informal interviews with a number of Commissioners and with leading members of the WCD Forum, the 68-member consultative group set up by the WCD and consisting of key representatives from government, the private sector, multilateral development agencies and affected communities.

The Mission's Key Findings

The Mission's main findings are set out in this report. The Mission confirms earlier concerns that:

  • Conditions in the region make a fair and just resettlement to international standards unattainable;
  • Well-documented failures of past and current resettlement projects in Turkey, acknowledged by the Turkish government, have still to be addressed in any substantive way;
  • Doubts still exist as to the true number of people who would be potentially affected;
  • Consultation with the affected people in the Ilisu area has been piecemeal, inadequate, biased in its format and constrained by an air of intimidation. Some key consultations which are reported to have taken place have in reality not occurred;
  • Host communities have not been asked to draw up resettlement plans and their budgetary requirements have not been assessed, in contravention of World Bank standards;
  • The adequacy of the socio-economic surveys required to meet international standards has been questioned;
  • Lack of capacity and institutional fragmentation render a coherent resettlement programme unachievable. Major institutional reforms will be necessary before there can be any confidence that resettlement will be carried out to international standards. There is also a need to overhaul existing compensation procedures;
  • Planned sewage treatment facilities in upstream towns are inadequate to ensure water quality in the reservoir area, either because they will not cover the entire population or because they are still at the feasibility stage;
  • The downstream impacts of Ilisu may be underestimated because no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken of the cumulative impacts of both Ilisu and its companion downstream dam at Cizre. The two projects are independent but have been wrongly represented as separate and unconnected. Because Cizre is an irrigation dam, water fed to it by Ilisu will be largely lost to downstream flow.
  • Time and financial pressures on investigations and salvage of the archaeological wealth of the affected area render such rescue efforts reckless, haphazard and contrived. More important, efforts to salvage archaeological resources are limited to artefacts and cannot extend to the thousands of caves in the area, even though the cave civilisation is the essence of the irreplaceable treasure that is Hasankeyf.

The Mission's Conclusions

The Mission concluded that:

  • The four conditions imposed by the ECAs have yet to be met - and the prospect that they will be met in the future is remote. Whilst the social, political and economic rights of the Kurdish majority in the region remain unrecognised - and indeed repressed - there can be no confidence that the Turkish authorities will abide by the conditions. Serious concerns also exist over the capacity - and will - of the ECAs themselves to monitor and ensure compliance.
  • Even if met, the four conditions leave many key concerns (particularly those relating to transparency and human rights) unaddressed and would fail to bring the project up to international standards. The project violates each and every one of the WCD's major policy recommendations and would still be in breach of WCD standards even if the four conditions were met in full.
  • The history of ECA involvement in the Ilisu project reveals major deficiencies in current ECA practice and procedure. In particular, the lack of common mandatory standards have encouraged a "band-aid" approach to project financing that works to the detriment of affected communities and industry alike. The OECD Working Party's proposals for ECA reform - particularly its emphasis on "benchmarking" - will exacerbate rather than remedy this deficiency.
  • Continued support for the Ilisu Project is in breach of both the spirit and the letter of the new Business Principles adopted by the ECGD. Ilisu is thus a litmus test of the ECGD's commitment to the new principles: proceeding with the project would signal a fatal lack of purpose in reforming the ECGD and in embracing the principles of sustainable development, as espoused by the UK government. Support for the Ilisu project would also conflict with the German government's intention to reform the Hermes guarantee system according to environmental, social and developmental criteria, stated in its coalition agreement. Granting a guarantee for the Ilisu dam would discredit all such reform efforts.

The Mission's Recommendations

In the light of its findings, the Mission will be pressing the ECAs involved in Ilisu to refuse export credit support for the project. In addition, it urges the Turkish Government to consider alternatives to large dam projects like Ilisu that would not impose increased hardship or threaten internal displacement of its Kurdish citizens and other minorities. Alternatives to Ilisu exist - for example, by addressing the 15-25% electricity losses through poor transmission. The Mission also urges the Government to respond to calls for peaceful, political solutions to the Kurdish question.

More generally, the Mission recommends a deep reform of current export credit agency practice. In particular, it urges ECAs:

  1. To adopt the proposals set forth in the "Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies," which is supported by over 300 NGOs worldwide;
  2. Accordingly to adopt mandatory, legally-binding standards, with accompanying "positive" and "restrictive" screening procedures, that would weed out projects that did not meet international environmental, development and human rights standards prior to their being considered for support and ensure compliance with those standards once support has been approved;
  3. Adopt the Report of the World Commission on Dams and endeavour to ensure that all future hydropower contracts in which they are involved comply with the Set of Guidelines for Good Practice (contained in Chapter 9 of the Report). At a minimum, companies seeking support for projects involving dams should be required to explain why specific WCD principles and guidelines are held to not be applicable and attach this explanation as an appendix to the project's Environmental Impact Assessment;
  4. To undertake and make public a human rights assessment of any project for which export credit support is being considered, detailing the extent of compliance by the national government with international human rights agreements and standards.

Section 1: Background to the project

The Companies, the Export Credit Agencies and the Concerns

Few infrastructure development projects have caused as much international controversy in recent years as the proposed Ilisu Dam in the Kurdish region of Southeast Turkey. Scheduled for construction on the River Tigris, some 65 kilometres from the Syrian border, the dam is intended to generate 3,600 gigawatt-hours of peak hour electricity a year and is Turkey's largest planned hydroelectric project. The dam forms part of the giant Southeastern Anatolia Project (known as GAP3 after its Turkish name, Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi), a network of 22 dams and 19 power plants; it would be built by a consortium of European and US companies for the Turkish government's State Hydraulics Works department (DSI), with financial backing from the export credit agencies of the companies' respective national governments. Once constructed, the dam would be transferred from DSI to the State electricity company, TEAS.4

The companies

Plans to build the Ilisu Dam were first mooted in 1954. Although pre-feasibility studies were completed in 1971 and the final design for the dam was approved in 1982,5 the project remained on the drawing board until the late 1990s.

One reason for the delay lay in a lack of finance. From 1984, the Turkish security forces were engaged in a vicious armed conflict against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) throughout the Kurdish region of Turkey. The war, which was costing $10 billion a year in military terms alone,6 left the Turkish government unable to fund the project on its own account. The conflict also led to the World Bank, the world's largest multilateral development agency, signalling that it would be unwilling to finance infrastructure projects in the region.7

In 1996, the Turkish government sought to raise the necessary finance by offering Ilisu to the private sector as a Build-Operate-Transfer project. No bidder could be found, however, raising questions over the projects commercial viability. A year later, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) selected the Swiss turbine manufacturer Sulzer Hydro as the main contractor for the project.8 The project was never put out for international tender.9

Whilst Sulzer Hydro - sold to Austrian VA Tech in 1999 - retained responsibility for the electromechanical works, in conjunction with ABB of Switzerland, it subcontracted the civil engineering works to a consortium led by UK construction company Balfour Beatty. Other companies in the consortium included Impregilo of Italy, Skanska of Sweden and three Turkish construction companies, Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen. According to the DSI, the engineering consultants to the project are the UK firm Binnie and Partners (now Binnie, Black and Veatch), although the company, which was part of the original design team, has told the Ilisu Dam Campaign that they "are not involved yet and are awaiting the project to be funded."10 As yet, no contracts have been signed between the DSI and any of the companies in the consortium.11

ABB's involvement in the dam ceased in March 2000, when it sold out its hydropower business to the Anglo-French energy giant Alstom, handing over all its contractual responsibilities for Ilisu (and other controversial projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam in China) as part of the deal. Three months later, ABB announced a new focus on alternative energy technologies, such as wind and solar - a market the company described as "huge".12 ABB stated that it expected to increase its sales in renewables and small-scale power generation from $400 million to $1.4 billion by 2004. The decision followed a decade long campaign by Swiss, Swedish and international NGOs to persuade ABB and other power generation companies to reconsider their involvement in hydropower13 - a campaign that had included tactics from mass letter writing to protests and shareholder actions. ABB has said that the decision was taken on the basis of an overall market analysis - but that the company took the growing sensitivity of major shareholders regarding social and environmental concerns "very seriously".

In September 2000, the Ilisu consortium lost another of its original members, when Skanska, which had a 24 per cent share in the project, announced its withdrawal from the project. Unlike ABB, whose place was filled by Alstom, Skanska has yet to be replaced. Although the company told the Financial Times that the decision resulted from unspecified negotiating problems which were unrelated to public protests over the social and environmental impacts of the project, company spokesperson Thor Krussel told the Turkish newspaper Ozgur Politika that the firm did not participate in projects which are "not to the benefit of society and the environment."14 In an interview with the London Guardian newspaper, Krussel also pointed out that the company's environmental policy had been updated so that the company was now committed to "caring about people and the environment" in all its work. Krussel stated: "Skanska will abstain from participating in construction projects when in our judgement a project will result in serious risks to the environment or to society at large."1516

Of the companies remaining in the consortium, Balfour Beatty, Impregilo and Sulzer Hydro have all been criticised for their involvement in a number of dams which have resulted in adverse social and environmental impacts (see Table 1). As a member of the Lesotho Highlands Project Contractors (LHPC), Balfour Beatty is currently being prosecuted in Lesotho, on corruption charges arising from the consortium's involvement in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.17 In a judgement given in October 2000, in a similar case against the Highlands Water Venture (HWV) consortium, (which includes the Italian company, Impregilo), the Court of Appeal in Lesotho ruled that partnerships per se could not be charged because they lacked legal personality. The prosecuting authority in Lesotho has yet to decide against which of the individual members of HWV they will now proceed. The effect of the Court of Appeal's ruling is that a similar procedure will be adopted in the charges against LHPC when the matter comes before the court in August 2001. Balfour Beatty has also fallen foul of the law in a number of other countries: in 1996, it was banned for five years from competing for projects in Singapore, following a corruption inquiry, and in 2000 the offices of Balfour Beatty-Massachusetts Electric were raided by the FBI in relation to fraud allegations over the company's contract for constructing Amtrak's electric systems for Northeast Rail Co.18 In recent years, Balfour Beatty has been prosecuted in the UK for its failure to uphold health and safety standards during construction of some of the UK's most high-profile projects - notably the Heathrow Tunnel Extension - and a number of senior Balfour Beatty staff are currently facing possible corporate manslaughter charges as a result of the Hatfield train crash in October 2000, in which four people died and 30 were injured on a stretch of line for which the company had the maintenance contract.

Table 1: The companies and their record
Company Role in Ilisu Corruption Allegations Impacts of Past/Current Dam Projects
Alstom, France/UK Electromechanical Works. Took over from ABB  

Tucurui, Brazil: Flooded more than 2,000 square kilometres of rainforest, displaced 24,000 people and led to virtual elimination of several indigenous groups.

Three Gorges Dam, China: Involves forcible relocation of 1.4 million people.

Itaipu Dam, Brazil: Drowned large area of rare Atlantic Forest, displaced 42,000, major adverse health impacts, widespread corruption associated with project

Sulzer Hydro (Acquired by VA Tech in October 1999), Switzerland/ Germany/Austria

Electromechanical Works  

Three Gorges Dam, China: Forcible relocation of 1.4 million people.

Nathpa Jhakri, India: World Bank withdrew from project after miscalculations in the height of the dam were revealed. Only produced half of anticipated power.

Balfour Beatty, UK Construction

Lesotho: current prosecution for corruption. Next hearing August 2001.

Singapore: 5-year ban following corruption allegations, denied by company

USA: under investigation for fraud

Pergau, Malaysia: Dam built with illegal use of UK development aid.

Samanalawewa Dam, Sri Lanka: reservoir of dam could not be filled because its bed leaked so badly. Dam now described as "a write off". Inadequate resettlement

Victoria Dam: Inadequate resettlement

Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho: Inadequate resettlement, alleged corruption, striking workers sacked, shooting of workers evicted from construction site.

Impregilo, Italy   Lesotho: being considered for prosecution for corruption as an individual entity.

Bakolori, Nigeria: No compensation to 12,000 people evicted. 126 protestors massacred by police.

Chixoy, Guatemala: 400 Maya Ache indigenous people who lived in reservoir area massacred.

Yacyreta, Argentina: Project described as "a monument to corruption".

Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho: Inadequate resettlement, alleged corruption.

The export credit agencies

Although the DSI is the project developer, the financing for Ilisu has (at the Turkish government's request) been handed over to the construction consortium which has been charged with raising the full construction costs for the project.19

The financial package for Ilisu will be arranged by the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS). With approximately half of the construction costs being made up of imports from Western Europe and the USA, the companies in the consortium sought government-supported export credit guarantees from the Export Credit Agencies (ECAs)20 of nine countries - Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

In November 1998, the Swiss export credit agency, Exportrisikogarantie (ERG), approved provisional export credit support of 470 million Swiss francs for the Ilisu contracts of Sulzer Hydro and ABB.21 Sulzer Hydro, which was bought up by VA Tech of Austria in 1999, has also applied to Hermes, the German export credit agency, for a 150 million DM (approx. $75 million) credit, or approximately 5 per cent of the project's total costs. The Hermes application is still pending: after intense campaigning by NGOs and wide public criticism, government officials promised that no decision will be taken until a resettlement action plan and environmental impact assessment have been submitted.

In the UK, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has announced that the government is "minded" to approve a $200 million credit for Balfour Beatty, whose joint venture in the US, Balfour Beatty International, has also applied for a further $20 million from Ex-Im Bank, the official US export credit agency. Ex-Im has issued a "Letter of Preliminary Commitment" and is reviewing Balfour Beatty's application. It is generally held that Ilisu will fail to meet Ex-Im's existing standards or the revised standards that Ex-Im is currently considering adopting (see p. 84).22

Italy's export credit agency SACE has similarly given approval for a $152 million guarantee to Impregilo, although this has still to be confirmed by the Interministerial Committee on Economic Planning (SACE having formally requested an opinion on its financial involvement in the project).

Sweden, which had been considering an export credit for Skanska, is no longer involved in the project, following Skanska's withdrawal.

Other Funders

According to the GAP Regional Development Administration, funding from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will be used for planning the resettlement of those affected by the dam, "constructing a Hasankeyf museum" and "preparing a document which contains rescued historical material".23

Major concerns

When first approved by the consortium of companies and export credit agencies supporting the project, Ilisu was in violation of a range of internationally accepted guidelines for development projects, as exemplified by those required for World Bank-financed projects. Not only did it abrogate five World Bank policy guidelines on 18 counts, but it was also in breach of core provisions of the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses and the UN/ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki 17 March 1992). The project had no resettlement plan and there had been no consultation whatsoever with affected people or their elected representatives, such as local mayors. The dam's environmental impacts were also largely unassessed: although the companies seeking contracts for the dam had commissioned an EIA, independent reviews had revealed it to be wholly inadequate. Moreover, despite fears that the dam could adversely affect the water quality of the River Tigris, disrupt downstream wetlands and irrigated agriculture, and exacerbate the potential for regional conflict over water between Turkey and its neighbours, Syria and Iraq, there had been no consultation with downstream states, as required under international law.

Since the announcement of export credit support for Ilisu, a number of reports - from both Non-Governmental Organisations24 and official sources25 - have exposed massive deficiencies in the planning and implementation of the project. In the UK, the involvement of the ECGD in the project has been subject to a number of parliamentary inquiries. In July 2000, the parliament's International Development Committee concluded: "We have here a project proposed for ECA support that, despite having been in preparation for many years, fails almost every internationally agreed test in terms of both consultation and planning for environmental and social impacts ... The Ilisu Dam was from the outset conceived and planned in contravention of international standards, and still does not comply."26 Following publication of the report, Ann Clwyd MP, a member of the committee and Chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, visited the region. Other MPs from the UK, Italy and Germany have also undertaken fact finding missions, reporting critically on the dam.27 A delegation of the German parliament's Human Rights Committee has also concluded that the Ilisu dam should not be constructed and that the German government should not give an export credit guarantee support. The Committee also recommended that the Turkish government should register Hasankeyf as a World Heritage Cultural Site.28

Public and parliamentary concerns have centred on a cluster of key issues:

  • First, that the long and continuing history of repression of the Kurdish majority in the region by the Turkish State makes a just outcome to the project unrealisable;
  • Second, that the project, which will flood the homes of up to an estimated 78,000 people, fails to meet the most basic international standards with regard to resettlement and environment;
  • Third, that the destruction of the ancient Kurdish town of Hasankeyf, a site of international archaeological importance, which would be partially submerged under the dam's reservoir, is an unacceptable price to pay for the project; and
  • Fourth, that the dam has the potential to exacerbate regional conflict over water between Turkey and its downstream neighbours, Syria and Iraq.

Criticisms have also been raised over the lack of transparency with regard to key project documents, notably the Environmental Impact Assessment, and over the failure to consider alternatives to the dam (see pp. 89-91).

These concerns are considered in more detail below.

Human Rights and the Repression of the Kurds

Central to the controversy surrounding the Ilisu project is the continuing repression of the Kurdish majority in the region by the Turkish State. Such repression has a long history and is rooted in policies aimed at integrating the Kurds into mainstream Turkish society, if necessary by force. To date, the Turkish State's policy of assimilation has involved widespread human rights abuses, the brutal suppression of local Kurdish customs and culture, the outlawing of the Kurdish language, the imprisonment, rape and torture of political opponents, and the enforced resettlement of Kurdish villagers (see Box 1 below: A History of Repression)


Box 1: A History of Repression

In 1923, the establishment of the modern Turkish State under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk brought a new kind of nationalism to Turkey. All citizens were by definition "Turkish": to define oneself as belonging to any other ethnic group was not only inconceivable, it was seen as an act in defiance of State authority.

Turkey's fifteen million Kurds have consequently suffered from various forms of oppression at the hands of the Turkish State over many years. In the late 1920s and early 1930s the State security forces of the newly established Turkish State used brutal methods, including mass deportations, to pacify the rebellious Kurdish Southeast of the country and to assimilate the Kurds into the Turkish population. In 1924, an official decree banned all Kurdish schools, organisations and publications. Use of the words "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" was forbidden and references to them were removed from Turkish history books. In June 1934, Law 2510 divided Turkey into three zones, (i) localities to be reserved for the habitation of persons possessing Turkish culture, (ii) areas to which persons of non-Turkish culture could be moved for assimilation into Turkish culture and (iii) regions for complete evacuation. At that stage, almost all Kurdish villages were renamed with Turkish sounding names. Parents could not register their children with distinctively Kurdish names. The Kurdish language was forbidden in written and spoken form. Kurdish folklore, music, traditional Kurdish clothes and colours and the celebration of the Kurdish new year festival Newroz have all been banned at various times.

The oppression of the early 20th century continues today. The speaking of Kurdish was forbidden at various periods until 1991 and as recently as April 1999 the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs banned State-run news agencies, government departments and universities from using words such as 'Kurdish problem', 'Kurdish people' and 'evacuated villages': instead they were ordered to use politically-approved expressions such as 'our citizens who are identified as Kurds' and 'abandoned villages'. In practice, any overt expression of Kurdish culture is likely to be seen as subversive. The savage conflict which has raged between Turkish security forces and Kurdish guerrillas in Southeast Turkey since 1984 has been the background for innumerable brutal human rights abuses on the part of the security forces, including village destruction, torture, extra-judicial killing and disappearances. The situation in the Kurdish regions has been roundly condemned by the international community.

Kerim Yildiz
Executive Director
Kurdish Human Rights Project (UK)


Unsurprisingly, the region has been wracked by conflict, most recently in the form of a bitter, 16-year-long war between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), during which an estimated 4,000 villages in the area were destroyed, and at least 3 million people forced to flee their homes.29

The majority of the evacuations took place in the early 1990s and were carried out with great brutality, whole villages being razed to the ground; villagers, including children, being raped, abducted, killed, tortured or beaten up; and livestock slaughtered. By the end of 1992, entire districts, including Sirnak, Silopi and Eruh (all overlapping the Ilisu region), had lost all their villages, with the exception of one village guard district.30 In July 1997, the Chairman of the Turkish Parliamentary Committee established to look into the problem of village evacuations confirmed that almost 365,000 inhabitants of 3,185 villages and hamlets had been forced out of their homes since 1990 as a result of the war. The US State Department cited a "credible estimate" of between 380,000 and 1 million for the numbers that have been forced to move.31 Other figures have been put as high as 10 million.

Since 1995, the figures have disclosed a declining but nevertheless continuing pattern of forced evacuation. In 1997, the Human Rights Association of Turkey (IHD) reported that 22 villages and hamlets had been evacuated and sometimes burned by State agents. These included three instances of forcible evacuation from in Eruh district, Siirt province and the forced evacuation of three hamlets in Besiri, Batman province. Both Eruh and Besiri districts are potentially affected by the proposed dam. Further evacuation and destruction by soldiers has been reported since then.

Most recently, the true colours of Turkey's State-sponsored "Back to the Village Programme," which claims to have returned thousands of evicted villagers to their homes in the Southeast, have been exposed by a series of horrifying events in autumn 2000. On 3 October 2000, villagers who had been told they could rebuild their village in the Lice district of Diyarbakir were forced to re-live the horrors of the war a second time as they watched the homes they had rebuilt over a 6-month period razed to the ground by Turkish soldiers who told them, "This hamlet does not have a place on the map and the people cannot live here." In a similar incident also in October 2000, three villagers in Hakkari province who had received permission to return to their village were killed by Turkish soldiers from the neighbouring province of Sirnak. A fourth, wounded victim, the sole survivor of the operation, was arrested and bodies of the three killed have not been returned to their families.

Although in September 1999, the PKK abandoned its armed struggle in the pursuit of a political settlement to the as yet unresolved "Kurdish question", much of the area is still under Emergency Rule and human rights abuses, including torture, remain commonplace. In their bi-annual report comparing figures on human rights abuses from the first half of 1999 to the first half of 2000, the Human Rights Association (IHD) makes clear that the PKK's cease-fire has had little effect on Turkey's extra-judicial killing and death by torture statistics which have decreased by a mere 0.6%.32 Despite assurances at senior levels that substantive steps are being taken to suppress the practice of torture, the Turkish Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, reporting in March 2000, concluded that there have been no improvements in torture practice since 1998 when it had conducted an earlier investigation.33

Under such circumstances, a free and open debate on the merits of the Ilisu project is nigh on impossible. Indeed, a number of human rights abuses directly associated with the dam have already been documented: critics of the dam have been subjected to intimidation34 or accused of belonging to the PKK, a crime punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment, whilst organisers of a rally to celebrate the history of Hasankeyf were forbidden by the local Governor from distributing a petition expressing concern over the dam. Such human rights abuses raise major concerns about the likelihood of a successful development outcome to the Ilisu project.

As of February 2001, none of the ECAs supporting the project, or considering support, had published any assessment of the implications of continuing repression in the region for Ilisu, nor indeed of the repercussions of construction of the dam on the rights of the marginalised in the region. In the UK, it has emerged that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was not even informed by the Foreign Office of the human rights implications of the project, provoking the International Development Committee to comment:

"We are astonished that the Foreign Office did not raise any questions about the proposed Ilisu Dam and its effects on the human rights of those living in the region. The large-scale resettlement of a population, many of whom may well question the very legitimacy of the Government which moves them from their homes, must surely demand some detailed analysis from the Foreign Office. We would expect comments on the necessity of a genuinely transparent, free and fair consultation process; discussion of the relation between the removal of communities and drift to the towns on the one hand and on the other any conflict-related tactics and military strategy of the parties to the conflict; certainly an analysis of the human rights of the affected community and the extent to which the building of the Dam could possibly infringe or affect them. We criticise the Foreign Office for failing to raise these issues in detail with ECGD and DTI Ministers."35

Although the Foreign Office denies that it failed to advise the DTI on the human rights implications of Ilisu, it has refused to release the relevant papers to the International Development Committee (see pp. 100-101).36


Box 2: The Experience of War

The woman pictured here gave the Mission the following testimony about the night her village was destroyed by Turkish soldiers in the summer of 1993:

"We had spent the day working on the farm. We got home late, too tired to eat and because the summer is so hot, we went to sleep on the roof of our house. In the darkness, the gunshots started. We went downstairs into the house. The gunshots went on till sunshine, and we also heard the sound of a helicopter. We were all scared, inside the house. We locked the doors. Everybody was excited. The gunfire was like rain and went on all night. We just couldn't believe that. I saw soldiers spraying houses with chemicals and setting them alight. We were terrified. One of our neighbours said, "They'll just get anyone." We all went to a cave to hide, about 50 of us. We took all the relatives and children whom we could find. We just wanted to be quiet and not be seen or heard, but suddenly we heard one of the children's uncles shout: "Why are you hiding there? You can't do anything with hiding! They'll just kill everyone.

"The soldiers were breaking up the doors and picking up people, collecting them - whoever they could find. We wanted to escape, so we went outside. I saw that my seven year-old daughter was within the group who was collected by the soldiers. We couldn't think what to do, we were so scared. My uncle's daughter lived with us, and had just given birth so we could not run away. We tried to escape on a particular path but were told that we couldn't get through. So we went to another cave to hide, but another man shouted, "Move away, you will be found there as well, so don't bother to hide." One soldier broke up bottle and there was a white smoke, and afterwards there were all flames around the house. It was a chemical bomb or something. I asked a child what was happening and I heard a woman shout, "They killed Aladdin and Farhrettin (her brother and husband)!" That woman was in such shock that she threw her baby to the flames, saying. "I lost everybody in my life so what am I going do with my baby!" So she just threw her baby to the flames. But at that time she was insane really. Fortunately, her daughter took the baby out of the flames and rescued the baby. They were holding the baby and they tried to get out of the village. I had eight children with me. We all tried to get to the neighbouring village. We were half naked. I was still thinking about my daughter who was caught by the soldiers and who was in the other group. I was just thinking about her, I was so anxious. When we got to the other village, it was early morning. We waited all day long, then my daughter came up with the other villagers sometime in the evening. When we asked her what had happened she said that the soldiers made them stand in a circle. They poured some petrol around them. There was one woman whose house was burning. In the house, there were some animals. The animals were screaming and trying to get out and they heard that for hours and hours. Eventually the terrible noise stopped.

"We spent the night in the nearby village, but we were so concerned about our village. The first thing we did in the morning was to go back and see what happened. As soon as we arrived, we saw tons of dead animals, including chickens, turkeys, donkeys, sheep - everywhere - all of them burnt. We also saw eight bodies lying around. These bodies were also burned in addition to being murdered. We could identify seven of them. We also heard an explosion. About a thousand loose animals were murdered with gunshots from Cobra helicopters. It was around nine o'clock when someone shouted: "The soldiers are coming again!" So we ran away. We were scared and went back to the other village and spent the night there again. But again in the morning, we went to our village, but at that time the smell of the dead animals was so bad that we couldn't stand it. There were others coming from the neighbouring village. We all tried to bury the corpses, but the bodies were in such bad condition. They were not like normal corpses. We just couldn't hold them properly because the flesh and bones were all divided - they were all separate. So we put them in bags and dug graves. But we forgot some bones and flesh, so I picked them up myself and brought it to the grave. There was one corpse left unburied. The soldiers came back again and we went back to the other village. On the way we saw again plenty of animals shot dead. Some of them had their youngsters close to them, also shot dead. We tried to help some of them that were injured only. The pollution, the situation was so bad - desperate. The soldiers made a raid to the nearby village and there again we heard gunshots all the time as usual. We were even getting used to that. We heard that one youngster was taken out and shot dead. He was a relative of this man (sitting here). There was nothing to do for us, so we went back to our village and dug up the ground under our houses to build a gap where we could hide. We stayed there for three, four days, but obviously we couldn't stay there forever, so we had to get out. We went to another neighbour village and stayed there for two more days. One morning, we got up very early as usually. Somebody's husband wanted to go to the mosque to pray, but they told him, "Don't go to the mosque, do it here." When the soldiers came back they went to one of the houses and asked the young lady in the house. "Where is Ramu (the owner of the house)?" She said, "You took the Ramu. He was with you. I don't know where he is." The soldiers answered, "Well, we took them, but we left them again." There was another soldier, who wasn't wearing uniform, he held the lady's hair and punched here a couple of times and afterwards the wife of the Ramu told him, "Ramu has come up here, but he has gone back to the farm, so he is now in the farm. So just leave her alone." But in fact, Ramu was in the house, he was hiding and they all were trying to hide him by putting whatever they could find over him, blankets, bed linens.

"If the river were a pen, there would not be enough ink to document our suffering."

Another man added this description of the same night:

"My fourteen-year old son went outside to calm the animals. He had a torch and a watch. The soldiers took his torch and watch and started to punch him. They beat him all night long. Afterwards they forced him to stay naked and tortured him there. They took six people I knew, including myself, and tortured us as well and killed someone who didn't have both hands. I still have problems with my feet and can't walk well. The boy is feeling okay, much better now. He is getting on with his life and learned on his own how to deal with living beyond torture. But he has not had help or counselling. But imagine if this happened somewhere else, in Germany, Italy or anywhere...he would never forget that and wouldn't be able to continue his life.... Of course I want to go back to my village but I used to own over 100 animals there, from which I got money. Now I don't have anything at all there. I want to go there but I don't really know how to survive there. And I want to have security as well. We want to rebuild our lives provided we are not put under pressure and we feel safe."


Ilisu, GAP and Forcible Assimilation

Concern has also been expressed over the political motivations underlying Ilisu's development objectives and indeed those of the wider GAP project of which it is part. In particular, the history of State repression in the region has led many to view the GAP as "war by other means".


Box 3: The GAP - Claimed Benefits

Covering nine provinces37 with a total area of 74,000 square kilometres, the $32 billion project38 is the largest development project ever undertaken in Turkey, and one of the largest of its kind in the world.39 Under the GAP, the Turkish government plans to develop a cluster of seven major water development projects on the Euphrates basin and six on the Tigris. When completed, a total of 22 dams and 19 power plants will have been built on the two river basins, regulating 28 per cent of Turkey's total water potential. In addition to generating 27 billion kilowatt hours of electricity,40 the dams would be used to irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land in order to grow cash crops and encourage the growth of agro-industries, such as food processing for export.41 According to Dogan Altinbilek, Director General of DSI, the project "has top national priority."42

The newly irrigated land would increase the area in Turkey under irrigation by 40 per cent.

Based on 1994 figures, the GAP authorities predict that the project will eventually increase vegetable production by 40 per cent, cotton by 300 per cent, barley by 40 per cent and wheat by 100 per cent. Around the Ataturk dam, the region has been transformed into one of the most important centres of cotton production in Turkey.43 Overall, it is claimed that the GAP will generate 3.8 million jobs and raise per capita income in the region by 209 per cent.44

Numerous government departments are involved in the implementation of GAP, under the aegis of the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAPRDA).

To date, Turkey has invested some $14 billion from its own domestic resources in GAP, with international institutions and the private sector investing a further $3.5 billion.45 Of the planned water projects, 12 dams and 6 hydroelectric power plants have already been built - including the giant Ataturk, Karakaya, Keban and Birecik dams. Sixty per cent of the planned hydroelectric plants are running, generating 15 per cent of the total electricity production of Turkey. As of December 1999, 11 per cent of the total planned irrigation target had been achieved, with 8 to 10 per cent under construction.

Although originally conceived solely as a water development project, the GAP has now been expanded to include other infrastructure programmes, including the building of schools, health care centres, roads, housing and tourism centres. According to the GAP authorities, the integration of these projects into the GAP programme reflects Turkey's commitment to "sustainable human development that is in conformity with the Rio principles". As Dr. Oclay Unver, President of the GAP Administration told a seminar held in London in February 2000: "This approach takes the human element as its focus. All physical structures and other investments become a means to serve this end."46

In reality, however, the GAP typifies "top down" development. There has been little or no consultation with affected communities and the projects are implemented without any local participation. Hundreds of thousands have now been displaced, often forcibly and rarely with adequate compensation. Many have ended up in the shantytowns of the major cities, unable to find full-time employment and living in poverty. Acknowledging these failures, the Turkish government announced in 1999 that it would review the project.47

The GAP has also caused major environmental degradation. Salinisation of irrigated land and soil erosion are now serious problems. According to Professor Dr. Alaeddin Taysun of the University of the Aegean, "About 7 million hectares of land that are now irrigated or will be in the future are under threat from erosion. Precautions against erosion also need to be taken on about 5 million hectares which are suffering erosion at a low level."48


There is little doubt that the majority of GAP officials and field workers are deeply committed to the programme's overt aims of poverty alleviation and economic development (see Box 3: The GAP - Claimed Benefits). There is little doubt either that the majority of people in the region, which is one of the poorest in Turkey,49 seek means to improve their living standards and to gain access to modern technologies, health care and education. But poverty alleviation and economic development are not the only - or even the most important - objectives motivating the GAP. From its inception in the mid-1970s,50 the project has been underpinned by the Turkish State's long-pursued policy of assimilating the region's Kurdish majority into mainstream Turkish society and culture. Indeed, the Turkish government's official publicity for the project explicitly states that the GAP is intended to "dramatically change the social and cultural make-up of the region." The Director General of DSI has also stated:

"We do not have Kurdish people. We are all Turkish people. We do not look on Kurdish people as a minority like in the USA. All are citizens of Turkey no matter where they come from and who they are. Turkey's policy is that the citizens in GAP region will not be treated differently from other regions just because of their ethnic origin. We have a lot of Kurdish people in the government and some are in key positions."51

To many Kurds who have been displaced from their homes in recent years, such statements have a sinister ring to them. Indeed, it is widely held in many quarters that the GAP project has been promoted by the Turkish authorities as a means of altering the demography of the region through the displacement of Kurds into larger towns so as to exercise more effective control over the region. As the UK Defense Forum notes:

"From the outset, the Southeast Anatolia Project has had profound security implications. It is no coincidence that the project is situated in the Kurdish region of Turkey - where a bitter civil war rages between the Kurds and the Turkish military. The expected security benefits are twofold, by increasing the income of hitherto impoverished Kurds, the government in Ankara hopes the new wealth will induce the people to support the government. More pragmatically, the project will transform the geography of Turkish Kurdistan. Improved communications, combined with new industries and farms, will shepherd the Kurds out of their traditional mountain fastness into planned urban areas where the government can keep greater control over them. An underlying motive of the project is to deny the Kurdish guerrillas the environment in which they operate."52

This view has been confirmed by Turkish soldiers interviewed by Britain's Channel 4 News. The soldiers admitted that their interest in the Ilisu project was entirely strategic. When the Ilisu waters rise, the PKK guerrillas' escape routes to the mountains would be cut off.53

GAP's claimed development objectives are also thrown into doubt by the skewed distribution of its benefits and its failure to tackle key structural causes of poverty. Indeed, it is clear that the last people to benefit are Kurds, and in particular poorer Kurds. Despite massive investment in the region through the GAP, for example, the social infrastructure of the east and southeast remains the most neglected in Turkey: per capita income is barely 42 per cent of the national average; only 9 per cent of children complete secondary school; the average literacy rate is 27 per cent lower than the national average; and the Southeast receives less than 10 per cent of the national development budget. As David McDowall, author of A Modern History of the Kurds, points out, such neglect "is longstanding and institutionalised, partly as a result of Turkey's longstanding determination to crush all expression of Kurdish identity" and "contradicts official claims of concern."54

McDowall also points to the failure of the GAP to grasp the vital need for land reform, a key requirement if rural poverty in the region, where landlessness is widespread, is to be addressed. Instead GAP planners have opted for the development of capital intensive agriculture - an indication to many critics of the shallowness of GAP's claimed poverty alleviation objectives. "The reason is simple", argues McDowall. "The landlord class largely control the vote of their villagers, useful in offsetting the dissident vote that finds expression in the region's towns." Neglect of land reform means, according to GAP's own master plan, that 8 per cent of farming families still control over 50 per cent of the land, 41 per cent hold 5 hectares or less (barely subsistence level), while 38 per cent have no land at all. GAP has little or nothing to offer this 79 per cent. "In such conditions the capital required for this massive project will come either from entrepreneurs living elsewhere in Turkey or from abroad. In short, the indigenous population is unlikely to benefit from the investment opportunity or have the education and skills to benefit from the projects."

In addition, "the most fundamental ingredient of development, full local participation has been missing". As a result, says McDowall, "Local people feel powerless in the face of something they either do not want or know nothing about."

These problems - though critical to assessing the claimed benefits of GAP in general - have yet to be investigated by the ECAs considering support for Ilisu, despite the dam now being promoted as "a key project within the GAP, one that has the potential to contribute to all of its aims."55


Box 4: Dams and the GAP

Euphrates Basin: 14 dams and 11 Hydroelectric Power Projects (HEPP)

  • Karakaya Dam and HEPP
  • Ataturk Dam and HEPP
  • Sanliurfa HEPP
  • Birecik Dam and HEPP
  • Karkamis Dam and HEPP
  • Camgazi Dam
  • Gomikan Dam
  • Kocali Dam and HEPP
  • Sinirtas Dam and HEPP
  • Fatopasa HEPP
  • Buyukcay Dam and HEPP
  • Kahta Dam and HEPP
  • Cataltepe Dam
  • Erkenek HEPP
  • Hancagiz Dam
  • Kayacik Dam
  • Kemlin Dam

Tigris Basin: 8 dams and 8 Hydroelectric Power Projects (HEPP)

  • Kralkizi Dam and HEPP
  • Dicle Dam and HEPP
  • Batman Dam and HEPP
  • Silvan Dam and HEPP
  • Kayser Dam and HEPP
  • Garzan Dam and HEPP
  • Ilisu Dam and HEPP
  • Cizre Dam and HEPP

Source: DSI website (www.dsi.gov.tr/gap.htm)

Note: The official GAP website (www.gap.gov.tr) lists only 8 dams under Euphrates Basin Projects.


Resettlement: Lack of Consultation

Critics argue that the continuing repression and lack of basic freedoms in the region make a fair and just resettlement of the 78,000 people who will potentially be affected by the project unattainable. The dam would create a reservoir approximately the size of the UK city of Manchester,56 affecting some 183 settlements57 and hamlets and the town of Hasankeyf. Consultation with affected communities has been minimal; critics are fearful of speaking out against the project; there is no accurate data on the numbers that will be affected; no resettlement plan has yet been drawn up for those who will be forced to move to make way for the dam's reservoir, in violation of international standards for infrastructure projects involving forcible evictions;58 and no compensation package agreed. Moreover, the history of resettlement at other dam sites bodes ill for those who would be forcibly evicted by Ilisu.

When Ilisu was first presented to the ECAs supporting the project, it was claimed that some "12-16,000" people would be affected, with 50 villages being flooded by the dam's reservoir. In September 1999, however, a list obtained by a delegation to the region, organised by Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), put the figure at 68 villages, with 57 more whose land would be partially flooded. All in all, the KHRP Mission estimated, a minimum of 25,000 people would be affected - twice the numbers admitted by Balfour Beatty. KHRP also discovered that at least 19 villages in the reservoir area have already been evicted at gunpoint, in many cases their houses being razed to the ground. The Fact Finding Mission also drew attention to the large number of people who had already been forced to leave the reservoir area as a result of military operations against the PKK but who would like to return if able to do so. These villagers, the Mission argued, should be counted as project affected people, with full rights to compensation. This has now been acknowledged by the project developers and the ECAs.

Subsequently, in December 1999, Britain's ECGD issued a report on "Stakeholders' Attitudes to Involuntary Resettlement in the Context of the Ilisu Dam Project". The report estimated that at least 36,000 people would be affected by the project and noted that the Turkish authorities had still not produced a detailed resettlement plan "even though the final design of the Ilisu Dam project was approved as early as 1982."59 The study also cast serious doubts on the value of assurances from the Turkish authorities as to resettlement, noting that past resettlement projects in Turkey have (with one exception) failed to meet international standards.60

The report warned that land tenure and land title problems had not been addressed in the resettlement planning for Ilisu and that no host areas had been identified for resettlement. It also expressed concern that providing appropriate compensation would be complicated by a number of factors: the lack of registration deeds and proof of ownership, forced land confiscation and absentee rural families. Although the report acknowledged that the Turkish Government is in the process of modernising its national policy and legal framework governing involuntary resettlement, it warned that "evidence from previous resettlement projects indicates that implementation is problematic".

The report also highlighted the lack of consultation with local people, noting that "local stakeholders have been waiting for more than 20 years to be informed directly about resettlement, despite the fact that the project design was approved by the government in 1982"61 and that "open consultative processes are not part of the institutional culture or political system."62 Lack of consultation and mistrust of the DSI were already widespread, the report stated, and "local stakeholders believe that they have no forum to express their concerns over adequate compensation for expropriated assets, decisions over new settlement locations and loss of social and cultural capital."63

The ECGD's report was published on the same day as the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers, announced that the UK was "minded" to support the project, subject to four conditions, one of which stipulated the drawing up of a resettlement plan which reflects internationally accepted practice. In doing so, the UK government appears to have ignored one of the key conclusions of the ECGD's report, which explicitly states that a resettlement plan drawn up so late in the planning cycle would be in violation of internationally accepted standards. Such standards, the report notes, "clearly specify that planning for the involvement of different stakeholders should start as early as possible in the project cycle": by contrast, involvement of stakeholders in the Ilisu project "will be reactive rather than proactive, with the DSI intending to convince the public of the merits and benefits of the project, rather than trying to establish constructive engagement with different public stakeholders in the reservoir area."64

Since the publication of the ECGD's report, the Turkish authorities have drawn up a draft Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), employing the consultancy firm SEMOR to undertake surveys of the numbers likely to be affected and their socio-economic conditions. Investigations undertaken by NGOs monitoring the Ilisu project reveal that the company has limited experience of working on resettlement, its main expertise apparently lying in the organisation of seminars and tourism (seeBox 5: "Your happiness will bring our success").

This mosque, used today by the people of Hasankeyf, contains the tomb of Imam Abdullah, grandson of Cafer-i Tayyer, the uncle of the prophet Mohammed. It is visited by some 30,000 pilgrims every year. In addition to the many ancient ruins which would be destroyed by the Ilisu Dam, this mosque and gravesite also stand to be submerged by the waters of the dam's reservoir.


Box 5: "Your happiness will bring our success"

To undertake its proposed resettlement plan for Ilisu, the Turkish Government commissioned SEMOR - the Seminar Organization Consultancy and Travel Co. Inc. - to carry out the required socio-economic surveys. Public information available on Semor suggests that the company has only ever been involved in one resettlement scheme, the Izmir Water Project which involved few of the complex problems that confront Ilisu.

As its name suggests, the main expertise of the company (motto: "Your happiness will bring our success") lies in:

  • Organising seminars (topics listed on its web site include: "1st Statistics Congress", "Computers Supported Education" "Efficient Use of CAD/Cam Software in companies")
  • holiday tours ("hotel reservations, meetings with the vendors, excursions, renting cars, renting car services, foreign and domestic transfers")
  • and consultancy

The company's web site lists 11 projects undertaken as part of its consultancy work:

  • 5 involve the setting up of companies or accountancy/management systems;
  • 3 consist of reports on the management of urban solid waste;
  • 2 involve social assessments of forestry and biodiversity programmes; and
  • 1 involves the drawing up of a resettlement plan for the Tahtali Dam - part of the Izmir Water Project.

Independently, the Swiss Export Credit Agency hired Dr. Ayse Kudat, a senior sociologist at the World Bank, to help ensure that the resettlement plan and compensation proposals met international standards. A leaked copy of Dr. Kudat's review of the Turkish Government's Draft Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was obtained by the Ilisu Dam Campaign and other NGOs internationally in August 2000.

The report confirmed most of the misgivings voiced by the earlier more cursory ECGD report and revealed that:

  • The numbers who may be affected by Ilisu are 2-3 times higher than previously estimated - possibly as many as 78,000;
  • Sweeping institutional reforms within Turkey are needed before "best practice" - as defined by World Bank or OECD guidelines - can be achieved;
  • The Turkish government has failed to consider alternatives to the Ilisu project, which violates both World Bank and OECD guidelines;
  • The project was approved before a resettlement plan was drawn up, which flouts both World Bank and OECD guidelines;
  • The Turkish authorities have failed to draw up a full socio-economic census, which violates World Bank guidelines;
  • There are major gaps in information needed to draw up a resettlement plan to international standards;
  • No resettlement budget has been prepared - in violation of World Bank and OECD standards - and, it is suggested, a paper commitment from Turkey to make the money available cannot be trusted;
  • Major economic and political obstacles must be overcome before it can be ensured that affected people will not be worse off than they were before the project, as the World Bank demands;
  • The special provision to protect the livelihoods of women has been ignored, in violation of World Bank guidelines;
  • Pastoralists will not be compensated for their land loss, in contravention of OECD guidelines.

The report promises compensation for those who have already been forcibly evicted from the reservoir area of the dam due to the 16-year conflict in the region. Nonetheless it provides telling evidence that the needs of this category of displaced villagers are being ignored as a result of "security concerns". For example, Kudat states that:

"DSI field staff calculate that 24 villages (together with their hamlets) lack land/title registration. These villages are still under security, and to most, there is no permission to enter. Their infrastructure and homes are ruined and their populations are spread around the country. Thus, to bring together the land/title registration officials and the villagers is not easy. Despite high levels of landlessness, the displaced communities are still concerned that lack of land/title registration would make it difficult for them to get compensated for whatever they have remaining. The fact that they have lost their trees and gardens is another major concern."65

The problems caused by the continuing State of Emergency in the region are also highlighted elsewhere in the report. For example, Kudat points out thatthe ability of the DSI to implement and enforce the resettlement action plan is hampered by the security situation. All five provinces affected by the construction of the Ilisu Dam are still under OHAL (that is governed under "extraordinary circumstances" regime) and as Kudat comments "the Ministry of Interior and the military have very different sets of priorities"66 from the DSI. The complexity and magnitude of how best to address the needs of previously displaced population "goes beyond the ability of the project and the solutions require the decisions of security agencies".67

The report also acknowledges that the Turkish Government has failed to give adequate consideration to alternatives to the Ilisu project. This violates both World Bank and OECD guidelines for projects involving involuntary resettlement.68 As Kudat notes:

"While it is today too late for the Ilisu resettlement plan to have an impact on dam design, the public still wants to know whether or not alternatives were considered and whether adverse impacts on settlements could not be reduced, particularly with respect to Hasankeyf's cultural heritage. Although some 10 alternatives were considered at the time the location of Ilisu was selected, the implications of other technical alternatives for resettlement are unknown."69

Although a final resettlement plan was promised by the Turkish authorities for August 2000, the plan has yet to be completed. UK Minister for Trade Richard Caborn claimed in December 2000 that "the timing of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) is less certain but a first stage report could be available around the turn of the year."70 At the time of printing, this first stage report had still not been released.

Flawed Environmental Impact Assessment

Just as there was no resettlement in place when the ECAs first granted provisional approval for Ilisu, so the project lacked an acceptable Environmental Impact Assessment.

According to Balfour Beatty, the Ilisu Consortium was "well aware from the outset of the considerable environmental impact that all hydro-electric power schemes tend to have".71 As soon as it discovered that Turkey had yet to conduct a formal EIA for Ilisu, the consortium therefore commissioned Hydro Concepts to produce one. Subsequently, Balfour Beatty stated that the EIA had confirmed "that there are no problems as regards the potential effects of the project on local flora and fauna, climate, landscape, ground water, earthquake risk, flooding risk, sedimentation and erosion."72 It is impossible to test such claims, since the EIA has yet to be released to the public - despite the threat of legal action by Friends of the Earth under European Union freedom of information legislation.

In December 1999, the UK government released a desk review of the EIA report (though not its crucial annexes) undertaken by Environmental Resources Management (ERM). In addition to highlighting a number of serious impacts that would follow dam construction, such as lowered water quality, ERM deemed that the report did not meet international standards of best practice73 and was deficient in many important respects.

Although ERM described the EIA as "well prepared", it highlighted a number of key areas which the report had entirely overlooked. The report gave no consideration, for example, to the cumulative effects of the dam in conjunction with other projects. No information was made available on the effects of altered river flow on wetlands downstream. In addition: "Little or (in most cases) no details are provided regarding the time-tabling of proposed data collection and mitigation measures, the institutional responsibilities and capacities for their implementation, the estimated resources needed (financial and manpower related) and the proposed methods or sources of finance." And while the dam's supporters claim a clean source of climate-friendly energy, ERM pointed to possible adverse climatic impacts from methane (a potent greenhouse gas) that would be released from rotting organic matter in the dam's reservoir.

The ERM report also warned of serious doubts over the Turkish authorities' institutional capacity to carry out the necessary environmental mitigation measures and stipulated that an "essential pre-condition for ECGD support" should be a requirement to undertake "an outline institutional review" before a decision is taken on whether or not to support the project.74 Despite this recommendation, the UK government not only elected to give conditional approval for the project in the absence of such a review, it also failed to make such a review a condition of export credit support.

Other "essential preconditions" urged by ERM were also rejected by the government. These included ERM's recommendations that:

  • consideration be given "to the formation of an international basin committee (or authority) where any future problems can be aired and addressed";75
  • "full and comprehensive EIAs be carried out to [international best practice] standards prior to any other major infrastructure developments in the region, including the Cizre Dam, other GAP schemes and any major transmission projects associated with the Ilisu Dam";76 and
  • each of the ECAs involved in the project should have "a say (and a right of veto) in the composition and terms of reference" for any independent monitoring panel.

Although the project had already provoked the Syrian government into protesting at the highest possible level over the possibility that the dam - in conjunction with other GAP projects - will be used as a political weapon by the Turkish authorities (see Water Wars - The Risk of Regional Conflict section below), ERM's terms of reference specifically excluded any analysis of "any of the social, economic or political impacts associated with the development."77

A new EIA has now been commissioned by the Ilisu Consortium ("as the original report is now two years old, an update is underway") and is now in the hands of the DSI. Despite promises by the ECGD and other ECAs to release the report, the UK government has acknowledged that it is not in a position to do so, since the EIA is the property of the consortium.

The Destruction of Hasankeyf

The Ilisu reservoir will flood the city of Hasankeyf, situated at a bend in the Tigris around 60 miles south east of Diyarbakir. Historians claim that the first settlers came to Hasankeyf in ancient Mesopotamia as many as 10,000 years ago. Sited on the river in a place of enormous strategic significance, in the intervening years layer upon layer of civilisations have been interwoven or been built on top of each other, yet the caves for which the city is justly famous are still inhabited, in a way of life which is culturally unique. The city is a formidable store of historical information and artefacts, including cave churches, ornate mosques and Islamic tombs, creating an astounding complexity of architectural and religious heritage spanning several civilisations, from the Byzantines and Sassanides through the Omayyads, Abbasides, Hamdanides, Mervanides and Artuks to the Eyyubians and most recently the Ottomans.78

Hasankeyf was awarded complete archaeological protection by the Turkish Department of Culture on April 14, 1978 (decision A-1105) under which the town, in its entirety, should be protected against negative impacts. This indicates that it is not sufficient to preserve individual relics in museums, and that the competent authorities do not judge the destruction of Hasankeyf to be acceptable.79

Balfour Beatty describes Hasankeyf as "the decaying remains of a medieval city".80 The company argues that the city's citadel is on a cliff and would therefore remain safe on a dramatic promontory above the lake. It acknowledges that "lower parts of the town would be flooded", however, "relocation of a few key buildings [is] under consideration" and "none of these buildings [are] considered by UNESCO to be of world importance."81 To date, Turkey has never applied to UNESCO to include Hasankeyf in the World Heritage List - so UNESCO has not been required to express a view on the importance of Hasankeyf, and therefore this claim cannot be made by the company with any veracity. UNESCO can only designate a site as a result of a request made by the State party to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.82

The company has, thus far, clearly and completely failed to appreciate that the greater part of the historical significance of Hasankeyf lies beneath the surface which is currently visible. The citadel is a small fraction of the significance of the site. The flooding of the 'lower parts of the town' would without doubt result in the complete loss to humanity of the cave dwellings themselves, and the rare and unique way of life which still exists within the caves. Whilst moving certain buildings may indeed be a physical possibility, moving the cave dwellings is clearly not, as they have been hewn from the ground over thousands of years.

In the company's view, the Ilisu project might in fact prove to be a catalyst for generating funds for the preservation of the main citadel. The Turkish Ministry of Culture, says the company, is the best body to decide on the merits of rescuing individual buildings and the ECAs involved should request regular reports on the activities of the Ministry of Culture. However, it appears that the Turkish Ministry of Culture has taken no interest whatsoever in Hasankeyf since its designation as a site of cultural heritage to be preserved, twenty-one years ago (see pp. 72-78).

Little or no account has been taken by the project developers of the deep historical and spiritual significance of Hasankeyf to the Kurdish population, both locally and globally. For example, the Kurdish people's equivalent of Romeo and Juliet, the Mem-o-Zin, is set in Hasankeyf - the equivalent of Verona. Many within the Kurdish community see the flooding of Hasankeyf as part of a wider political strategy to eradicate Kurdish culture.

Concern has also been expressed by archaeologists over the destruction of Hasankeyf. In January 2001, Professor Martin Hall, President of the World Archaeological Congress (WAC), wrote to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair expressing "grave concern" over Britain's proposed support for Ilisu and urging its withdrawal from the project.83 WAC argued that the government's condition with respect to the potential cultural impacts of the dam - to "produce a detailed plan to preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible" - is inadequate and unlikely to be met. Inadequate because "the cultural heritage impact of the dam reservoir extends far beyond the purely physical confines of Hasankeyf itself";84 and unlikely to be met because "circumstances prevailing in the region" make it "very difficult to draw up and implement a satisfactory preservation plan." Noting with "particular alarm" that other sites affected by DSI-managed dams - notably the remains of the Roman city of Zeugma, which has now been flooded by the Birecik Dam (see p.72 and also Box 8: The Birecik Dam: The Companies and the Banks)- had only been subject to last minute 'salvage archaeology' operations, WAC states: "Such working conditions can never lend themselves to the fulfillment of the condition set with respect to the archaeological heritage at Hasankeyf." WAC further noted that the cultural impacts of the dam are very likely to be "severe, irreversible and disastrous for long-term social stability within affected communities and in the region generally."

Professor Olus Arik, head of the Turkish State-organised archaeological dig at Hasankeyf, has himself called into question the adequacy of the rescue archaeology mission at Hasankeyf. "We need a minimum of fifty years here and we have just nine or ten - unless of course we can stop the dam," he told History Today.

The Turkish Ministry of Culture is spending about £76,000 on archaeological explorations throughout the area to be flooded by the Ilisu dam and related works downstream. The Hasankeyf archaeology team will receive about £15,000 of this. Professor Arik compares this to a glass of water in the desert.

The mission's official aim - to preserve as much of Hasankeyf as possible and make it into a national museum, with artefacts and selected buildings rescued from the lower and middle towns - is also treated with scepticism by Professor Arik: "We need a proper restitutional project. You can't just carry stones away".85

Water Wars - The Risk of Regional Conflict

Fears have been expressed in a number of quarters that Ilisu - in conjunction with other GAP dams - could severely disrupt the downstream flow of the Tigris to Syria and Iraq, affecting communities reliant on seasonal agriculture and heightening political tensions between Turkey and its neighbours in what is already a volatile region. The fears have been heightened by the armed conflict that has dogged the region since 1984, with Turkey increasingly at odds with Syria for harbouring the PKK.

Turkey is already known for its aggressive water policies. "Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil", President Demirel said when opening the Ataturk Dam in 1992.86 In February 2001, similar views were expressed by Mas'oud Yalmaz, Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, who told the Arab daily newspaper Al-sharq Al-Awsat that Turkey views the Euphrates river as a Turkish river and not an international one. He dismissed Syrian opposition to the series of dams that Turkey is building on the river stating, "The Euphrates reservoir is very important for the future of economic development in Turkey." Despite Yalmaz's assurance that his country is not seeking conflict with Syria, he reiterated the view that Turkey had the right to determine the amount of water allowed to Syria unilaterally, stating, "The division of water will not be equal as the Euphrates, like any other Turkish river, should be basically used for serving the interests of the Turkish people.87

In the past Turkey has already threatened to block water flows to its downstream neighbours: indeed, in the late 1980s, Turkey blocked the flow of the Euphrates for 9 days.88 As a result of dams already built on the Euphrates, combined with drought in the region, the flow of water to Iraq is estimated to have been reduced by 20 per cent.89 Only last year Turkey announced unilaterally that it was going to reduce the flow of the Euphrates to Syria to one third of the previously agreed amount due to severe drought in the region.

Already analysts are stating that wars could be sparked in the region over - and with - water. The spare storage capacity of Ilisu's planned reservoir alone would be sufficient to block the flow of the River Tigris for an average of two to three months per year. Syria, which has for years demanded a mathematical division of the water, has protested to Britain over its involvement in the dam.90 Noting the strategic importance of Turkey's abundant water resources, a report by the UK Defence Forum (a think-tank which advises the government on regional risks) has warned that the GAP project as a whole is:

"one of the region's most dangerous water time bombs. The dispute has not erupted yet because the project has not yet reached its full potential. By the time of its planned completion in 2010, the vital interests involved give it the potential to become one of the region's most dangerous flashpoints."91

The project developers argue that these fears have been overplayed. They contend that:

  • Ilisu is designed for power, not irrigation and that hydro-electric uses do not impair downstream flows;
  • unlike the Euphrates, significant tributaries join the Tigris downstream of the Ilisu site; and
  • the proposed operational regime will ensure a satisfactory level of discharge in all seasons.

Balfour Beatty claims that minimum rates of discharge have now been agreed for the critical impounding period. They also argue that a major objective of the ECAs involved is to agree with the Turkish Government on "a management regime for the flow of water that is consistent with [the UN Convention on Non-Navigational Use of Transboundary Watercourses] but does not require formal assent of any other state".92

The details of the agreement on minimum discharge rates during impoundment are yet to be released. It is therefore impossible to evaluate the extent to which they meet Syria and Iraq's concerns over the project. Moreover, as Tony Juniper, Policy and Campaigns Director for Friends of the Earth (England, Wales and Northern Ireland), notes:

"The assurance that flow rates will be maintained can only be proved in practice. Should Turkey decide in the future to use water for political purposes, there would be little that the participating export credit agencies could do about it. And should disputes over water escalate into conflict, then most of the countries supporting the dam would be under pressure as NATO members to side with Turkey."93

A legal opinion commissioned by Friends of the Earth has concluded that if Turkey fails to consult with its downstream neighbours prior to progressing the Ilisu proposal, it will be in breach of international law.94 The legal implications for ECGD support for the project are significant, according to Juniper:

"Because even the loosest interpretation of export credit rules cannot justify assistance to another country to violate international treaties, then action might be taken in the British courts to challenge any decision by the UK to grant a credit."95

Turkey argues that, from the very beginning, it has informed Syria and Iraq of its plans regarding every GAP project.96 However, in July 2000, the Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs confirmed that:

"the Government of the Republic of Turkey has not officially informed, consulted, or negotiated with us about the implementation of the Ilisu Dam Project on the Tigris as stipulated by the rules of international law and the relevant agreement on the Tigris river and other agreements concluded between the two countries."97

Iraq has similarly stated that "construction of the dam will constitute a breach of international law and it would seriously harm Iraq's rights to the river waters."98 In August 2000, Dr. Fahmy AL-Qaysi, Director of the legal department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated: "The State of Iraq did not receive any official notification from the State of Turkey concerning its plans to construct the Ilisu Dam and learned about the Turkish side intentions through media reports."99

In the UK, ECGD support for the project is therefore vulnerable to legal challenge. Significantly, the UK government has announced that it will require evidence of consultation between Turkey and its downstream neighbours before any export credits for Ilisu are approved.100

Section 2: The mission and its findings

The mission's remit

In response to the widespread international concern over the cultural, social and environmental impacts of the planned Ilisu Dam, the Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) backing the project imposed four conditions that would have to be met by the Turkish government in order for the project to obtain export credit support. The four conditions, announced in December 1999, were as follows:

  1. Draw up a resettlement programme which reflects internationally accepted practice101 and includes independent monitoring;
  2. Make provision for upstream water treatment plants capable of ensuring that water quality is maintained;
  3. Give an assurance that adequate downstream flows will be maintained at all times;
  4. Produce a detailed plan to preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible.

Whilst, on paper, these conditions would go some way to meeting the concerns of critics, there are considerable doubts whether they can or will be met in practice. As already noted (see above p.28), the ECA's own August 2000 review of the Turkish government's draft resettlement plan highlighted a number of concerns, notably regarding the lack of institutional capacity within Turkey to undertake a resettlement programme to international standards. Another set of concerns relates to the ability - and will - of the ECAs themselves to monitor compliance, the rigour with which they will do so, and the political leverage available to them should the Turkish authorities renege on the conditions.

More intractable are the implications for compliance of Turkey's well-documented repression of the Kurdish majority in the region, its abject failure to abide by previous commitments to curb human rights abuses against the local population and its racist policies of enforced assimilation of ethnic Kurds into mainstream Turkish society. Indeed, the continuing conflict in the region is central to the controversy over Ilisu. Human rights abuses - relating to forced evictions and intimidation - have already been documented in connection with the dam and whilst intimidation, torture, denial of freedom of expression and repression remain the norm in the area, the prospects of a just outcome to the project remain distant, if not unattainable.

The Fact Finding Mission and its Remit

In October 2000, an international Fact Finding Mission of Non-Governmental Organisations from the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany and Italy was established under the aegis of the Kurdish Human Rights Project and the Ilisu Dam Campaign. The Mission was charged with:

  1. Assessing the progress being made by the Turkish government in meeting the four conditions laid down by the ECAs; identifying the institutional and other problems that remain outstanding; and evaluating the prospects of their being resolved;
  2. Assessing whether or not the conditions, even if met, are sufficient to bring the project into line with evolving international best practice. The Mission was explicitly charged with reviewing Ilisu in light of new guidelines developed by the World Commission on Dams;
  3. Identifying corporate governance failures in the practices and procedures of the supporting ECAs that have contributed to the controversy over Ilisu; assessing the extent to which these failures will be addressed by new procedures under consideration by the OECD's Working Group on Export Credits; and proposing corrective action;
  4. Evaluating whether or not continued support for Ilisu could be justified by the UK government in the light of new procedures being developed by the UK Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD).

The Fact-Finding Mission visited the Ilisu region from 9th-16th October 2000. The Mission met with affected people, prominent municipal officials, lawyers and local professional associations relevant to the project. By the second day of its day of its visit, after its presence in the region had been noted by the authorities, the Mission was followed by State security police, who also sat in on one interview uninvited. State security police also attended a press conference held by the Mission on its return to Istanbul, threatening that the press conference was illegal.

Members of the Mission also attended the launch of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) in November 2000, conducted informal interviews with a number of Commissioners and with leading members of the WCD Forum, the 68-member consultative group set up by the WCD and consisting of key representatives from government, the private sector, multilateral development agencies and affected communities.

The Mission's Key Findings

The Mission concluded that:

  • The four conditions imposed by the ECAs have yet to be met - and the prospect that they will be met in the future is remote. Whilst the social, political and economic rights of the Kurdish majority in the region remain unrecognised - and indeed repressed - there can be no confidence that the Turkish authorities will abide by the conditions. Serious concerns also exist over the capacity - and will - of the ECAs themselves to monitor and ensure compliance. Export credit support for the project should not therefore be approved.
  • Even if met, the four conditions leave many key concerns (particularly those relating to transparency and human rights) unaddressed and would fail to bring the project up to international standards. The project violates each and every one of the WCD's major policy recommendations and would still be in breach of WCD standards even if the four conditions were met in full.
  • The history of ECA involvement in Ilisu project reveals major deficiencies in current ECA practice and procedure. In particular, the lack of common mandatory standards have encouraged a "band-aid" approach to project financing that works to the detriment of affected communities and industry alike. The OECD Working Party's proposals for ECA reform - particularly its emphasis on "benchmarking" - will exacerbate rather than remedy this deficiency.
  • Continued support for the Ilisu Project is in breach of both the spirit and the letter of the new Business Principles adopted by the ECGD. Ilisu is thus a litmus test of the ECGD's comittment to the new principles: proceeding with the project would signal a fatal lack of purpose in reforming the ECGD and in embracing the principles of sustainable development, as espoused by the UK government.

The Mission's detailed findings from its visit to the area are set out below. Its findings with respect to Ilisu and the World Commission on Dams and export credit agency reform follow in Section 3.

An estimated 78,000 people, most of them ethnic Kurds like these young boys, stand to be affected by construction of the Ilisu Dam.

Evaluating progress in meeting the four conditions

Condition one: "Draw up a resettlement programme which reflects internationally accepted practice and includes independent monitoring"

Under pressure from the Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) backing Ilisu, the Turkish government has promised to undertake a resettlement plan to international standards. In early 2000, the DSI commissioned SEMOR, a Turkish consultancy firm, to undertake surveys of the numbers likely to be affected and their socio-economic conditions in order to draw up a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). Public information available on SEMOR suggests that its past involvement in resettlement is limited to just one other project - the Izmir Water Project. (see Box 5 above: "Your happiness will bring our success"). Independently, the Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) hired Ayse Kudat, a sociologist formerly at the World Bank, to review the draft RAP. Kudat's review - sent to the agencies in early August - highlighted major concerns over the draft plan, including seven violations of World Bank and OECD guidelines (see footnote 103 below).

The Fact-Finding Mission confirmed these concerns. In particular, the Mission found that:

  • Well-documented failures of past and current resettlement projects in Turkey, acknowledged by the Turkish government, have still to be remedied in any substantive way, casting doubts on the value of reassurances received from both the Turkish authorities and the companies that Ilisu oustees will be properly resettled;
  • Doubts still exist as to the true number of people who would be potentially affected;
  • Consultation with the affected people in the Ilisu area has been piecemeal, inadequate, biased in its format and constrained by an atmosphere of intimidation. Some key consultations which the Turkish government apparently claims to have taken place have in reality not occurred;
  • Host communities have not been asked to draw up resettlement plans and their budgetary requirements have not been assessed, in contravention of World Bank standards;
  • The adequacy of the socio-economic surveys required to meet international standards has been questioned; and
  • Lack of capacity and institutional fragmentation render a coherent resettlement programme unachievable. Major institutional reforms will be necessary before there can be any confidence that resettlement will be carried out to international standards. There is also a need to overhaul existing compensation procedures.

The Mission found numerous continuing violations of World Bank and OECD standards with respect to resettlement planning and concluded that the lack of basic freedom of expression, movement and political rights in the region makes the prospect of a just and fair resettlement to international standards unattainable. Moreover, its own experience of being constantly followed by the security forces, in conjunction with evidence that critics of the dam have been intimidated, led the Mission to conclude that whatever measures for independent monitoring are agreed on paper, they are unlikely to be observed in practice.

These concerns are explored in greater detail below.

Confusion over the number of affected people

Originally, the project sponsors and the companies involved in the Ilisu project put the number of people affected at 12,000-16,000.102 Following the findings of a previous Fact-Finding Mission in 1999, this number was increased to 25,000. Subsequently, a report by the British government put the numbers still higher - at 35,000. The Kudat report states that even this figure is a gross underestimate. According to Kudat, 78,000 people would be potentially affected by the project, and she clearly stresses the importance of this higher figure:

"...the RAP should be prepared for the maximum estimate of potentially affected populations. This is justified both on grounds of the international principles used and on the assumption that the affected communities will grow in size."103

The Kudat figure includes those already evicted (or forced to migrate) from the Ilisu reservoir area as result of internal conflict in the region, but who may wish to return once peace is fully restored. Kudat does not give separate figures for this category of affected people, but does point out that 85 of the 183 villages to be affected have already been evacuated.104

The Mission confirmed Kudat's figures for cleared villages, independently obtaining a list of 85 villages which, in many cases, had been burned as a result of security operations carried out by Turkish government forces in the 1980s and 1990s and from which all the residents had been forcibly evicted. The Mission also met with GÖÇ-DER (Immigrants Association for Social Co-operation and Culture), a Turkey-wide NGO providing support for those displaced from the region. From GÖÇ-DER, the Mission learned that a minimum of 45,000 people have already been removed from the reservoir area and possibly upwards of 50,000 (see Box 6: GÖÇ-DER - The Immigrants Association for Social Co-operation and Culture). This is 3-5 times higher than the number acknowledged by the DSI, whose Director-General stated in February 2000: "Perhaps up to 10-15,000 people have moved from [the] area because of economic and security reasons."105

The ECAs should verify whether Kudat's figures were based on similar estimates and, if not, whether this raises the numbers of potentially and actually affected people. If the numbers are higher than Kudat's estimates, the ECAs should insist on a reassessment of the resettlement budget, which has yet to be finalised, in addition to a related re-evaluation of the financial viability of the project.

Doubts on Promises to Trace Missing Villagers

Kudat stipulates that provisions should be made to compensate those who have already displaced from the reservoir area as a result of the war, since, once the dam has been built, they will be unable to return home. This principle has also been accepted by the ECAs and the companies involved in the project and, to its credit, by the Turkish government.

In May 2000, Balfour Beatty told its shareholders that, "a major programme is to be initiated by DSI to trace the former inhabitants of [evacuated] villages and determine their legal rights to compensation."106 The Mission sought to evaluate the DSI's progress in this regard and was considerably concerned to learn that, as of October 2000, no effort had been made by the Turkish authorities to contact GÖÇ-DER, despite its central role and expertise in assisting evicted communities. GÖÇ-DER is one of the few groups in Turkey working with war refugees from the Ilisu area and it is reasonable to assume that it would be a first port of call in any attempt to trace former residents, particularly given the absence of any official government or intergovernmental body monitoring or providing help for refugees from the war. The failure to contact GÖÇ-DER would indicate either a lack of institutional capacity to carry out the DSI's promised programme of research into the whereabouts of former inhabitants, or a lack of political will to do so, or both.

The Mission also learned from interviews with war refugees that no efforts have been made by the DSI to consult directly with those forcibly evicted from the reservoir area with a view to assessing their potential compensation claim. The liabilities that need to be met in any resettlement budget are thus largely unknown.


Box 6: GÖÇ-DER: The Immigrants Association for Social Co-operation and Culture

Founded in 1997 "to establish solidarity among the victims of forced migration and to voice their demands for a humane life," the Turkey-wide non-governmental organisation GÖÇ-DER today provides invaluable support and services for the thousands who have been internally displaced from the Southeast.

Faced with the explosive numbers of refugees who flooded into Istanbul in the mid-1990s because of widespread village destruction and military violence in the Southeast - refugees whose very status as forced migrants was continuously denied by the Turkish State - the founders of GÖÇ-DER decided to offer assistance and support to internal refugees which the Government failed to provide.

In the past four years since it was established, GÖÇ-DER has been able to provide not only desperately needed practical assistance for refugees that includes free medical care, translation assistance and legal advice, it has also provided villagers driven hundreds of miles from their rural homes with a sense of community in the unfamiliar world of Turkey's largest cities. In turn, members of GÖÇ-DER's dedicated staff have been subjected to threats and intimidation campaigns, raids, terms of imprisonment, office closures and lawsuits.

Refugees' lives in the cities are characterised by extreme poverty. Kurds from the Southeast face huge difficulties in securing work because of Turkish discrimination, unfamiliarity with factory work or other types of urban employment or simply because they do not speak Turkish. Children often are forced to beg or to contribute in some way to the family income and so do not go to school. And for all refugees - children as well as adults - the psychological trauma of violence, torture, and destruction of their villages combined with the social trauma of resettlement in shantytowns outside Turkey's largest cities makes for a life of continued miseries and hardship.

Refugees from the Ilisu Dam Region: Testimony

The following excerpts from interviews conducted buy the Mission with refugees at GÖÇ-DER reveal the realities faced by those who have fled from the region of the Ilisu Dam and now live in the shantytowns of Istanbul.

Father of seven from Barae village, Siirt province:

"For seven years I have been living in Istanbul with my family. In the village I had my own house, gardens, apple orchards, vineyards and fields and my own copse. Our economic situation was very good. Our children were going to school and everything was great. At the moment we are living in poverty in Istanbul. My children cannot study properly on account of having to work. I am unemployed and feeling hopeless. My vineyards and apple trees have been unattended for seven years and the trees have shrivelled up. The Ilisu Dam that is to be built in the area means that my remaining property and rights will be submerged under the waters of the dam. My children are working at an age when they should be playing. They are working in the clothing trade. Sometimes the employers do not pay and put us into difficulty. My children have not managed to accustom themselves to city life. They get very bored. It is the same for us, our lives are very monotonous. From home to work, from work back home. I hardly see the faces of my children. We get really fed up. We cannot find here the enthusiasm and excitement that we used to experience at the weddings and on special days in the village in the old days. Only once a year during the religious festivals are we able to visit our village friends to share our troubles and find consolation. We cannot see each other as often as we would like because of the travel costs. In our birthplace we had land, gardens and orchards, and sheep and lambs that the children would take to the pasture to graze. When they returned in the evening everything would be hectic, some would do the milking and others would feed the animals. We would hoe our gardens and prune our trees. In the copses we would wander until the evening, breathing fresh air into our lungs. Now we have none of these things. Our women have nothing but their yearnings and spend all day doing nothing but watching the television. And since there is nothing worth watching on TV we are living a life of imprisonment in our own homes. The locals in Istanbul look on us as foreigners. Even neighbours to not ask how we are and do not even exchange the most basic greetings. Since leaving my home district I have not breathed any proper fresh air. We long for the village conversations and the greenery of the natural environment. We live with a constant stress inside us. We used to receive many visitors at festivals. Here even if we died no one would know. No one visits us. In Istanbul my lungs hurt and a feeling of yearning never leaves me. The fact that our land is to be submerged by the waters of the future Ilisu Dam makes things even worse. As if it's not enough for us to be here as the victims of injustice, the fact that the places where we spent our childhood are to be submerged intensifies our distress. In order for my losses and my rights to be secured I request our association to take the necessary steps and for the building of the dam to be prevented."

Mother of nine from Çelik village, Mardin province:

"We were forced to leave the village and move to the city in 1993. I have been very adversely affected by city life. Most nights I cannot sleep for wondering about the village and due to the adverse aspects of city life. I feel depressed and tense. In my apartment block there are 20 Turkish families and only one Kurdish family. I do not speak the language of any of my neighbours. I cannot do the shopping as I don't speak Turkish. When I go out it is as if life is closed to me. In the village our economic and social situation was very good. We had a tractor, fields, orchards, cows, sheep, chickens and geese and our crops were abundant. Our land was well irrigated, we worked, mother and father, and nourished our children and were able to send them to school. After our village was evacuated and burnt in 1993 we lost everything, our property was burnt, including our animals and household goods. We could not even rescue a spoon. First we moved to Dargecit. Our tractor was not in the village so by chance was saved, but our trailer and other equipment for sowing were burned. We sold our tractor and tried to live off some land we had bought long before in Dargecit. We could not make ends meet in Dargecit. I sent my 8 and 10 year old children to stay with my sibling who lives in Istanbul. The children did shoe shining on the street and sent us the money. My husband went to work in Russia, Libya and Saudi Arabia. We stayed in Dargecit for 4 years. We were unable to make ends meet so went to Istanbul hoping to find work. My husband has been unable to find work. Two of my daughters, aged 12 and 15 are working and providing for the household. In the village we knew and got on well with everyone. We used to borrow and lend things to each other. We used to help each other at weddings, religious holidays and festivals. We were happy in the village. I am living in Istanbul by dreaming of our music and customs in the village. Sometimes in the village we would perform the traditional dances until after midnight. We cannot do any of our embroidery, cradle designs or woollen and other handicrafts. We do not have the materials or the environment. We want to return to our village in an atmosphere without repression, interrogation and beating. We are opposed to the dam being built and are living with this hope. We demand that the state pays for the losses caused to us by the security forces. For years we have put up with problems in the city but when we go back to the village we want to go freely without fear."

Male village representative from Balcelik village, Mardin province:

"In the village we carried out farming and animal husbandry. That is, we were our own bosses. At harvest time we were in the village, the rest of the time we went to the city to work. We were better off than we are now. Repression began in 1992. I was a village representative....On several occasions I was subjected to torture. I was beaten and then released. This continued until 22 July 1993 when our village was burnt. I was in the village when it was burnt. Gunfire began in the evening. We knew from previous threats that if we were caught we would be killed. Those of us who were able to saved themselves. When we returned to the village we encountered a complete ruin...it was a dreadful sight. There were dead animals everywhere. They had killed seven people from our village and the bodies had been burnt to prevent recognition. There was nothing we could salvage of our property. After staying in neighbouring villages for a week we hired a vehicle and moved to Istanbul with two other families. Since my brother was here he helped us. We were able to survive thanks to the assistance of our relatives. We have still not recovered and have suffered both emotionally and economically. Our village had lots of historical artefacts. Now we have been forced to live in Istanbul. Now we hear that our village is to be submerged by the waters of the dam. The only thing that was keeping us going here was the hope that one day we would return to our village. We are living in very reduced circumstances. We work when we can find work, the rest of the time we are unemployed. We want our association to secure the conditions so that we may return to the village. At the moment we cannot dare to return while repression continues. Our only hope is still to return, to go freely to my land, gardens and orchards."


Unrealistic Assumptions on Compensation Claims

According to Kudat, the majority of those evicted from the reservoir area as a result of the war are unlikely to claim compensation:

"It may be safe to assume that less than half of the partially impacted among them would return to their communities between now and 6-7 years from now when the dam might be complete. The remaining may no longer be interested in pursuing compensation if all they have left is a largely destroyed traditional home. A similar assumption may be entertained for the fully affected vacant communities as well."107

The Mission challenges this view, which it holds to be superficial and lacking in evidence. War refugees from the reservoir area were emphatic in interviews with the Mission that they would seek compensation if their land were flooded by the dam. The Mission has no doubts that this view is widely-held within the refugee community.

It is important to stress, however, that those interviewed were primarily seeking justice and an acknowledgement of their rights, and not just monetary recompense. It is equally important to note that many refugees may feel constrained from seeking compensation due to financial constraints, lack of public funding, fear of being unable to prove land titles and a general climate of intimidation against the population's use of the legal system.

This atmosphere also makes it difficult for those previously displaced by the war to submit an official request to go back to their land. Kudat's assumption that "the governor's office list of people who have signed up to return to those displaced communities affected by Ilisu should provide one indication [of the likelihood of return]"108 therefore seems highly unrealistic.


Box 7: Problems Obtaining Compensation

The Mission met with lawyers who specialised in compensation for those who have been evicted from their homes as result of GAP infrastructure developments. The Mission learned:

  1. There is no public funding available to people who wish to appeal against the sums awarded in compensation for the value of land appropriated by DSI. Consequently, only those who can afford to do so will make an application to the domestic court for the sums awarded in compensation to be varied upwards. This appears to be a small proportion of the many who feel that they have not been given adequate compensation in the first place. In general, it appears that compensation is awarded at a level of about 1million Turkish Lire (TL) per hectare, and on appeal, that level is raised to between 6-7 million TL per hectare, a sum which is generally thought to reflect the value of the land more accurately.
  2. Even where the domestic court finds in favour of the application, and re-calculates the sum to be awarded, the Government frequently takes a very considerable time to pay the sum. This is in contravention of Article 46 of the Constitution, which states inter alia that "Indemnity for expropriation will be paid immediately and in cash....a part of an indemnity not paid thus will be subject to indemnity costs and the maximum level of interest payable on debts of the State."
  3. Calculation of compensation appears to be confined to the issue of the value of the land which is being appropriated. There appears to be no mechanism by which other consequential losses can be reflected in any award, for example the loss of the farmed fruit trees which have been the basis of a fruit farmer's business. There appears to be no mechanism which reflects the discomfort caused by an obligation to re-locate, and no financial mechanism which reflects the numerous consequential losses which flow from the relocation of an entire community. There appears to be no body of litigation emerging to indicate that other types of compensation for those who are not landowners are being tested in the Turkish courts.
  4. The economic situation within Turkey over the period in question has been so extremely volatile that inflation rates have generally been exceptionally high. It is a matter of fact that inflation rates between 1994 and 1997 ran as high as 97% per annum.

False Claims over Improved Resettlement Practices

Both Kudat and the companies involved in Ilisu have acknowledged problems with resettlement in the past. As Kudat comments: "In the Turkish context, past failures have been particularly severe with respect to inadequate and inappropriate delivery of resettlement housing, lack of concern with the well-being of self-settlers, transparent participation of affected populations in resettlement decisions, and monitoring of social impacts during and after dam construction."109

Balfour Beatty, however, has argued that Turkey's resettlement procedures now meet international standards. According to a briefing prepared by Balfour Beatty in 1999:

"Turkish laws and procedures regarding resettlements have been amended over recent years and adapted to internationally comparable standards. The experience with already completed hydroelectric projects has led to noticeable improvements of the relevant legal basis. In particular, the principles have been established that all persons affected by a resettlement - regardless of their status - will, at their choice, either be resettled with a new house or land, or given monetary compensation sufficient to set up business in a town or city."110

The Turkish authorities - which vigorously defend their past record on resettlement111 - similarly point to the resettlement of the 30,000 people relocated as a result of the Birecik Dam as evidence of their commitment to ensuring "participatory" resettlement and their success in delivering improved local living standards. The resettlement programme, administered with funding from the United Nations' Development Programme (UNDP), started in 1997112 and the reservoir began filling in December 1999 (see Box 8 below: The Birecik Dam: The Companies and the Bank).


Box 8: The Birecik Dam: The Companies and the Banks

The 672 MW Birecik Dam and Hydroelectric dam on the River Euphrates, close to the Syrian border, has been extolled by the Turkish authorities both as a model for future project finance and as a testament to its commitment to sustainable development.113

Built on a "Build Operate Transfer" (BOT) basis, with the private sector putting up the DM 1,853.4 million financial package for the dam, Birecik has been described as the biggest BOT hydroelectric project in the world. The deal, which is underwritten by the Turkish Treasury, was initially delayed by political wrangling and concern over political risk and the legal status of BOT contracts. These, however, were resolved after the Turkish courts ruled that BOTs are commercial contracts rather than concessions: any contractual dispute would therefore have to be settled through international arbitration, rather than in the Turkish courts. The ruling also permitted a more favourable tax regime.

The dam is projected to produce 2.5 billion kWh of energy annually and the dam reservoir will also irrigate 70.000 hectares of arid land in the Gaziantep and Araban plains. After a 15-year operating period to recoup construction financing, and make profits, the construction consortium will transfer the plant to the government without any charge.

The dam, whose reservoir began to fill in 2000, was built by a consortium headed by Germany's Philipp Holzmann AG (16.9%) with Gama Industrie AS (18%) as the local partner. Other firms involved included: Strabag AG (8.4%) from Austria,114 GEC Alsthom ACEC Energie SA (7.4%) from Belgium, GEC Alsthom Nyperc SA, CEGELEC ACEC SA, CEGELEC SA from France, Sulzer Hydro Gmbh from Switzerland and Verbundplan Gmbh from Austria.

Chase Manhattan Bank acted as the financial advisor to the Birecik BOT venture. A commercial loan of DM 464.4 million, repayable over 7.5 years, was from a syndicate of 44 banks repayable over 7.5 years and a further DM 327 million came from equity contributions from the BOT consortium members. Export credits were obtained from Germany's Hermes, France's COFACE, Belgium's OND and Austria's Oesterreichische Kontrollbank, with each portion being syndicated by a domestic banking firm - including Germany's Bayerische Landesbank, France's Societe Generale, Belgium's Generale Bank and Austria's Girozentrale Vienna.115


In February 2000 - several months after the villagers had already been moved - Mr. Kaya Yasinok, Vice-President of the GAP Administration, told a seminar hosted by the Turkish Embassy in London:

"Our approach to the resettlement of the people affected by the Birecik Dam Project assumes that the adverse consequences of resettlement can be minimised through careful planning and intervention ... The [resettlement] project involves the participation of people living in 45 affected settlements, and addresses such issues as the selection of sites for resettlement, economic investments in new areas and employment ... As part of GAP's commitment to the principles of sustainability and participation, local people and all the relevant parties are informed about each stage of the project ... At every stage of the project, local people and other parties are involved and their participation is ensured ... [The plan] explicitly includes a process which assists in the adaptation to a new mode of life ... [The] ultimate aim is to enable individuals to attain a higher standard of living than they experienced before the project."116

Such claims are important, since Turkey's past and current track record on resettlement provides the best indication available of the likely outcome at Ilisu. The Mission was therefore gravely concerned to learn of serious resettlement failures at Birecik:

  • Far from the resettlement programme being participatory, the inhabitants of approximately 18 villages located in the area close to the construction sites were forcibly evacuated by soldiers in 1996 and 1997 and received no compensation at all.
  • Over a thousand villagers from Kavalica, a village close to Halfeti, were forced to abandon their homes and belongings when they awoke to find their homes partially submerged by the rising reservoir. Project officers had failed to alert them of the rising waters. The villagers had not left their houses because they were still waiting to receive compensation promised by the government.
  • Numerous families received no compensation whatsoever, because they did not have land rights, and still have not been given houses despite promises that they would be re-housed. Several cases contesting compensation have been taken to European Court of Human Rights (see Box 10: European Court of Human Rights Cases Relating to GAP);
  • Villagers who have been moved to new resettlement sites complained that their new houses are over-crowded and had not even been finished when they moved in. Leaking ceilings appears to be a common complaint. One oustee told the Mission, "In the new villages, it is like death";
  • The Mission was also deeply shocked to learn of the apparent indifference shown by the project authorities to the loss of ancestral graveyards to the reservoir. No assistance was given to villagers to move their graveyards. Where tombs were moved, it was only because villagers used their own money and labour to move them. The psychological impact on many villagers of seeing their ancestral graves flooded is reported to have been severe. As a member of the Chamber of Architects in Diyarbakir told the Mission: "People were psychologically devastated because they watched their cemeteries going underwater ...When people realised that they would leave their ancestors' graves under water, they didn't want to leave anymore"117
  • Of particular concern is the complete absence of any viable employment for those resettled. The displaced villagers, having been moved into the State's shoddily constructed housing units (on which they will also have pay rent for the next 3 years), find themselves in desolate areas where the government's promised commercial centres and factory jobs have not materialised. One evicted villager mourned the end of nearly three centuries of fruit farming which his family had practised on the same land uninterrupted since the 1700s. He and his family had lost their home, their livelihood, and their way of life, which included a sense of cultural continuity. They had been re-housed on a hill overlooking the Birecik reservoir, and he had secured temporary work as a security guard at what little remained of the archaeological site at Zeugma (known as Apamea-Seleucia in ancient times, one of the most important trade and cultural centres of the Hellenistic period and referred to by modern-day archaeologists as "a second Pompeii"). Knowing his job was short-lived, he saw no realistic possibility of further work in the area and had a bleak picture of his family's fate.
  • One result of this lack of economic opportunity is that those who received compensation are rapidly running through their savings. Many see no prospect other than emigration to local conurbations, where services are already overstretched and unemployment levels are high.

These findings are particularly significant - and disturbing - given that the resettlement debacle at Birecik was taking place at the very time that the Turkish authorities and companies were reassuring the international community, including Export Credit Agencies, that everyone would be properly compensated and that there would be no repeat of previous resettlement failures, such as that at Ataturk (see Box 14: Ataturk' Victims: The Continuing Misery). The Mission recommends that no export credits be approved for Ilisu until there is clear, independently verified evidence that the problems of past resettlement have been satisfactorily addressed and resolved.


Box 9: Resettlement - Improving Prospects or Slow Death

As numerous commentators acknowledge, involuntary resettlement is a traumatic process, regardless of one's social or economic background. The World Bank, for example, has stated:

"When people are forcibly moved, production systems may be dismantled, long-established residential settlements are disorganized, and kinship groups are scattered. Many jobs and assets are lost. Informal social networks that are part of daily sustenance systems - providing mutual help in childcare, food security, revenue transfers, labour exchange and other basic sources of socio-economic support - collapse because of territorial dispersion. Health care tends to deteriorate. Links between producers and their consumers are often severed, and local labour markets are disrupted. Local organizations and formal and informal associations disappear because of the sudden departure of their members, often in different directions. Traditional authority and management systems can lose leaders. Symbolic markers, such as ancestral shrines and graves, are abandoned, breaking links with the past and with peoples' cultural identity. Not always visible or quantifiable, these processes are nonetheless real. The cumulative effect is that the social fabric and economy are torn apart."

NGOs working on the issue concur, as do academics who have researched the psychological and cultural impacts of resettlement. As Ackerman points out,

"Even where planning is effective, some (especially the aged) will never come to terms with their new homes. For them the transition period ends only with death."118

In the case of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, the psychological and social traumas of resettlement are exacerbated by the discrimination that they frequently face from mainstream society; by the strong cultural, economic and religious ties that often bind them to their particular land; and, in many cases, by a past history of oppression, dislocation and exploitation.

All too often, forced resettlement can thus prove the final blow to their integrity as a people. What may appear to planners as a minor impact119 - the submergence of ancestral graves, for example, or even specific forest glades or river pools - can have serious social repercussions, since the economic and religious life of many communities - particularly indigenous communities - is often linked to specific topography of their lands.

According to one NGO leader interviewed by the Mission, the toll of cultural alienation amongst those resettled from villages to cities as a result of dams already built in the GAP region is already apparent: "There has been a high rate of suicide from those resettled from villages to make way for the dams-largely women between the ages of 17 and 21 years old. Twenty-eight committed suicide in four months in Batman alone (which has a population of 300,000). This is from the effects of 17 years of war but it is greatly worsened by the resettlement problems."

The Mission also heard many stories that indicate the resettlement programmes (including Birecik) have failed to better people's lives because they presume a cultural homogeneity between the city dwellers and villagers which does not exist. Said one prominent attorney working to assist resettled villagers, "Resettled populations are like foreigners in the cities. There are serious economic and cultural problems in adaptation. One of the most serious problems is that they did not know how to spend or invest their compensation. Businesses had a high rate of failure and money evaporated after the resettled people fell prey to phoney partnerships with crooked partners ...Some families emigrated, some people left families behind, many went into debt. I remember very few families that actually did well. There is a traditional family network of support that they can draw on but this increases inner family debt, destroying family bonds and family conflicts consequently arise ...Local management systems are traditionally feudal, with one top dog getting most of the money from compensation. In some cases, this person got it all. But the majority of those that got any money got only enough to buy a house and start a small business. Most people got nothing."

World Bank resettlement standards require that those resettled should not be worse off than before they were moved. There are abundant past andcurrent resettlement failures that show quite clearly that this condition is not being met in Turkey's Southeast despite assurances to the contrary by project proponents.


Lack of Land Titles

The terms of compensation for Ilisu have yet to be announced.120 The experience of those relocated by other GAP projects, however, has set a precedent which does not give rise to any expectation that compensation will be prompt, adequate or effective. Turkish law on resettlement has frequently been flouted and poorer, landless oustees have suffered disproportionately. In the case of the Ataturk and, most recently, the Birecick dams, for example, it was predominantly landowners who were compensated for resettlement: those who lacked title to land did not get compensated despite assurances that they would be.

It is therefore of grave concern that the vast majority of people in the Ilisu reservoir area lack titles to land. In Hasankeyf, for example, the Mission confirmed Kudat's estimates that the vast majority are landless. Within the project area as a whole, it has been estimated that only a fifth of those who would be affected have title to their land.121

Assurances from the Turkish authorities that those without title will be compensated must be treated with extreme caution. Past experiences suggest that such assurances are more honoured in the breach than in the observance. In Hasankeyf, the Mission learned that residents who were forced out of the caves in the 1960s were provided with houses, but that they were not awarded title to them until three years ago - at which point they had to pay for the houses, even though they had already paid for them when they first moved in. The experience at Birecik is also significant, given that the authorities failed to fulfil promises to compensate those without land.

The Mission notes with considerable concern that land registries do not even exist for some of the villages that would be affected by Ilisu. According to the Kudat report: "It is of utmost importance for DSI to provide guidance by earmarking the lands that are to fall under the reservoir for partially affected displaced communities. DSI should establish procedures to do so for the large number of displaced settlements without a land/title registration system."

The Mission also notes with great concern that those deprived of access to pasture lands because of the dam's reservoir will not be compensated under current compensation law, in contravention of OECD guidelines. The OECD guidelines state: "Customary land ownership and usufruct rights must be recognised for compensation purposes to avoid the destitution of former users."

Kudat acknowledges that "access to pasture lands commonly held by the communities ... will be jeopardised in communities that will be fully affected." Those forced to sell their cattle, however, will not be entitled to compensation. According to Kudat:

"The national legal framework does not address the issue of common property resources for pasture in a comprehensive manner. The policy vacuum with respect to common property resources has so far meant the disregard of the potential income restoration for the livestock owners."122

The Mission recommends that no export credits be awarded until land registration has been satisfactorily completed and the right to compensation for the loss of common property resources secured in law. This is important not only to ensure that landless families currently living in the reservoir area are properly compensated in the event of the dam being built, but also to ensure that those (possibly as many as 50,000) who have been forced to migrate from the reservoir area due to the conflict also receive just compensation.


Box 10: European Court of Human Rights Cases Relating to GAP

The Mission met with lawyers in Birecik, and asked what remedies were available in the courts to people whose lands were expropriated. The lawyers indicated that there were a large number of cases which were currently being adjudicated in the European Court of Human Rights.

The Mission later obtained transcripts of two settlements and one judgement in cases which have been taken to the European Court of Human Rights. In each case the applications had been based upon the premise that the delay in the payment of the compensatory award was so great that it amounted to violations of Article 6 and Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 1, 1st Protocol states that:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No-one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by general principles of international law."

Yasar and others v Turkey. (Judgment): Case Numbers 27697/95 and 27698/95

Applications were made to ECHR by Yasar and seventeen others concerning violations of their rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol.

In August 1988, the DSI indicated its intention to expropriate land at the village of Bagacik, as part of its dam-building plans. Transfer of title in the land took place on 1st June and 1st September 1992, with compensation of 30,790,000TL and 34,456,100TL (65,240,100 TL in total) being paid to the Applicants. Appeals were lodged in the Court of first instance for the awards to be re-assessed in late 1992. (The case numbers were 93/93 and 93/109). The tribunal ordered that an expert opinion should be sought to value the land. The expert report was then contested by DSI, and a second report commissioned. Subsequently, in respect of 93/93, DSI was ordered to make a further payment of 91,824,379 TL, which sum included a simple interest rate of 30% pa, calculated from the dates on which the title had passed, on 1st September 1992. In respect of 93/109, DSI was ordered to make a similar further payment of 187,000,000TL, the interest being calculated from 1st June 1992. The Court of Appeal confirmed these judgements on 20th October 1992.

On 10th October 1996, the Appellants in Case 93/93 received 209,230,000TL, and in Case 93/109, the Appellants received 432,607,000TL. During the relevant period, the interest attracted by debts of the State was running at 7% per month, ie 84% pa. (Article 51, Law 6183, and Rule 89/14915 of the Council of Ministers) However, according to Law 3095, interest payable on State debts was calculated at 30% pa during the period concerned. Between 1994 and 1996, the ECHR found as a matter of fact that inflation in Turkey was running at 93.76%

The Applicants to the European Court of Human Rights submitted that there were breaches of their rights under 1st Protocol, Article 1, since four years had passed since the original first instance rulings, and two years since the Appeal Court had confirmed their award of further compensation. This delay in payment, coupled with the dire economic state of the Turkish economy, amounted to the breaches of which they now complained. They also submitted that there was no means in Turkish law by which they could enforce against the State for money owed to them.

In its judgement, the Court considered the margin of appreciation to which a State is entitled, in the determining of interest rates, bearing in mind the State's obligations to its citizens. It also considered that a balance must be struck, between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community at large. It referred to previous jurisprudence, in which the nature and degree of prejudice caused by delay was considered. [Akkus v Turkey, 9th July 1997], Lithgow and others v United Kingdom 8th July 1986]. It concluded that the delay between the final judgement and payment of the compensation lay at the hands of the Turkish government, and that it had caused disproportionate prejudice to the Applicants. The delay, coupled with the length of the procedure which the Applicants had had to endure, did not reflect an appropriate balance between the rights of the property owning individual and the community at large. There had been a violation of Article 1, 1st Protocol. Compensation, damages and costs of the hearings in the domestic courts were therefore payable, in the total sum of $24,895 US, (interest on the judgement at 6% pa).

BT and others v Turkey. (Settled): Case Numbers 26093/94 and 26094/94

Nine applications were joined in this case. DSI gave notice of its intention to expropriate three areas of land at Bulanik, as part of its dam-building programme in 1990. Compensation became payable at the date on which the three parcels of land were expropriated. In August 1992 the applicants appealed to the domestic court of first instance, for the level of the award to be re-assessed. Their applications were given three separate numbers, 92/51, 92/65 and 92/70. The domestic court ruled in November 1992 that the level of each of the three awards should be raised, and it calculated new sums payable in respect of each piece of land. The sums incorporated damages, and interest at 30% pa, to be calculated from the date at which title in the land had been transferred, which had occurred in July and November 1992. These judgements were confirmed in the Court of Appeal in May, November and April 1993 respectively.

Compensation was finally paid in respect of 92/51 in November 1996, three years and six months after the Appeal Court ruling; in respect of 92/65, one year and nine months after the Appeal Court ruling, and in respect of 92/96, three years and nine months after the Appeal Court ruling.

These cases were not pursued by the Applicants, upon the Turkish government settling the matter by undertaking to pay to the Applicants the sum of 23,200$US, which figure included compensation and costs.

V.N.K. and 44 others v Turkey. (Settled): Case Numbers 29888-96/96

DSI expropriated land in 1993 in the village of Tekaagac. The Applicants appealed to the domestic court of first instance for the award of compensation to be re-assessed. Between 1993 and 1995, thirty-one appeals were successful. Between 1994 and 1995, these judgements were confirmed in the Court of Appeal. Applications were made to the Strasbourg Court between 1995 and 1997, during which time payment was made by DSI, with delays having amounted to between eleven and twenty three months between judgement and payment. On 12th August 2000, the Turkish government settled the matters, by paying US$66,840 to the applicants, which again reflected compensation costs and interest.


Inadequate Consultation

International standards require full consultation with affected communities, in addition to a full socio-economic survey. World Bank guidelines state:

"The affected hosts and resettlers need to be systematically informed and consulted during preparation of the resettlement plan about their options and rights."123

And again:

"Resettlement plans should be based on recent information about the scale and impact of resettlement on the displaced population. In addition to describing standard household characteristics, socio-economic surveys should describe (a) the magnitude of displacement; (b) information on the full resource base of the affected population, including income derived from informal sector and non-farm activities, and from common property; (c) the extent to which groups will experience total or partial loss of assets; (d) public infrastructure and social services that will be affected; (e) formal and informal institutions...; (f) attitudes on resettlement options. Socio-economic surveys, recording the names of affected families, should be conducted as early as possible..."124

The Kudat report notes that a total of 2,100 households have been consulted, covering 45 settlements, a third of households in Hasankeyf, and "over 100" displaced households. This is out of a total of 183 settlements to be affected by the Ilisu dam. In effect, less than a third of the settlements affected have been surveyed. Others, admits Kudat, were not consulted because of the security situation in the region: "Some communities, although not displaced, were not accessible for security reasons at the time of the socio-economic surveys."

The Fact-Finding Mission interviewed villagers in Hasankeyf who expressed concern over the consultation process. They stated that SEMOR, the consultancy firm contracted by the DSI, had interviewed 300 people of whom 80 per cent were illiterate or could not speak Turkish. The women and elderly people had to work through translators provided by SEMOR rather than family members, which many found socially awkward. The villagers were told that the decision to build the dam had been taken and they were then given options as to how they would like to be resettled: did they want a new village elsewhere? or cash to resettle by themselves? how many rooms would they need in their new houses? would they like to work on dam construction? It is important to note that the villagers were not offered compensation in land - a breach of World Bank guidelines which "encourage 'land for land' approaches, providing replacement land at least equivalent to the lost land".125 As the Kudat report states, there is hardly any land available and what little there is would, according to Kudat, probably not be acceptable resettlement land to the villagers.126

A questionnaire in Turkish was handed out to villagers in Hasankeyf and some neighbouring settlements. The first question asked villagers whether or not they were in favour of the dam. Many told the Mission that they felt that they had no option but to answer in the affirmative, although opposed to a dam that would flood Hasankeyf. This was in part due to the perception that the dam was a fait accompli and, in part, due to their experience that opposition to the dam is misconstrued by the authorities as evidence of sympathy for the PKK movement.

Villagers told the Fact-Finding Mission that they were concerned that the answers they gave to the questionnaire may have been subsequently altered. They stated that SEMOR representatives filled the forms in with pencil, but asked them to sign the form in ink. As one villager commented, "We are worried that our answers were changed when SEMOR got back to their hotel." Because the Fact-Finding Mission was unable to see copies of the questionnaires used, it was unable to pursue this matter further. It strongly recommends that ECAs request copies of the original documents.

Representations made by villagers to the Mission led it to conclude that the socio-economic survey undertaken by SEMOR may not have been as rigorous as claimed in the Kudat report. Villagers interviewed in a settlement outside Hasankeyf told the Mission that SEMOR had questioned them about the yields of their harvest, the ownership of the houses, the number of animals they owned and other issues related to their socio-economic status. However, villagers interviewed in Hasankeyf were adamant that no such questions had been put to them in the questionnaires they completed.

The Mission acknowledges that it interviewed only a small sample of villagers during its visit. Nevertheless, the consistency with which villagers of Hasankeyf denied being asked about their socio-economic status merits investigation by ECAs.

It is clear that no efforts have been made by the authorities to consult directly with local municipal officials in Hasankeyf on the resettlement plan or other issues related to the dam. Officials interviewed told the Mission that they had not been consulted on the archaeological rescue plan for Hasankeyf. No one in Hasankeyf and Batman to whom the Mission spoke had seen a copy of the draft Resettlement Action Plan - or indeed heard from SEMOR since its one week visit to the area.

The Fact-Finding Mission was disturbed by the pressure that has clearly been exerted on Hasankeyf residents to express support for the dam. The Mission was told of a recent visit by a Swedish delegation to the town when banners were displayed in favour of the dam, carrying slogans such as "I love my country, I love my dam". No banners opposing the dam were permitted. The Mission also heard of the difficulties that villagers have had in organising events to express the opposition to the dam. In June 2000, for example, the Save Hasankeyf Platform had organised a festival to celebrate Hasankeyf, but permission was denied for any petition to be circulated and for any interviews to be given to the press. Given the very serious consequences attendant on being suspected of sympathising with the PKK, the authorities' association of opposition to Ilisu with separatism is a major deterrent to any meaningful dissent. Put bluntly, people are frightened to take a public position against the dam. In February 2000, the mayor of Hasankeyf cut short a visit to Europe, where he was scheduled to talk to the Minister responsible for the UK ECGD, after receiving anonymous death threats.

However, the Mission was told by the muhtar (the elected headperson of a village) of Hasankeyf, "I am now declaring that we don't want a dam that would flood Hasankeyf. If you see anything written or said by me to the contrary, it is because I have either been put under pressure or my statements have been falsified".

It is perhaps significant that the Mission was repeatedly told by those it interviewed that, in their opinion, the dam would not be built if it was in western Turkey, or that there would be a better chance of voicing opposition in the West. Many also considered the dam to be a tool for crushing their Kurdish identity.

Host communities

International guidelines stipulate that host communities - those which will receive the people evicted by Ilisu - must be consulted.

The Kudat report claims that such consultations have taken place. However, all of the information gathered by the Fact-Finding Mission indicated the reverse.

The Kudat report claims that "Consultations were held with governors, mayors and representatives of the government agencies responsible for RAP implementation." However, the Mission specifically asked the Mayors of Diyarbakir and Batman whether or not they or their office had been consulted. The Mission was told that no such consultation had taken place.

Both Mayors stressed the problems that the two cities were already experiencing in providing infrastructures - schools, hospitals, health care, sewage, etc. - for the existing population, which has massively swelled because of immigration due to the upheavals of the conflict and the forced eviction of many villages.

Major efforts are being made to address these issues and, in Diyarbakir, the Mayor expressed confidence that, with international funding, current infrastructure development (including 50,000 to 60,000 new houses) "would enable the city to deal with the problems of past immigration". However, an influx of new migrants from Ilisu would place a number of additional strains on infrastructure with which neither city could cope without central government funding. No request has been made by the central government to either Diyarbakir or Batman to produce a report about their funding requirements and no promises of funding have been forthcoming. The Mission also notes that village and town level officials have not been given the opportunity to meet with their counterparts in areas where people are being settled from past dams. The opportunity of learning from past experience is therefore being lost.

The Mayor of Batman stressed his concerns over further immigration to the city, noting that in addition to infrastructure problems, the number of people committing suicide in the city has risen threefold in the last 15 years. This problem is, in his view, directly related to the traumas of village evictions, subsequent migration and the problems the villagers have encountered in trying to settle and start a new life. As the Mayor commented, "Immigration from those resettled into Batman is a great concern....There is a conflict in cultures between those that are resettled here and those that are already here....It is the adaptation process that is difficult. There is already 50 per cent unemployment, infrastructure problems, sewage problems, colonisation problems...and health facilities, schools, etc. are not adequately funded."

The failure to consult host communities and their elected representatives breaches World Bank guidelines on two counts. First, the guidelines require such a consultation: "The [resettlement] plan should address and mitigate resettlement's impact on host populations. Host communities and local governments should be informed and consulted ... Conditions in host communities should improve, or at least not deteriorate."127 Second, the guidelines require a detailed resettlement budget to be prepared as part of the Resettlement Action Plan: "Where large-scale population displacement is unavoidable, a detailed resettlement plan, timetable and budget are required."128 Without a detailed assessment of the budgetary requirements of the host communities, any budget proposed under the RAP would misrepresent the true scale of resettlement costs and overestimate the financial viability of the project. The Mission notes that assessing these budgetary requirements will require detailed and lengthy consultation and research over a period of several months. ECAs should ensure that such a budget for host communities is in place - and properly assessed - before accepting the Resettlement Plan.

The failure of the Turkish authorities to assess the budgetary needs of the host communities adds to - and reinforces - concerns already raised by the Kudat report, which noted that, as of the beginning of August 2000, no resettlement budget had yet been prepared for the project. Kudat also suggested that a paper commitment from the Turkish authorities to make the money available cannot be trusted:

"A resettlement budget is yet to be prepared and is likely to exceed previous estimates. The key challenge will be for the national budget to provide a convincing commitment by the State to this budget."129

Relying on Presumed Economic Growth to Relieve Post-Project Impacts - A Breach of Standards

According to international standards, resettlement projects should ensure that those resettled are not worse off than they were before the project.130 Relying on future economic growth alone to restore or improve the living standards of a displaced population is specifically discouraged under World Bank guidelines. The World Bank states:

"Normally, general economic growth cannot be relied upon to protect the welfare of the project-affected population."131

It is clear from the Kudat report, however, that the proposed resettlement plan breaches these two key guidelines. Kudat notes, for example, that securing the livelihoods of landless and poorer people will be dependent on future growth in the region:

"Whether post project situations will improve ... depends on the developments of the next decade that currently appear to be positive but are difficult to predict with any certainty."132

Kudat also says:

"Whether the poor among the affected populations could be worse off depends on the near term economic and political outlook of the region."133

And:

"While it is unlikely that rural resettlement could be managed to restore completely and/or improve incomes in all cases, urban opportunities will grow and could be managed to the advantage of affected populations."134

The Kudat report itself acknowledges that "it is generally risky to build a resettlement plan solely on the basis of a region's development."135 In a tacit admission that such development is by no means assured, the report recommends that, in the case of host communities, "the RAP should ... consider host community needs should the expected positive regional developments not take place in a timely fashion."136

Significantly, the Kudat report clearly spells out the failure of past GAP projects to benefit affected communities, causing significant social problems and economic impoverishment. A footnote is more explicit:

"The urban centres of the Southeast Turkey that received high levels of migrants suffer from widespread unemployment and poverty. Educational levels are high and typhoid, dysentery and other infectious diseases are widespread. Staff shortages in schools and in the health sector are still acute. In some parts of the city of Diyarbakir, people continue to drink water from the irrigation canals."137

The Fact Finding Mission confirms that future economic growth in the region is ultimately contingent on the successful outcome of a peace process that will bring an end to conflict and the restoration of democratic rule. Currently the region is under Emergency Rule, severely curtailing basic freedoms. This point was made to the Mission repeatedly. The Mission also notes that commercial companies and international development agencies have also expressed concern over the security of future investment whilst the region remains under Emergency Rule.

Given the economic and political instability of the area, the Mission therefore believes that future economic growth cannot be presumed. Even if the hoped-for growth does occur, it is the view of many of those whom the Mission interviewed that growth cannot be relied upon to secure employment and services for the thousands of people who would be affected by the Ilisu Dam and its accompanying downstream project at Cizre. Central government support would also be needed: such support, however, is already lacking throughout the region and does not appear to be forthcoming.

Institutional Failures and the Need for Reform

Although the Kudat report is upbeat in its assessment that some aspects of the proposed Resettlement Action Plan will meet international standards at least on paper, it highlights major institutional limitations that stand in the way of the Plan's realistic implementation.

These include a lack of institutional capacity and a lack of communication between implementing agencies. Kudat argues that overcoming these problems will require sweeping institutional restructuring and reform. The Kudat report states: "In a number of areas, additional data will have to be collected if best practice is to be achieved. Also, new institutional arrangements should be formulated and agreed upon between concerned institutions." It continues: "The GAP framework alone will not resolve all the institutional complexities of the resettlement projects. There is a need to have a more unified institutional framework, a single earmarked budget for resettlement implementation, and mechanisms for quality assurance, enforcement and monitoring and evaluation... "

Kudat points out that the ability of the DSI to implement and enforce the RAP is hampered by the security situation and by the lack of coordination with other institutions which each act independently and have separate budgets. All five provinces affected by the proposed construction of the Ilisu Dam are still under Emergency Rule and, as Kudat comments, "the Ministry of Interior and the military have very different sets of priorities" from the DSI. The complexity and magnitude of how best to address the needs of previously displaced populations "goes beyond the ability of the project and the solutions require the decisions of security agencies".

The Mission supports these views. In addition, as already noted above, it found evidence that the laws on expropriation and compensation failed to ensure that compensation be prompt, adequate and effective - the standard required by international law. Under current procedures, the ownership of all immobile properties and resources to be expropriated should be determined by a cadastral survey. A valuation committee consisting of five permanent members, including two representatives of the affected communities, and five others should then be established in each district to value the expropriated property. Landowners who are dissatisfied with the evaluation have just one month to appeal. Moreover, an effective appeal requires the services of an attorney, which those in the lowest income groups are unable to afford.

In addition, as evidenced by the case of the Ataturk Dam, some lawyers have exploited the resettlement situation, collecting 10-15 cases for each village as a way to earn more money for themselves. Typically, an appeal can take one year and involves visits to the local court, which can be time-consuming and expensive for poorer villagers. Many villagers are simply unaware of their legal rights to appeal and the one-month period in which to do so. Many are also illiterate and are often intimidated by the process. Some speak only Kurdish.

Even where a challenge is successful and higher compensation is agreed, it may take years before such compensation is paid. Although this will incur extra costs for the authorities, who must pay a penalty for non-payment, the country's high inflation rate makes non-payment a cheaper option than payment. By the time villagers receive the compensation they are due, its extra value is likely to have been significantly reduced by inflation.138 The consequence is a system riddled with loopholes that benefit the state and which results, on average, in only one sixth of the compensation due ever being paid.

Without a proper legal framework that guarantees prompt compensation that is not conditional upon holding title to land, the Turkish government's assurance that everyone affected by the Ilisu project will be compensated lacks credibility. In the absence of such a legal framework, ECAs should not support the project.

Resettlement and Regional Conditions

Previous Fact Finding Missions and independent reports on the Ilisu project have stressed the difficulties of achieving a just resettlement programme in an area which continues to be wracked by conflicts and which remains subject to emergency laws, none of which have yet been repealed. The Kudat report notes how security considerations have restricted access to villagers,139 thus preventing a full assessment of their population densities and the socio-economic status of villagers.

The Fact-Finding Mission found additional evidence of the impacts of Emergency Rule in the region. The Mission heard of how the climate of intimidation had adversely affected the outcome of previous resettlement programmes. At Urfa, it learned that in the case of the Ataturk Dam:

"People are too afraid or unaware how to appeal (the valuation of their property). If ever one person approached an expropriation officer he would be viewed as a trouble maker and feared even by his own neighbours."140

Human rights groups, other NGOs and the independent press also face a constant threat of closure. The Mission learned of one incident in which an NGO had been sued after publishing a map showing the location of villages razed by the military during the war, and another in which an NGO had been closed down after producing an innocuous human rights poster showing pictures of refugees, people holding banners and migrant camps.

The Mission concludes that the essential prerequisites to an internationally acceptable resettlement plan-freedom of speech, of press, and of association necessary to conduct credible consultation - do not exist. It is of particular concern, for example, that several leading NGOs critical of the Ilisu project are not recognised by the Turkish government.

Independent Monitoring

The failure of Turkish authorities to abide by Turkish law governing resettlement in many other GAP projects, coupled with concerns over the lack of a resettlement plan and the fragile political conditions on the region, has led the ECAs considering support for the project to stipulate that an independent monitoring body be established to ensure compliance of the Ilisu project with agreed international standards.

The Mission considers that such a condition is unlikely to be met. The Mission itself faced repeated refusals by DSI authorities to release any information about the Ilisu project or to establish a constructive dialogue with independent foreign experts. Its own experience of constant police surveillance also reinforced the view already expressed by NGOs that the scope for truly independent monitoring is severely restricted by existing security measures in the region.141

Condition two

"Make provision for upstream water treatment plants capable of ensuring that water quality is maintained"

Concerns have been expressed that current levels of sewage and other waste entering the Tigris river, principally from Diyarbakir, Batman and Siirt, will severely degrade the water quality of the proposed Ilisu reservoir, threatening public health and leading to possible eutrophication and the release of methane, a significant quantity of greenhouse gases. This issue was not properly assessed in the original Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the project (yet to be released to the public) but was highlighted in a subsequent desk study of the EIA undertaken by Environmental Resources Management (ERM) for the UK government (see above pp. 30-31). ERM noted:

"There appears to be no mention of hydrogen sulphide/methane monitoring behind the dam wall, although this could potentially be a risk for such a deep reservoir with high eutrophication potential."142

The Fact-Finding Mission met with the Mayors of Diyarbakir and Batman to learn of plans to address sewage problems in the cities. In Diyarbakir, the first stage of a new sewage treatment plant has been commissioned with funding from the German government through Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW). The companies involved include Lurgi Bamag GmbH, Passavant-Roediger Anlagenbau GmbH, and Vinsan Veziroglu Insaat Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. In Batman, a feasibility study will be undertaken shortly but no plant has yet been commissioned and project finance has still to be arranged.

The Mission welcomes these initiatives. The planned project in Diyarbakir will go a long way to remedying the severe sewage problems currently faced by the city. However, the Mission is concerned that the new sewage treatment plant will not be sufficient to secure the water quality of the Ilisu reservoir. Even when all the proposed plans are in place, 20 per cent of the sewage from Diyarbakir (whose population is currently estimated at 1.7 million) will still not be connected to the sewage system. It is also unclear whether or not factories discharging waste to the Tigris will be connected to the system.143 This will leave the waste from some 340,000 people untreated, with potentially severe consequences for water quality in the reservoir. In addition, the Mission was told by the head of the Bar Association in Diyarbakir that people are required to pay for their sewage and for potable water. This means that those resettled to Diyarbakir would have to pay as well, and it is uncertain whether their compensation package provides for this. In Batman, as noted above, sewage treatment plans are still only at a feasibility stage.

The Mission concludes that this condition has not been met and cannot be met until the one hundred per cent coverage is guaranteed for Diyarbakir, Batman and Siirt, with full project plans and finance in place. The Mission also recommends that the revised EIA being undertaken by Sulzer Hydro examines whether industrial effluent, which is likely to increase with economic growth in the region, will be adequately treated and whether the regulatory regime is sufficient to ensure proper management of the system.

There is as yet no published resettlement plan for the tens of thousands of people who will lose their homes, lives and livelihoods to the Ilisu Dam. The Mission urges international Export Credit Agencies to undertake and make public a human rights assessment of projects like Ilisu for which export credit support is being considered. This assessment should detail the extent of the project's compliance with international human rights agreements and standards.

Condition three

"Give an assurance that adequate downstream flows will be maintained at all times"

Concern has been expressed by Syria and Iraq over the downstream impacts of the Ilisu project, the fear being that Turkey will deny water to downstream states. Recognising that Turkey is obliged under international law to consult with its neighbours on any project which might infringe on their rights to the shared waters of the Tigris, the British government has stated that "there should be a published assurance that the required consultation of neighbouring states has been carried out."144 No such consultation has yet taken place (see above p. 36).

The view that water from the dam will affect power relations with neighbouring countries in the region was shared by the Mayor of Diyarbakir during an interview with the Mission in which he noted, "I'm aware of the issue of the conflict with Syria and Iraq [from the dams in the GAP system, including Ilisu]. As the amount of available water decreases, the government will be more conservative with it, which will increase conflict. If there is not a fair plan, there will be a serious conflict." However, far from there being a fair plan with Syria and Iraq, there is no plan; not even the most rudimentary, legally required consultation.

Furthermore, the strained political relations between Turkey and its southern neighbours could easily be worsened in the next year by the need for the Turkish government to block more water flow from both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in order to make up for water shortages which have affected the reservoirs of already existing dams. Because of the severe droughts which affected eastern Turkey in the past year, the Keban, Karakaya, Ataturk and Karkamis hydro-plants, which account for one-fifth of Turkey's national output, are experiencing their lowest water levels in ten years. Officials said the levels in the dams were so low that it might take four or five years before they return to normal.145 This led Turkey unilaterally to declare that it will reduce the promised downstream flow of the Euphrates from 500 cubic metres/second to 160 cubic metres/second. The fact that the water is now so low also raises doubts about Ilisu as a means of meeting Turkey's future energy needs (see pp. 89-91).

The dam will not only impact on international power relations: it will also affect the livelihoods and development opportunities of those living downstream, especially those in Iraq. The greatest burden is likely to fall on the rural poor and those who depend directly on the waters of the river. The Mission did not inquire directly into the projected impacts of Ilisu on downstream flow. However, independent engineers who have assessed the project told the Mission that, contrary to claims by the project sponsors, Ilisu is not intended only for generating hydroelectricity. The dam was planned for use in conjunction with a further 45-metre dam downstream at Cizre, which will irrigate some 66,000 hectares. The water from Ilisu's reservoir will be used to feed this dam and ensure a year-round supply of irrigation water. The two projects should therefore be considered as one when considering their impacts on downstream flow, although construction at Cizre will begin three years after Ilisu, owing to its smaller size.

The Mission was also told that the site of the Ilisu Dam was specifically chosen to allow for the maximum reservoir size - 11 billion cubic metres. Alternative sites are available on the Tigris which would produce the same amount of power (3.8 billion kWh/year) but with a significantly smaller reservoir. One interpretation put on this was that the size of the proposed reservoir reflected a political choice motivated by a desire to ensure sufficient storage at Ilisu to allow for the control of downstream flows to Syria and Iraq. The Mission notes that a major reason given by Ilisu proponents for supporting the dam appears to be the belief that the dam would enable Turkey to exert political control in the region. As a member of the State security police put it to the Mission: "The dam means power - who has the water has the power."

The Mission asked DSI for project documents but was told that no documents on either project are available to the public - and that they will not be available until construction has begun.

The link between Cizre and Ilisu suggests that the impacts on downstream water flow can only be assessed properly if both dams are considered together. The Mission therefore calls for a strategic environmental assessment to be made a condition of approval for any export credits, in order to evaluate fully the cumulative impacts of the two projects on the river basin as a whole. Export Credit Agencies may also wish to inquire whether or not the project sponsors misrepresented the nature of the Ilisu project, given its connection with the proposed Cizre Dam.

Condition four

"Produce a detailed plan to preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible"

A previous September 1999 Fact Finding Mission to the region, on visiting Hasankeyf, established that only a restricted site evaluation was being conducted by a single archaeological team. This evaluation, led by Professor Olus Arik, was deeply constrained by lack of time and money and had resulted in only a minute amount of exploratory excavation of the site. The October 2000 Mission sought to establish the extent to which that exploratory excavation had increased or expanded in its ambit. The Mission's specific objectives were:

  • To discover what methodologies were now being used to analyse the site at Hasankeyf and other sites of paramount archaeological significance in the region due to be submerged by the reservoir;
  • To discover what plans have been put in place with the intention of saving, ex situ, a proportion of the artefacts of Hasankeyf and other sites of paramount importance;
  • To discover the extent to which there has been or is any ongoing consultation with local populations over the importance and significance to them of their monuments, graveyards, and places of worship.

The Mission first made a visit to the Birecik Dam at the Belkis/Zeugma site. There were no archaeologists on site to consult. The excavations at Zeugma are documented as being sophisticated but wholly inadequate. The speed with which the Birecik Dam has been constructed and filled has conclusively deprived civilisation of the opportunity to document and map the enormous quantity of significant remains now lying at the bottom of the reservoir. At the very least, what is known to have been destroyed is a Roman Legionary Fortress, a Roman bath and an early Bronze Age cemetery. In addition, countless mosaics and frescoes at Roman villas at Zeugma have been lost. What has also been lost is the cultural and natural wealth of the ancient settlement of Apema and that at the mounds of Tilobur, Tilbes, Tilmusa and Horum. It is worth noting that it would be inconceivable for such uncontrolled archaeological destruction to have been sanctioned in a country belonging to the European Union.

The Mission had the opportunity to speak to a number of resettled communities who were deeply aggrieved that they had been forcibly parted from their homes and associated heritage and that they were no longer able to worship in their traditional places or to tend the graves of their families. In summary, the work which had to be done so hastily at Birecik to preserve a tiny fraction of the archaeological heritage of the region is devastatingly inadequate in almost every particular. The extraordinary achievements of the archaeologists working round the clock on site were only possible after negotiations with the Turkish government resulted in a few weeks' extension of their licence to work, before the reservoir was filled and the site lost. Archaeologists consider that the mosaics that were lifted are the most outstanding examples of their type.

The Mission then visited Hasankeyf itself. The Mission was not able to establish contact with any of the archaeologists who are thought to be working on the site, as this work appears to be limited to the summer season. It was established that many artefacts have already been removed to be preserved ex situ. The Mission was told by dignitaries in the community that an aerial survey of the area had been done some ten years previously. However, this photography was thought to have been part of a reconnaissance operation, and was not in the nature of an archaeological survey. There is a certain amount of labelling that can be seen on parts of the site. The Chamber of Architects in Diyarbakir, which includes a number of professional archaeologists, has stated that although a programme to assess removable pieces has been run by the Middle East Technical University based in Ankara through the support of DSI, it has focused on a mere counting of monument pieces and evaluating whether or not they are movable. Such a programme cannot even begin to constitute an adequate archaeological survey of a site of such vast complexity and age. Such a survey would involve the co-ordination of specialists of each of the relevant eras. Members of the Mission, in discussion with experts from a number of the different periods which cover the history of Hasankeyf, have been made aware of the large number of different civilisations which are reflected in different ways, not only in Hasankeyf but also in the surrounding area for many miles. What would be lost in the flooding of Hasankeyf cannot be properly estimated in any event, since so much of the material lies buried beneath the more recent civilisations which have occurred there.

The Mission was repeatedly told that flooding Hasankeyf would violate Turkish law. One prominent lawyer interviewed by the Mission stated: "The government cannot build this project legally because Hasankeyf is a Class 1 protected area."146 Hasankeyf was listed as a national protected site in 1978 and again in 1980 when a new order was issued. Flooding the town would therefore require the special permission of a council, based in Diyarbakir, responsible for local sites protected under the law. Without permission from this council, argued the lawyer, the flooding of Hasankeyf would be illegal.147 The council, which is appointed by the Minister of Culture, has not yet given a permission to build the dam. A meeting was planned in March 2000, but was postponed in order to take account of the conditions imposed by the ECAs. The Mission notes that the ECAs involved in the project are prohibited under their own guidelines from supporting activities that contravene host country laws. In this regard, it is of significance that a legal case has already been lodged by an Istanbul-based lawyer, Murat Cano, contesting the legality of the dam.


Box 11: The Murat Cano Court Case

Lawyers on the mission met with Murat Cano, a lawyer at the Turkish Bar in Istanbul. Cano observed that Hasankeyf, and the rich but largely undiscovered historical and archaeological heritage of the area belonged to a wider public than the Turkish nation, and he reiterated that members of the European Union had a responsibility to ensure that that heritage was protected for the benefit of future generations. He is Plaintiff in an action against the Turkish government. Whilst he fully recognises and acknowledges the country's need for further supplies of electric power and irrigation, he is currently seeking a stay order in respect of this particular project, and a decision that the contracts made with Sulzer Hydro and ABB Power Generation should be cancelled.

The grounds of his application are as follows:

  1. Hasankeyf is one of most important cultural assets in the world
  2. No account was taken of the importance of Hasankeyf in the design of the Ilisu project.
  3. The project is in conflict with Turkish law. More specifically, Cano argues that Ilisu contravenes: (i) Turkish legislation for the protection of its cultural assets passed: (ii) decisions taken by conservation boards pursuant to Turkey's obligations under the European Convention for the Conservation of Archaeological Heritage and (iii) UNESCO principles for the protection of cultural assets endangered by public or private projects, which require that an inventory of cultural assets in the area should be made, and the project designed in such as way as to protect those assets in situ. Also, that where important monuments are under threat, alternative projects should be developed and the monuments protected in situ.
  4. Preservation of the vast archaeological reserves of Hasankeyf under the present plan is limited to excavation and documentation.
  5. Relocation of Hasankeyf is impossible, because of the nature of the site and because of the limited time which is available.
  6. Long term benefits, in particular the income which would derive from tourism in the area have not been considered in the economic justification for the project.
  7. Alternative proposals which would avoid the immersion of Hasankeyf have not been considered.

Cano's action was commenced in the Ankara Administrative Court on 12th January 2000. That Court has now ruled that the action must be transferred to the Administrative Court in Diyarbakir, where proceedings are now pending.


Conversations with local dignitaries also revealed the existence of a deep and abiding sense of cultural heritage, in particular, the enormous expanse of time - some 10,000 years - which is bridged at Hasankeyf. These conversations also indicate the extent to which, for the last 30 years, those dignitaries have seen Hasankeyf in a state of enforced declined, both because the town has been starved of the funds necessary to protect its heritage and because it is denied the possibility of generating funds through tourism as a result of the town's protected status. The Chamber of Architects has also commented that "the historical sites have a meaning if people living in them don't move away; it is important to say that Hasankeyf should be completely saved."

Already archaeologists have made major finds at the site. For example, until recently, nobody knew that Hasankeyf was the site of Kulliye University, which dates from the 14th century Eubyan period. According to myth, the university campus had one room for each day of the year. The ruins of the site, close to the town's ancient mosque of Sultan Suleyman, were unearthed in 1986 but the discovery was not publicised. A team from the Istanbul Technical University, headed by Professor Metin Ahunbay, has now started new excavations close to the ancient mosque and worked for a two-month period with 110 students during the summer of 2000. The Ministry of Culture recently visited Hasankeyf and assured people that a budget for a further six months works has already been allocated. It is not clear who is in charge of the disbursement of such money.

It is not possible to ascertain whether or not any sophisticated methodology has been used on the Hasankeyf site as a whole to determine what it contains. However, villagers asserted that there have been no recent geophysical surveys whether involving the use of magnetometry, resistivity meters or ground penetrating radar. They have only observed limited physical excavation: it is therefore not know what treasures will be lost other than those which are already above ground. The Mission was conducted around Hasankeyf by people whose families had only recently ceased to occupy the caves, which had been carved centuries ago into the side of the mountain.148 Against their will, these families had been forced to move out of their homes in the caves into housing units situated next to the river, with which they are not satisfied. Whatever plan is made to preserve artefacts from this site, it will be impossible to preserve the ancient caves themselves since they will inevitably be flooded if the dam goes ahead. The caves are integral to the essence of - and are an irreplaceable part of - the site. Indeed, they are the reason why the site has received such international acclaim. Furthermore, though the mission was unable to examine any open vertical sections in the town that might have given an indication of the true depth of cultural deposits buried below ground, Olus Arik has recently indicated that below ground archaeological deposits at the site are very extensive indeed.149

Some of the cave dwellings in Hasankeyf which are still inhabited and which would be submerged by the waters of Ilisu.


Box 12: HASANKEYF and Turkish Obligations under International and European Law

Turkey is a party to the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The Convention holds within it a definition of Cultural and Natural Heritage. Article 1 sets out what is to be considered as Cultural Heritage, for the purposes of the Convention:

'monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;'

'groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science'

'sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view,'

It is difficult to see how the area which will be flooded by the Ilisu Dam could be better described than at Article 1 of the Convention. Monuments, groups of buildings and sites within the terms of Article 1 are all present. A comprehensive body of Turkish legislation appears to address the commitments which are contained within the Convention, but for a reason which is a matter for conjecture, that the legislation designed to protect Hasankeyf is not enforced.

2. Turkey signed the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised) in January 1992. However, it did not ratify the treaty until November 1999. The Convention came into force in Turkey in May 2000. In Article 1, the aim of the Convention is expressed to be the protection of archaeological heritage, which is seen as a source of the European collective memory, and as an instrument for historical and scientific study. Archaeological heritage is defined as all remains and objects and any other traces of mankind from past epochs. It includes structures, constructions, groups of buildings, developed sites, moveable objects, monuments of other kinds as well as their context, whether situated on land or under water.

By Article 2 of the Convention, Parties undertake to institute a legal system, for the protection of its archaeological heritage. This system is to make provision for inventories, creation of reserves, (even where there are no visible remains on the ground or under water), and for the preservation of material evidence to be studied by later generations;

By Article 5 of the Convention, Parties undertake to ensure that archaeologists combine to produce policies which ensure well balanced strategies for the protection, conservation and enhancement of sites of archaeological interest. At Article 5, this is held to include the 'allocation of sufficient time and resources for an appropriate scientific study to be made of the site and for its findings to be published'. There is no indication available to the Fact-Finding Mission that the Turkish authorities are complying with these obligations under the Convention.


The archaeological rescue condition imposed by the Export Credit Agencies seems to imply that Hasankeyf is the only site of major cultural significance which is facing submersion (see World Archaeological Congress discussion above, p. 33).150 This is not so. International archaeological interest is revealing that this site is one of a series of sites to be flooded which form a crucial part of humanity's understanding of its transition from hunter-gatherer to settled agriculture. It is now becoming clear to the archaeological community that seven years - the estimated time that it would take to construct the dam - is wholly insufficient to make either an accurate or a complete survey of what would be lost in the resulting flood. Members of the archaeology profession take the view that this site is of at least the same significance as Ephesus, which is still under excavation one hundred years after the explorations began.

According to sources within the archaeological profession who are familiar with these sites, such time frames are the norm. The accelerated time frame for excavation in the Ilisu project area is unrealistic and contrived. The Mission concludes that the constraints of time and money imposed by the dam construction schedule make a mockery of any claims that a full and competent investigation of the archaeological wealth of the affected site is being made.

Meanwhile, according to sources within the archaeological profession, the findings of international teams of archaeologists have similarly not been made public, and it is not clear that all findings have been wholly revealed to the Export Credit Agencies. The Mission will not be able to reveal in detail these findings unless permission is obtained from Turkish authorities. We strongly urge Export Credit Agencies to request permission to make this information publicly available, both for themselves and for society as a whole.

The Mission also strongly recommends that any proper archaeological and historical survey of the region must include proper consultation with the local communities affected. The mission agrees with the views expressed by the World Archaeological Congress (see above p. 33) that the local values placed upon material culture histories, and the research questions that may therefore take precedence in any subsequent scheme of research, should be of equal or greater importance than those arbitrarily assigned from outside (largely by archaeologists, bureaucrats or historians, very few of whom have ever been anywhere near the area). This is rendered doubly important by the very limited existence of any written record/history for the region over the last five hundred years or so

The Mission notes that the principal professional association of archaeologists within Turkey, ICOMOS - Turkey, has stated that "in the long run, the Ilisu dam will be a social, cultural and environmental disaster."151

Conclusion

The Fact-Finding Mission concludes that the four conditions imposed by the Export Credit Agencies have still to be met - and the prospect that they can be met in the near future is remote. It will therefore be pressing the ECAs to refuse export credit support for the project.

Section 3: Ilisu, The World Commission on Dams and ECA reform

In addition to evaluating the progress - or lack of it - being made by the Turkish authorities in meeting the four conditions laid down by the export credit agencies considering support for Ilisu (see Section 2), the Mission was charged with:

  1. Assessing whether or not the conditions, even if met, are sufficient to bring the project into line with evolving international best practice. The Mission was explicitly charged with reviewing Ilisu in the light of new guidelines developed by the World Commission on Dams;
  2. Identifying corporate governance failures in the practices and procedures of the supporting ECAs that have contributed to the controversy over Ilisu; assessing the extent to which these failures will be addressed by new procedures under consideration by the OECD's Working Group on Export Credits; and proposing corrective action;
  3. Evaluating whether or not continued support for Ilisu could be justified by the UK government in the light of new procedures being developed by the UK Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD).

The Mission's findings on these three issues are detailed below.

Issue three: Ilisu - a litmus test of the ecgd's and hermes' commitment to reform

The Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) considering Ilisu do not stipulate the standards against which compliance with their four conditions will be measured. On resettlement, for example, they merely state that a plan must be drawn up to "international standards".152

Since the ECAs set out their conditions, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), an international body charged with drawing up new guidelines for the hydro industry, has reported: its report is widely regarded as setting the benchmark for best practice in dam projects - and hence for "international standards."

Significantly, the UK government has implied that it considers that Ilisu should meet the WCD standards in order to obtain UK export credit support. In February 2001, Chris Mullin, Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for International Development told a seminar organised by the British Dam Society and the Institute of Civil Engineers: "Our government has made it clear that we will only support Ilisu if a number of conditions are met. These conditions reflect the criteria identified by the Commission."153

US Ex-Im Bank, which has issued a "letter of preliminary commitment" to Balfour Beatty for Ilisu, has also stated its intention to incorporate "elements" of the WCD guidelines into its Environmental Procedures and Guidelines (EPGs), which are currently undergoing revision. The draft text of the new Ex-Im EPGs "encourages participants of hydroelectric and water resource projects to follow to the extent possible the principles and guidelines set forth in the Final Report of the World Commission on Dams".154 While Ex-Im has reviewed Balfour Beatty's application, it is thought unlikely that Ilisu will meet its existing or revised policies much less the WCD's guidelines.

The Fact Finding Mission has reviewed the WCD guidelines and finds that Ilisu, as currently planned, violates all of them in each and every particular. Whilst welcoming the UK government's view that Ilisu should meet the WCD guidelines, the Mission refutes its claim, as expressed by Mr. Mullin, that the four ECA conditions, once implemented, would bring Ilisu into compliance with the WCD's guidelines.

The ancient town of Hasanekyf holds over 10,000 years of history. The Zeynel Bey Mausoleum pictured here is just one of the many important cultural and archaeological sites which may be lost to the Ilisu Dam.


Box 13: WCD - The New Benchmark

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was set up by the World Bank and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in 1997 "to review the performance of large dams and make recommendations for future planning of water and energy projects". The Commission was chaired by Kader Asmal, South Africa's then Minister for Water, and consisted of industry leaders (including Goran Lindahl, at the time CEO of ABB), the US honorary president of the industry-sponsored International Committee on Large Dams (ICOLD), academics with expertise in the energy and water sector, respected civil servants, members of the NGO community, and a member of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission. The Commission was also supported by a WCD Forum, a 68-member consultative group set up by the WCD and consisting of key representatives from government, the private sector, multilateral development agencies and affected communities.

The WCD's independence - reflected in the composition of the Commission - is widely acknowledged; and its report, based on two and a half years of in-depth research and consultation, constitutes the most comprehensive, global review of the economic, social and environmental impacts of dams to have been undertaken.155

Institutional Support

A number of governments have lent the WCD's report their support. The German Ministry of Development announced it would strive not only to implement the guidelines in its own work but also to ensure their implementation in multilateral fora. The UK government, for its part, has also responded favourably, with Chris Mullin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Development, announcing that the Department for International Development "... will offer support to governments in developing countries wanting to implement the Dams Commission report. We are willing to provide assistance on applying criteria and implementing the guidelines."

Multilateral development banks have also responded favourably to the WCD's report and are considering adoption of its guidelines. In January 2001, the African Development Bank announced, "The [WCD's] criteria, guidelines and standards, provided in the report, would be particularly useful during the planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation, monitoring and decommissioning of dams financed by the Bank. We plan to incorporate the criteria and guidelines during the development of Bank's technical guidelines to support our recently completed policy on Integrated Water Resources Management." The Asian Development Bank told the WCD's Commissioners in December 2000 that "ADB will re-examine its own procedures, including our environment and social development policies, and determine the extent to which the report's recommendations may necessitate changes in these procedures."

For its part, the hydropower industry has also welcomed the WCD's report. On the day of the launch of the report, for example, construction company Skanska, until recently a partner of Balfour Beatty in the Ilisu Dam construction consortium, announced it would adopt the WCD's new guidelines. Skanska's press release stated, "Skanska intends to apply the guidelines for major hydropower projects recommended by the World Commission on Dams...." Axel Wenblad, Vice President of Environmental Affairs of the Skanska Group, said, "We find the Commission's work to be extremely valuable. It represents a major stride for sustainable development, with open and transparent processes in which all affected parties can participate, particularly those groups that are affected directly. Our hope is that the Commission's work can serve as a model for dealing with other types of controversial infrastructural projects. At Skanska, we hope that the Commission's new criteria and guidelines become accepted globally and we are prepared to actively strive toward these being accepted among the stakeholders concerned."

Other companies and industry associations have also responded favourably to the WCD's report. Harza, a major hydropower development firm, wrote in a letter to the Washington Post, "The report offers a unique insight into dams and their benefits and associated costs. The report proposes a sound approach to the future development of a very old, yet important, water resource technology." An editorial in Hydro Review Worldwide, a leading industry publication, stated "... as Commission Chair Kader Asmal has declared, the 'real work' must now begin. This work includes reducing the broad findings of the Commission into practical, implementable policies and practices. These, in turn, can lead to the creation of socially beneficial, politically acceptable, and affordable and financeable developments -- including new dam based water resource projects."

Balfour Beatty, meanwhile, has responded lukewarmly to suggestions that it should endorse the WCD guidelines, both to secure its position as an industry leader and to restore the damage to its reputation incurred through involvement in Ilisu. In a letter to Friends of the Earth, Lord Weir, Chair of Balfour Beatty, states:

"There is also at this stage, as you will recognise, complete uncertainty as to how in practice promoters of dams will interpret the W.C.D. principles and seek to implement them and what external reactions will be. As doubtless you will also do, we await with interest the first specific example of what happens in practice."


Ilisu and the WCD

The WCD published its report, Dams and Development, in November 2000. The report sets out a new framework for decision-making on water and energy development which "reflects a comprehensive approach to integrating [the] social, environmental and economic dimensions of development", in addition to "creating greater levels of transparency and certainty for all involved".

The new framework embodies five core values - equity, sustainability, efficiency, participation and accountability - which, the report makes clear, have frequently not been met in past projects.

  • Equity

    The WCD's report states, "The poor, other vulnerable groups and future generations are likely to bear a disproportionate share of the social and environmental costs of large dam projects without gaining a commensurate share of the economic benefits."

  • Sustainability

    The WCD notes that dams are a major factor in the degradation of watershed ecosystems, fragmenting and transforming aquatic and terrestrial environments with a range of effects that vary in duration, scale and degree of reversibility.

  • Efficiency

    The evidence gathered by the WCD indicates that dams have generally fallen short of their performance targets on electricity production, irrigation, water supply and flood control.

  • Participatory decision-making

    The Commission states, "The WCD documents a frequent failure to recognise affected people and empower them to participate in the process." It also notes the corrupting influence of vested interests on decision-making.

  • Accountability

    The WCD's report makes repeated reference to the lack of accountability of dam planners, builders and operators to affected people and society in general.

In order to ensure that future dam projects comply with these principles, the Commission proposes a set of guidelines for water and energy resources development, based on seven strategic priorities and corresponding policy principles:

  • Gaining Public Acceptance
  • Comprehensive Options Assessment
  • Addressing Existing Dams
  • Sustaining Rivers and Livelihoods
  • Recognising Entitlements and Sharing Benefits
  • Ensuring Compliance
  • Sharing Rivers for Peace, Development and Security

The Mission has reviewed the Ilisu project in the light of the above strategic priorities. Its findings are set out below. For ease of reference, the WCD guidelines are set out first, followed by an evaluation of Ilisu's current compliance or non-compliance and an evaluation of the extent to which the ECA conditions would bring the project into line with the WCD guidelines.

  • Gaining public acceptance

WCD Guidelines

"Public acceptance of key decisions is essential for equitable and sustainable water and energy resources development." Decisions relating to the planning and implementation of a project must be jointly negotiated by affected communities and the project developers. The negotiations should be conducted through a stakeholder forum in which "those whose livelihoods, human rights and property and resource rights ... are core stakeholders."156 Negotiations "should result in demonstrable public acceptance of binding formal agreements among the interested parties with clear, implementable arrangements for monitoring compliance and redressing grievances."157 Where indigenous groups are affected, the project must have their prior informed consent.158

Evaluation of Compliance

As noted in Sections 1 and 2, the Ilisu area has been devastated by armed conflict, and remains under emergency rule. Freedom of expression and freedom of association do not exist, and the Kurdish communities affected by the Ilisu dam cannot voice their opposition to the project. In this context, the conditions do not exist for ensuring "an open and transparent process" in which negotiated agreements on all key decisions can be reached between all stakeholders, as recommended by the WCD. As a result, the WCD's pre-condition for project approval - that "all key decisions" should enjoy "demonstrable public acceptance" - has not been, and cannot be, met. The continuing Emergency rule - and accompanying security presence - also renders compliance through independent and transparent review unachievable.

More specifically, the project currently fails to meet the following WCD guidelines with respect to "demonstrable public acceptance":

  • No stakeholder analysis has been undertaken in order to identify key stakeholders for inclusion in a stakeholder forum empowered with negotiating agreement on key decisions:159
  • No stakeholder forum has been established (and none is contemplated) and stakeholders have not "participated in the project design and the negotiation of outcomes that affect them";160
  • Key decisions are not being agreed through a negotiated process in which all stakeholders "have an equal opportunity to influence decisions";161
  • No measures have been taken, or are contemplated, to address power imbalances between various stakeholders162 in order to ensure "an open and transparent decision-making process in which the rights and entitlements of vulnerable groups [are safeguarded]";163
  • The project proponents have not undertaken to prohibit acts of intimidation against stakeholders;164
  • Access to the "information, legal and other support necessary for informed participation in decision-making" has not been made available, particularly for vulnerable groups;165
  • Where consultation exercises have been held, communities have not been given "sufficient time to examine various proposals and consult amongst themselves";166
  • The Turkish authorities have failed to demonstrate a willingness "to negotiate in good faith through all key stages, from options assessment to final implementation, operation and monitoring";167 and
  • Stakeholders have not "participated in baseline, impact and investigative studies"168 and have not been invited to do so.

The Mission notes that, even if the conditions imposed by the ECAs are met in full, the project would still be in violation of the WCD's guidelines with regard to its first strategic priority. For example, there is no requirement to set up a stakeholder forum; no requirement to take measures to address power imbalances between stakeholders; and no commitment by the Turkish authorities - or indeed the ECAs themselves - to abide by a negotiated decision-making process involving all stakeholders.

  • Comprehensive options assessment

WCD guidelines

"Alternatives to dams do often exist" states the report. Development needs and objectives should be "clearly formulated through an open and participatory process" before any one option is selected. In the assessment process, "social and environmental aspects" should have "the same significance as economic and financial factors."169 The assessment of options should continue "through all stages of planning, project development and operations." Planning "must give priority to making existing water, irrigation and energy systems more effective and sustainable before taking a decision on a new project."170

Evaluation of Compliance

The Mission considers that Ilisu fails this second strategic priority on all counts:

  • No participatory assessment of development needs and objectives has been undertaken - and none is planned. Moreover the institutional arrangements for such an assessment do not exist in Turkey. Indeed, as the ECGD's own social assessment of the Ilisu project points out, "Open consultative processes are not part of the institutional culture or political system."171
  • No comprehensive, participatory options assessment has been undertaken - and none is planned. Assessments of alternatives to Ilisu have been minimal: no consideration has been given to the solar energy option, nor to the use of gas fired power stations, nor to the "no dam" option. Yet alternatives to Ilisu exist which are both economically competitive and less socially and environmentally destructive.

Given the potential offered by abundant solar energy in the region, it may also be argued that the Republic of Turkey would be better advised to opt for a solar programme, particularly in view of the potential opportunity for Turkey to establish a competitive edge in the technology. In addition to possible cost advantages, embarking on such a programme could promote Turkey to a leading position in a key technology for the 21st century. At present, no other country has established a mold-breaking programme in this area. A large-scale solar programme would also be likely to be highly beneficial to Turkish trade. The use of solar energy avoids the import of fuel. Indigenous production would ensure that the overwhelming majority of the value of the projects would be retained in Turkey, with Turkey lining itself up to become a major exporter of solar technology in the future. Moreover, because solar power is flexible, a solar programme can easily be adjusted as power requirements emerge. An additional advantage would be that solar plants can be installed in relatively small numbers near key areas of demand, so avoiding the need to expand the power grid at great cost.

Gas-fired plants also appear to offer a cheaper alternative to Ilisu. In November 1998, the Swiss government guaranteed contracts for Ankara gas power project. At US$380/kW, this project costs less than a third of Ilisu. The recent private sector investment in three gas-fired power plants in the Marmara region has also demonstrated the attractiveness of this option from a financial point of view. The Mission was also informed that the Marmara plants' contribution to power supply in Turkey was sufficient to allow the government to reject the Akkuyu nuclear project without the danger of creating power cuts.

The attraction of such alternatives is enhanced still further by recent drought in the GAP region which has caused an acute shortage of electricity due to low water levels in many large hydro reservoirs, which are experiencing their lowest water levels in ten years. Officials said the levels in the dams - which supply one fifth of the nation's electricity - were so low that it might take four or five years before they return to normal.172

  • Priority has not been given to improving the effectiveness of existing energy systems, as recommended by the WCD, or to improving the performance of existing dams, despite numerous studies that have repeatedly documented the inefficiency of Turkey's existing energy systems. Yet a number of independent studies reveal that demand-side management and improvements in transmission both represent less costly, more sustainable alternatives to Ilisu. A January 2000 report on Turkey by the International Energy Agency, citing the Turkish Government's own State Planning Organisation's 1996-2000 Five Year Development Plan, concludes that "energy efficiency is considered the cheapest energy source [and] potential gains to be achieved by increased energy efficiency are substantial."173 The IEA estimates "the total energy saving potential for the three consumptive sectors to be approximately 13.2 mtoe [million tonnes oil equivalent] per year, corresponding to slightly more than the current final energy consumption in the energy sector."

The World Bank similarly notes that "considerable problems have plagued operations of the existing power infrastructure." In generation, "the plant availability factor has remained low (40-60%) [and] the losses in the transmission and distribution network continue to be high at 18% of total generation (mainly in distribution)."

  • No attempt has been made to compare the Ilisu site's environmental and social impacts to those of other possible dam sites. The WCD recommends that, where a comprehensive options assessment leads to a dam being selected, "the same multi-criteria approach proposed for the earlier stages of option assessment" must be used to "determine its precise location, alignment and height." The DSI, however, has actively refused to consider a number of possible alternative dam sites whose impacts would be less severe than Ilisu. Even where sites have been considered, the DSI has failed to compare environmental and social impacts.174

The Save Hasankeyf Platform has undertaken its own assessment of one alternative dam design and concluded that a reduction of 55 metres in the height of the dam would leave Hasankeyf untouched, albeit for a reduction in the dam's power output.175 The Fact Finding Mission also learned that two independent engineers have proposed another alternative consisting of a small reservoir upstream of Hasankeyf which would be used to channel water into a second basin not far from the Ilisu site where water could be passed into turbines. The Mission was told by engineers that such an option would provide the same amount of energy as Ilisu. The Mission was also told that the Turkish Prime Minister is reported to be interested in exploring this option. However, sources told the Mission that top ranking officers in the DSI oppose any changes to the original project design for Ilisu. The Mission is not in a position to evaluate these claims but recommends that they should be examined.

The conditions laid down by the ECAs do not address the issue of options assessment - and will not therefore bring the project into line with the WCD's guidelines with respect to this second strategic priority.

  • Addressing existing dams

WCD Guidelines

"Opportunities to improve the efficiency, environmental and social performance of existing dams and optimise their benefits must be taken.176 Outstanding social issues associated with existing large dams should be identified and assessed - and "processes and mechanisms ... developed with affected communities to remedy them."177 The WCD is emphatic that "priority must be given to financing a negotiated reparation plan before funding new dam projects in a specific location or river basin in a country."178

Evaluation of Compliance

Here again, the Mission found the Ilisu project to be in complete violation of the guidelines proposed by the WCD:

  • No "comprehensive post-project monitoring" has been undertaken of dams already built under the GAP;179
  • No mechanisms are in place - or are being put in place - to make reparations for the loss of livelihood and other damages suffered by those who have been forced to move as a result of dams already built as part of GAP. Existing dams in the area have already displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Most of those evicted have not received any compensation or rehabilitation:180 as the Mission confirmed in meetings with those evicted to make way for the Ataturk Dam, the problems suffered by those who have been evicted by past dams are severe (see Box 14: Ataturk's Victims - The Continuing Misery).
  • Funding new dam projects is being given priority over funding "a negotiated reparation plan", contrary to the WCD's recommendations.181

The ECA's conditions do not address reparations or improving the performance of existing dams. The conditions will not therefore bring Ilisu into compliance with the WCD guidelines in respect of its third strategic priority.


Box 14: Ataturk's Victims: The Continuing Misery

It is generally acknowledged that the resettlement programme at the Ataturk Dam, completed in 1993, which affected between 150,000 and 200,000 people - more than twice the number originally estimated or currently acknowledged by the authorities182 - has fallen far short of international standards. Although the entire town of Samsat and nearly 300 hundred villages were flooded by the Ataturk Dam, no comprehensive Resettlement Action Plan was prepared by the DSI whatsoever.

The Mission met with villagers affected by the Ataturk project and learned that compensation was frequently inadequate and delayed;183 that more than 80 per cent received no compensation whatsoever and no replacement houses; and that those few who obtained compensation have often lost that money because of rapid inflation, and a lack of familiarity with city life and commercial activities.

Many villagers told the Fact-Finding Mission they "were not resettled, but evicted". Others stated that "resettlement had resulted in major social problems, including the breakdown of social networks, clashes and disputes among neighbours over compensation, and resulting injuries and deaths".

Companies and financiers involved

The Ataturk Dam, dedicated to the founder of modern Turkey, is the largest structure ever built in Turkey for irrigation and hydropower generation.184 It is located on the Euphrates river and constitutes the centrepiece of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).185

When the Ataturk project was approved, the DSI awarded the contract for building the dam to the Ataturk Engineers Joint Venture (AEJV), consisting of Electrowatt and Societe Generale pour l'Industrie from Switzerland and Dolsar from Turkey. The electromechanical contracts went to the Swedish-Swiss transnational Asea Brown Boveri AG,186 Sulzer-Escher Wyss Gmbh, Noell Gmbh and Voest Alpine from Austria. Earthmoving and construction work was made the responsibility of the Turkish Consortium ATA-insaat.

The overall cost of the project was around US$2.3 billion USD. The original contract value of Swiss francs (Sfr.) 960 million mushroomed to well in excess of Sfr. 1,000 million. A banking consortium led by Union Bank of Switzerland came up with a 18-year export credit of Sfr. 5,734 million. The fact that Swiss, German, Italian and Austrian companies were involved meant optimum risk management, with coverage from Switzerland's export credit agency, as well as Hermes in Germany, SACE in Italy and OKB in Austria.

Health impacts187

Before the construction of the Ataturk dam, malaria was not present in the region. However, the dam's reservoir, together with its associated irrigation channels, created an ideal breeding ground for the disease's mosquito vectors which rapidly spread the disease. The malaria parasite had been introduced to the area through infected migrant workers' returning home from seasonal work in the cotton-growing Cukurova region - 400 km west of Urfa. Malaria deaths have already occurred in a number of villages.

Other tropical diseases - notably schistosomiasis and leishmaniasis - have also spread after the introduction of intensive irrigation in the region. Animals are also reported to have died because of new diseases, forcing farmers to slaughter their stock in order to prevent the spread of infection.

At present, there is no authority charged with monitoring the dam's health impacts and doctors and medical staff receive no training in dealing with malaria. Once a year, during the cotton harvest, malaria tablets are distributed by a "Malaria Group" run directly by the Health Ministry - but, the Mission was told, people are only given one malaria tablet each. It is very unlikely that such interventions will prevent the spreading of malaria in the area.

The authorities' response to the advent of the disease has been limited to spraying chemical products in urban areas. No public education programme accompanied the spraying and many people became ill after drinking water from canals which had been sprayed. The use of agro-chemicals is also reported to be problematic. The Mission met with families who worked for eight months of the year in cotton fields. It was told that severe inflammation and irritation of their skin and acute stomach upsets invariably occurred after the crops had been sprayed.

In June 1999, a local journalist collected a sample of water from Akcakale town, where 25.000 people live, and brought it to an official public laboratory in Urfa in order to obtain a detailed chemical analysis. Staff from the laboratory told him that they lack adequate facilities and thus, "We don't deal with these things". The story appeared in the newspaper "The Voice of Akcakale" in mid-June, prompting many people to go to the Town Hall to request further information. Officials responded by telling people that they "didn't need to know about chemicals in the water." The local newspaper was subsequently closed down.188

Social and Environmental impacts

The lack of any training for farmers in managing irrigation water and handling pesticides has led to the indiscriminate use of both, resulting in the salinisation of land and the poisoning of farmers.

Overuse of fertilisers is also causing soil degradation and pollution. Many fear that the problems will get worse following the planned introduction of cotton farming in the Urfa region. Some effort has been made to reduce salinsation, however, including the building of drainage canals.

Resettlement and compensation issues189

Those interviewed told the Mission that, although aware that the dam would be constructed, they were unable to conceive of the extent of its reservoir. They were not consulted over compensation, the levels of which were unilaterally decided on by the government

Affected villagers were given no opportunity to voice their views on compensation and resettlement. Land was only offered as compensation if the villagers were prepared to move to distant resettlement sites elsewhere in Turkey. Since few spoke Turkish, the majority were unwilling to move. Those eligible took cash compensation. "What people really wanted was some land with some farming equipment in the area close to the reservoir," the Mission was told.

Problems rapidly emerged over land titles: some properties had more than one owner whilst others had no owner at all. In some instances, disputes led to bloody clashes among villagers.

Most people received no compensation. The few who did had never seen so much money in one lump sum and "they didn't know if it was the right amount due to them." The first instalment to be paid was very low and a number of villagers went to court to challenge the compensation payments. Those interviewed report that "many lawyers exploited the situation by trying to collect 10-15 cases for each village in order to earn more money."

The compensation appeals lasted three years, after which the courts generally ruled in favour of the villagers. On average, the original compensation payments were one-sixth of those finally awarded. Many cases are still pending.

Many of those evicted "didn't know how to survive and decided on their own to move to cities, where they soon felt like foreigners." They also didn't know how to invest their money in urban commercial businesses. Often they were cheated by city-based partners and lost all their money.

Those who received no compensation were forced to migrate to the major cities of the region.

"They just resettled on their own and tried to look for any kind of job. Children and youngsters started to sell a few things on the street; they didn't go to school anymore and then left their families to move to bigger cities looking for a better future." Families were forced to borrow money from relatives, but often it was not enough and many now have large debts.

Impacts on neighbouring countries

Internationally, the large-scale tapping of the Euphrates and the Tigris has met with not a little disquiet on the part of Turkey's downstream neighbours. Both Syria and Iraq expressed concern at Turkey's degree of control over the rivers, particularly when construction work at the Ataturk dam made it necessary to hold back the waters of the Euphrates for a month. DSI deputy director of the Ataturk Dam Raif Ozenci pointed out that "in fact Syria and Iraq will be better off in that the regulation of river flow and the possibility of guaranteeing specific volumes throughout the year will alleviate the floods and droughts which have plagued the region since time immemorial. Furthermore, it is claimed that the damming of the Euphrates will lead to more rainfall and thus a richer environment". According to official sources, at least one third of water in the Euphrates has been used for irrigation since the Ataturk Dam was completed.190191


  • Sustaining rivers and livelihoods

WCD Guidelines

The WCD report stipulates: "A basin-wide understanding of the ecosystem's function, values and requirements and how community livelihoods depend on and influence them, is required before decisions on development options are made." Priority should be given to options that avoid impacts on the environment, followed by "the minimisation and mitigation of harm to the health and integrity of the river system."192 States should observe the precautionary principle, exercising "caution when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate and when the negative impacts of actions on the environment, human livelihoods, or health are potentially irreversible."193

Evaluation of Compliance

The Mission found that Ilisu directly violates the WCD guidelines on sharing rivers and livelihoods. It notes that:

  • No assessment of the cumulative social and environmental impacts of the dams already built on the Tigris and Euphrates has ever been carried out, and so far, there is no environmental impact assessment for Ilisu which measures up to international standards.
  • The precautionary principle is being flouted by the Turkish authorities, the companies and the ECAs involved in Ilisu. The ECGD's review of the Ilisu Consortium's own Environmental Impact Assessment reveals major uncertainties over the environmental impacts of the dam and large areas of ignorance - yet the ECAs are still considering the project in defiance of the precautionary approach.

The issue of shared rivers is addressed by the four conditions laid down by the ECAs. However, no requirement is made for a basin-wide assessment of the cumulative impacts of existing and planned projects. The condition would therefore fail to bring Ilisu into line with the WCD guidelines with respect to the WCD's fourth strategic priority.

  • Recognising entitlements and sharing benefits

WCD Guidelines

The rights of affected people must be recognised. "Mutually-agreed, formal and legally enforceable mitigation, resettlement and development provisions" should be jointly negotiated by the project developer and affected people.194

Evaluation of Compliance

As noted in Sections 1 and 2, the rights of communities affected, or potentially affected by Ilisu, have not been recognised by the Turkish authorities. In particular, the following entitlements - all specified by the WCD - have been denied to villagers:

  • The right "to participate in negotiating the outcomes of the options assessment process";
  • The right "to participate in negotiating the implementation of the preferred option"; and
  • The right "to negotiate the nature and components of mitigation and development entitlements".195

In addition:

  • Ilisu lacks a Mitigation, Resettlement and Development Action Plan, accepted by affected people and backed by "a master contract that outlines the obligations of government and the developer";196
  • No performance contracts have been signed - or even considered - between the government and individual affected families, as recommended by the WCD. Such contracts should specify "entitlements (compensation, resettlement where necessary and direct benefits from the project), delivery schedule and recourse procedures"; and
  • No legally enforceable benefit sharing mechanisms have been negotiated with affected communities.

None of the four conditions laid down by the ECAs addresses the issue of benefit sharing. The conditions would not therefore bring Ilisu into compliance with the WCD's fifth strategic priority.

  • Ensuring compliance

WCD Guidelines

The WCD's report states: "A clear, consistent and common set of criteria and guidelines to ensure compliance [with commitments made for the planning, implementation and operations of dams]" should be adopted "by sponsoring, contracting and financial institutions". The WCD recommends a Compliance Plan should be drawn up and be subject to independent monitoring. The costs for establishing compliance mechanisms and ensuring their effective application should be "built into the project budget."197

Evaluation of Compliance

The Mission notes that the WCD's recommended mechanisms for ensuring compliance are entirely absent from Ilisu. For example:

  • No "clear, consistent and common set of criteria and guidelines to ensure compliance" has been adopted - let alone agreed - by "sponsoring, contracting and financing institutions";198
  • No "Compliance Plan"199 has been agreed - let alone considered - for Ilisu;
  • No independent review panel200 has been agreed for Ilisu;
  • There are no requirements for the DSI, as project sponsor, to set up performance bonds "to provide financial security that obligations will be met";201
  • No provisions have been made in the project budget "for compliance mechanisms and related institutional capacity".202

Although the ECAs' first condition - on resettlement - specifies the need for independent monitoring, the condition fails to meet other compliance requirements stipulated by the WCD. Moreover, as noted in Sections 1 and 2, there are grave doubts that independent monitoring is possible whilst the region remains under Emergency Rule.

Other suggested compliance mechanisms also fail to meet the WCD guidelines. For example, the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department has undertaken to write "clawback" mechanisms into any contract undertaken in support of Ilisu, whereby the credit could be voided if its conditions are not met. No details have been made public, however. In addition, it is also questionable whether clawback conditions, though welcome, would suffice to ensure long-term compliance with agreements undertaken by the Turkish authorities, for example on environmental mitigation and resettlement, since the involvement of Balfour Beatty, the company which would receive ECGD support, is likely to be over before many problems emerge.

  • Sharing rivers for peace, development and security

WCD Guidelines

The WCD recommends that rivers must be shared for peace, development and security. The storage and diversion of water on transboundary rivers should be based "on principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, no significant harm, prior information and the Commission's strategic priorities."

Evaluation of Compliance

As noted in Sections 1 and 2, the planned Ilisu Dam threatens to disrupt the flow of the Tigris to Iraq and Syria. Turkey refuses to consult these riparian countries on the impacts of Ilisu and other dams. Professors Crawford, Sands and Boisson de Chazournes concluded in a detailed legal opinion for Friends of the Earth (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) that building the Ilisu Dam without such consultation would violate international environmental law on several counts. Their conclusion has been confirmed in an independent legal opinion prepared by Astrid Epiney, professor of international law at Freiburg University, Switzerland. The WCD report recommends that "where a government agency plans or facilitates the construction of a dam on a shared river in contravention of the principle of good faith negotiations between riparians, external financing bodies withdraw their support for projects and programmes promoted by that agency".

  • The Mission concludes that, even if met, the ECAs' four conditions leave many key concerns (particularly those relating to transparency and human rights) unaddressed and would fail to bring the project up to international standards. The project violates each and every one of the WCD's major policy recommendations and would still be in breach of WCD standards even if the ECAs' four conditions were met in full.
  • Issue two: ECAs and governance

The Ilisu project tells us much about political oppression and the lack of democracy in Turkey. But it also tells us much about the governments considering support for Ilisu. In particular, it reveals:

  • the depth of some of these governments' commitment to human rights and the environment;
  • the lack of coherence between stated government policies and actual departmental practice; and
  • governance failures in the management of the ECAs involved.

In the UK, for example, the government is publicly committed to paying "particular attention to human rights [and] transparent and accountable government" and to ensuring "that the full range of government policies affecting developing countries, including environment, trade, investment and agricultural policies, takes account of our sustainable development objective."203 In line with the new policy, announced in 1997, large capital projects in the South are to be avoided. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has also committed Britain to a new "ethical foreign policy" in which Britain would "once again be a force for good in the world ... Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension".204 In Germany as well, the Social Democrat/ Green government was widely expected to give stronger emphasis to environmental and human rights criteria in its foreign policy.

Ilisu flies in the face of such commitments, revealing a massive gulf between the rhetoric and reality of government policy. Parliamentary scrutiny of the Ilisu case has also revealed the decision making procedures that led to the UK's giving conditional approval for the project to be deeply flawed. Despite the government's "ethical foreign policy", for example, investigations by the House of Commons' International Development Committee revealed that "the Foreign Office did not raise any questions about the proposed Ilisu Dam and its effects on the human rights of those living in the region".205 Meanwhile, in evidence to the committee, the Minister responsible for the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) denied that his department had any responsibility for human rights - this despite the government's announcement that all departments should take account of sustainable development objectives (seeBox 15: A Tragi-Comedy in 90 Seconds).

The UK's International Development Committee has also drawn attention to the failings of the "band-aid" approach to standards exhibited by Ilisu. The Committee notes:

"Much has been said of the need to monitor any commitments made. Certainly, the conditions must be public, clear and to internationally agreed standards. There must be independent monitoring procedures with the agreement that any cover becomes void should the monitors conclude that something has been broken. But the unbiased observer must surely conclude that something has gone very wrong when conditionality has been used in this way - with ECAs and Governments bending over backwards to secure the deal. The Turkish authorities had not complied with international standards - why was the project not simply rejected for cover? Is it always the case when such conditions are not met that ECGD simply asks for the required plans to be produced, and on that basis cover is given? How seriously can such commitments be taken?"

The committee concluded:

"There is good reason for the expectation that relevant international criteria should be met before a proposal is agreed and cover sought - it is a sign of political will, institutional capacity, developmental commitment and good faith. The shotgun wedding approach to export credit that we find in the case of the Ilisu Dam does not in our view bode well for the implementation of commitments but is rather the worst form of export credit practice ... We do not believe that fundamental conditions met at the last minute, and only as a result of export credit agency pressure, can be treated seriously."


Box 15: A Tragi-Comedy in 90 Seconds

Ilisu has brought Britain's commitment to human rights into sharp focus. A major question that still has to be answered is the extent to which the department of Trade and Industry was briefed by the Foreign Office on human rights abuses in SE Turkey.

In 2000, the UK Select Committee on International Development held hearings on the Ilisu Dam. Richard Caborn, the Minister responsible for the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), was questioned on the issue. What assessment, the Committee wanted to know, had the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) made of the impact of the dam on conflict in the region, which for years has been wracked by a brutal armed conflict between the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish security forces.

Caborn replied as follows:

Caborn: "We take human rights very seriously indeed. In fact, the people who disabuse human rights, the record is there that we would not be supporting that type of regime. Clearly the criteria is laid down for that..."

30 seconds pass. Caborn continues

Caborn: "Nobody has raised a question as far as ECGD cover is concerned. Remember, that is the point we are dealing with ... There is nobody who has come back and raised the human rights questions in terms of this dam and the awarding of ECGD cover."

15 seconds pass. Caborn continues

Caborn: "In terms of human rights, you have asked me a question and I have given you the answer. The DTI is not responsible for human rights."

The entire exchange took less than 90 seconds. Ninety seconds in which human rights slip from top of the government's agenda to an issue that is of no concern to the Department of Trade and Industry.

As an insight into the UK government's commitment to sustainable development - which surely includes upholding human rights - the exchange could not be more revealing.


The Mission agrees; and would argue that the institutional failures identified by the International Development Committee will not be rectified whilst export credit agencies lack mandatory, transparent and legally-enforcible human rights, environmental and development standards. Without such standards, in the Mission's view, ECAs are operating in an effective policy vacuum, with staff and exporters alike denied a clear set of rules to abide by. Under such circumstances, the pressure to disregard human rights and environmental concerns will remain.

The Mission recommends that, at a minimum, export credit agencies should introduce:

  • A restrictive list of projects which will not be considered for support because of their established adverse environmental, human rights or development impacts;
  • A positive list of projects which will receive favourable consideration because of their contribution to the national and international sustainable development objectives;
  • Mandatory human rights, environmental and development standards, drawn up in consultation with project-affected communities and civil society and aimed, inter alia, at ensuring that all projects which pass the initial screening process
    • have the minimum impact on the environment;
    • safeguard the lives and livelihoods of those directly affected by ECA-backed loans;
    • minimise the need for resettlement and ensure that those resettled are better off than prior to the project;
    • assess alternatives to the proposed project, including the option of the project not being implemented;
    • ensure the full and active participation of affected people and interested groups in the decision-making process surrounding the project; and
    • ensure that projects have been rigorously and transparently screened for their full, climate change impacts.
  • Internal procedures, including career penalties and rewards, to ensure that inappropriate projects are screened out and that approved projects comply fully with agreed environmental and development standards.
  • Transparent decision-making procedures that permit public scrutiny of, and input into, the approval, implementation and operation of ECA-supported projects.

The Mission believes that such standards would not only provide exporters the certainty they need in order to plan ahead but would also enhance policy coherence within government, particularly with respect to human rights and the environment. In addition, they would provide the public - and project affected people - with the legal means of holding ECAs to account for the impacts of the projects they support.

The OECD Draft Agreement - Failing to Meet the Challenge of Reform

It is therefore of grave concern to the Mission that the some ECAs within the OECD ECA Working Party, which is currently negotiating an agreement on common environmental standards for the export credit agencies of its member governments, oppose mandatory standards in favour of the so-called "benchmarking" proposal, a "pick-and-mix" approach, whereby proposed project standards are simply compared with various international standards and then agreed to on a project-by-project basis.

Not only would such an approach prove bureaucratic, costly and time-consuming for exporters, but it would perpetuate the very institutional failures that have bedevilled Ilisu. Under the draft agreement, which the Mission has reviewed in detail, ECAs will not be required to reject projects that fail to meet international standards but will instead only be encouraged to impose mitigatory measures as conditions for support.206 This is precisely the approach criticised by the International Development Committee (see above pp.100-101).

Of further concern is the discretionary nature of the agreements reached. For example:

  • There is no requirement to undertake Environmental Impact Assessments for projects: rather, "members shall, where appropriate, request an EIA for the most sensitive projects identified by their respective screening and scoping procedures;"207
  • ECAs are not required to abide by a single set of standards; rather, they "shall use, whenever possible on an agreed basis, examples of best practice," with "national, host government standards, international financial institutions' standards" serving as "reference points, or benchmarks."208 The Mission notes that, on past experience, this is likely to lead to the lowest common denominator and least onerous standards being adopted.

The agreement also eschews any negative or positive listing of projects, requiring only that ECAs "screen all applications in order to identify those projects which may have adverse environmental or social impacts." The Mission believes that such a requirement confuses information gathering with screening; the agreement gives no guidance as to how ECAs should act on the information gathered. No criteria are laid down that would direct staff as to which projects to screen out, or indeed which projects should be positively encouraged. As such, the agreement provides a flimsy and inadequate basis for ensuring that future projects contribute postively to sustainable development.

The procedures laid down in the agreement are also completely lacking in any requirement for transparency or public participation. The choice of standards, for example, does not have to be justified publicly - and is thus not open to even rudimentary public scrutiny.

The Mission concludes that the OECD's proposed reforms fail to respond to the challenges thrown up by Ilisu. Largely discretionary and devoid of legally-binding rules that would weed out unacceptable projects prior to their approval, the agreement will serve to perpetuate the very problems that Ilisu has highlighted. As a result, under the proposed benchmarking approach, the proposed Ilisu dam could be allowed to proceed despite its severe risks to human rights and the environment.

Issue three: Ilisu - a litmus test of the ECGD's and HERMES' commitment to reform

As a result of the public outcry over Ilisu, the ECGD has announced a new set of new "Business Principles" which it argues will address the concerns raised. To its credit, the ECGD has moved beyond the built-in agenda of the OECD export credit negotiations by embracing the need to address human rights and development issues, in addition to environmental impacts. However, in the Mission's view, the reforms embodied in the Business Principles fall far short of a credible and coherent response to the growing public concern over the ECGD's activities. In particular:

  • The legal status of the Business Principles is unclear;
  • The Business Principles are largely discretionary; as such, they fail to provide the incentives, penalties and binding rules that would make them a suitable instrument for governing the ECGD's business practice;

A further deficiency is that the Business Principles commit the ECGD to very little. On sustainable development, for example, the ECGD merely undertakes to "increase its awareness and understanding of project impacts, including environmental, social and human rights issues."209 The Principles also commit the ECGD to a policy of "constructive engagement", with the aim of improving projects in which it is involved, without providing any guidance as to how this will be achieved without a repetition of the "band aid" approach that has characterised Ilisu.

The Principles also lack enforcement mechanisms. No staff incentives and sanctions are laid down to ensure that the principles are acted upon. No guidelines are provided for implementing the Principles and there are no mandatory standards which staff are required to follow. In addition, no role is given to affected communities in the decision-making process on projects. There is no requirement for the ECGD to consult project-affected communities and those adversely affected by ECGD-backed projects will still be denied automatic means of redress.

Despite these deficiencies, the Mission believes that the Principles signal a new direction in ECGD practice. In particular, the Mission welcomes the ECGD's undertaking to "ensure that our activities take into account the government's international policies, including those on sustainable development, environment, human rights, good governance and trade."210 The Mission believes that continued support for Ilisu would be in breach of both the spirit and the letter of this commitment. In particular, the continuing denial of civil, political and human rights in Southeast Turkey brings Ilisu into flagrant conflict with the UK's stated commitment to an ethical foreign policy. The Mission thus views Ilisu as a litmus test of the ECGD's commitment to its new objectives: proceeding with the project would signal a fatal lack of purpose in reforming the ECGD and in embracing the principles of sustainable development, as espoused by the UK government.

In Germany, the Government of the Social Democrat Party and the Party of Buendnis 90/Die Gruenen (The Greens) announced in its coalition agreement of October 1998 that it would "initiate reform of foreign trade promotion, especially the granting of export credit guarantees (Hermes) according to environmental, social and developmental criteria". In January 2001, the government published its first draft of the new policy proposal.

While the Mission welcomes the German government's commitment to initiating environmental, social and developmental criteria into Hermes' granting guidelines, it is deeply concerned about the proposal now presented.

The only binding standards mentioned in the current proposal are those of the importing country. However, as the Ilisu project shows, environmental legislation and its implementation in developing and transitional countries are often inadequate. The observance of World Bank standards therefore only presents a minimal criterion that should be upheld in projects that apply for a Hermes guarantee from the very beginning of project planning. Ilisu is a sad example of belated attempts to bring a project up to international standards by means of imposed conditions. The exercise is both time-consuming and not likely to render the desired results in any case.

This lack of binding standards is especially worrying in light of the fact that all projects with a German contribution of less than 20 per cent are exempt from screening. If this was the rule with other ECAs as well, a case like Ilisu, where no country alone takes a 20 per cent share, could have gone ahead without even rudimentary examination despite the severe environmental, social and human rights impacts that are set out in this report.

As the ECGD's report on the Ilisu Environmental Impact Assessment highlights, it is essential to have both clear criteria for the drafting of an EIA as well as sufficient capacity to evaluate those EIAs submitted. The draft guideline, however, leaves open the question of which kinds of environmental studies should be prepared for which kinds of projects.

As far as developing an adequate enviromental guideline therefore, the Mission recommends that a minimum baseline include a comprehensive screening procedure for all guarantee applications, the creation of independent EIAs according to clearly defined international standards for projects which pose threats to a country's environmental, social and human rights situation, and the observance of World Bank standards at an early stage of the project design. Meanwhile, as the announced Hermes reforms have not yet been implemented in a substantial way, the Ilisu project remains a central test case for the German Government's willingness to respect environmental, social and human rights criteria in its guarantee policy.

The Mission's Recommendations

In the light of its findings, the Mission will be pressing the ECAs involved in Ilisu to refuse export credit support for the project. In addition, it urges the Turkish Government to consider alternatives to large dam projects like Ilisu that would not impose increased hardship or threaten internal displacement of its Kurdish citizens and other minorities. Alternatives to Ilisu exist - for example, by addressing the 15-25% electricity losses through poor transmission. The Mission also urges the Government to respond to calls for peaceful, political solutions to the Kurdish question.

More generally, the Mission recommends a deep reform of current export credit agency practice. In particular, it urges ECAs:

  1. To adopt the proposals set forth in the "Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies," which is supported by over 300 NGOs world-wide;
  2. Accordingly to adopt mandatory, legally-binding standards, with accompanying "positive" and "restrictive" screening procedures, that would weed out projects that did not meet international environmental, development and human rights standards prior to their being considered for support and ensure compliance with those standards once support has been approved;
  3. Adopt the Report of the World Commission on Dams and endeavour to ensure that all future hydropower contracts in which they are involved comply with the Set of Guidelines for Good Practice (contained in Chapter 9 of the Report). At a minimum, companies seeking support for projects involving dams should be required to explain why specific WCD principles and guidelines are held to not be applicable and attach this explanation as an appendix to the project's Environmental Impact Assessment;
  4. To undertake and make public a human rights assessment of any project for which export credit support is being considered, detailing the extent of compliance by the national government with international human rights agreements and standards.

Appendix 1: Jakarta Declaration For Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies

June 13, 2000

Over 50 representatives of Indonesian and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and social movements convened in Jakarta and South Sumatra 1-7 May, 2000 for a strategy meeting on official export credit and investment insurance agencies (ECAs). They agreed on the following Declaration, endorsed by 347 NGOs from 45 countries.

Introduction

Non-governmental organizations around the world call the attention of governments and international institutions to the mounting adverse environmental, social, human rights and economic consequences of ECA activities. We have directly witnessed the unconscionable human suffering and environmental devastation that ECAs have produced in Indonesia, which is only one of many country examples. ECAs have supported many projects-e.g. in the mining, pulp and paper, oil and power sectors-which have had devastating social and environmental impacts. ECAs have supported the export of arms used for human rights abuses by the Suharto government. In 1996, ECA exposure in Indonesia was $28 billion, an amount equivalent to 24% of Indonesia's external debt. The Indonesian ECA debt places an unacceptable burden on the Indonesian people, crippling their future development. As a 22 September 1999 "Financial Times" article pointed out, careless industrialized country export credit agencies share a major responsibility for "violence in East Timor and economic disaster in Indonesia."

Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies have become the largest source of public international finance, supporting in 1998 over eight percent of world exports. In 1998 ECAs supported $391 billion in private sector business and investment, of which $60 billion was for middle- and long-term guarantees and loans, mainly supporting large-scale project finance in developing countries. This exceeds all bilateral and multilateral development assistance combined, which has averaged some $50 billion over the past decade. ECAs account for 24 percent of all developing country debt, and 56 percent of the debt owed to official governmental agencies.

In April, 1998 163 NGOs from 46 countries sent to the finance and foreign ministries of the major industrialized OECD countries a "Call of National and International Non-Governmental Agencies for the Reform of Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies." The NGOs called for transparency in ECA decision making, environmental assessment and screening of ECA financial commitments, including participation of affected populations, social sustainability (equity and human rights concerns) in appraisal of ECA commitments, and for an international agreement in the OECD and/or G8 on common environmental and social standards for ECAs.

Over the past two years the major industrialized countries have only made the minimal commitment to work towards common environmental approaches and guidelines in the OECD. The lack of transparency and meaningful public consultation in the OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, particularly the lack of any consultation with representatives of affected groups and organizations from non-OECD recipient countries, has rendered this process a travesty. ECAs have consistently learned no lessons from the past and continue to approve financing for environmentally and socially destructive operations.

The social and environmental negligence, support for human rights violations, and lack of transparency of ECAs must come to a halt. ECA financing for major arms transactions, for obsolete technologies rejected or illegal in their home countries, and for economically unproductive investments is a scandal of global proportions.

Call for Reform

Based on the experiences of Indonesia and many other countries, NGOs from around the world reiterate the April, 1998 international Call for Reform of Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies. We call upon OECD governments, ministers and national legislatures to undertake with due dispatch the following reform measures for their ECAs:

  1. Transparency, public access to information and consultation with civil society and affected people in both OECD and recipient countries at three levels: in the assessment of ongoing and future investments and projects supported by individual ECAs; in the preparation within national ECAs of new procedures and standards; and in the negotiation within the OECD and other fora of common approaches and guidelines.
  2. Binding common environmental and social guidelines and standards no lower and less rigorous than existing international procedures and standards for public international finance such as those of the World Bank Group and OECD Development Assistance Committee. These guidelines and standards need to be coherent with other ongoing international social and environmental commitments and treaties, for example, the conventions of the International Labor Organization and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. In addition ECAs must conduct full, transparent accounting for climate change impacts and move to increase investments in sustainable renewable energy. So far, some governments have established, or are establishing, environmental and social policies which substantially deviate from, and are below these internationally recognized standards and guidelines.
  3. The adoption of explicit human rights criteria guiding the operations of ECAs. This should be done in consultation with affected people and civil society, and based on existing regional and international human rights conventions. In Indonesia and elsewhere ECAs have not only supported arms exports directly linked to egregious human rights abuses, their support for mining, paper and pulp mills and other major infrastructure investments often has been accompanied by destruction of indigenous and local peoples' rights to land and livelihood resources, armed suppression of dissent, and suppression of press freedom to criticize such abuses.
  4. The adoption of binding criteria and guidelines to end ECAs' abetting of corruption. According to Transparency International, the continued lack of action by ECAs to address this issue is bringing some ECA practices "close to complicity with a criminal offense." We endorse the recommendations of Transparency International submitted to the OECD and European Union in September 1999, on how ECAs should avoid continued complicity in corruption. These include, inter alia, recommendations that export credit applicants must state in writing that no illegal payments related to a contract were made, and that any contravention of the ban on illegal payment should entail cancellation of the state's obligation to pay. Companies found guilty of corruption should be banned from further support for five years, and export credit agencies should not underwrite commissions as part of the contracts they support.
  5. ECAs must cease financing non-productive investments. The massive ECA support for military purchases and white elephant projects, such as nuclear power plants, that would be rejected by OECD bilateral aid agencies and multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank must end.
  6. The cancellation of ECA debt for the poorest countries, much of which has been incurred for economically unproductive purposes. We support the call of the Indonesian anti-debt coalition for the cancellation of Indonesian ECA obligations, now placing an insupportable burden on the Indonesian people.

Conclusion

The OECD Development Assistance Committee declared in 1996 that "we should aim for nothing less than to assure that the entire range of relevant industrialized country policies are consistent with and do not undermine development objectives." The OECD ECAs, and the OECD Export Credit Working Party, completely disrespect this call. These ECAs have so far refused to accept any responsibility for their past mistakes, and to draw any meaningful lessons from them. The current practices of the ECAs embody a form of corrupt, untransparent, environmentally and socially destructive globalization as serious and reprehensible as the concerns raised by civil society and activists around the world about the World Trade Organization, the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

We call upon concerned citizens and organizations around the world to turn their attention to ECAs and their negotiating forum, the OECD, and to press their governments to undertake reform without further delay.

Undersigned Non-Governmental Organizations and Individuals:

Austria:
Action for World Development NSW Inc.
Aid/Watch
Australian Council for Overseas Aid
Bougainville Freedom Movement
Campaign Against Corporate Tyranny in Unity and Solidarity (CACTUS)
Community Aid Abroad (Oxfam Australia)
Economic Reform Australia
Friends of the Earth Australia
Information for Action
Jubilee 2000 Australia
Mineral Policy Institute
Native Forest Network/Southern Hemisphere
People for Nuclear Disarmament
Public Interest Advocacy Centre
Rainforest Information Centre
TEAR Australia (Christian Action with the World's Poor)
The Bathurst Justice Group
The LEAD Group Inc.
Wordwit International (Australia and China)
World Vision Australia (WVA)
Austria:
Erlaßjahr 2000 Österreich
Naturfreunde Internationale
Bangladesh:
Like-Minded Environmental Activists Group (LMEAG)
Belgium:
Eurodad
Fern
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID)
Bolivia:
Plan de Desarrollo Indigena (PDI)
Brazil:
Conselho Indigenista Missionario (Espiritu Santo)
Ecoa
Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens-Brasil (MAB)
Rios Vivos Coalition (America Latina/Europa/USA)
Ecoropa:
Partnership, Management And Support Programme
Canada:
Alternatives
Canadian Auto Workers
Canadian Council for International Cooperation
Canadian Friends of Burma
Canadian Labour Congress
Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights
Democracy Watch
East Timor Alert Network
Falls Brook Centre
Halifax Initiative
MiningWatch Canada
Project Ploughshares
RESULTS Canada
Social Justice Committee of Montreal
Society Promoting Environmental Conservation
Steelworkers Humanity Fund
Sweet Land Collective
West Coast Environmental Law Association
Costa Rica:
Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción (NGO association with 45 members in 20 countries)
FoE International's Campaign on the Environmental and Social Impacts of Mining
Denmark:
Danish Association for International Co-operation
Finland:
Coalition for Environment and Development
Finnish Asiatic Society
Finnish Association for Nature Conservation
Finnish Energy Political Association/Alternative to Nuclear Power
Finnish Nature League/Forest Group
France:
Agir ici pour un monde solidaire
Amis de la Terre
Attac France
Fédération Artisans du Monde
France-Libertés Fondation Danielle Mitterrand
Helio International
Info Birmanie
L'Observatoire des Transferts d'Armements
Reseau d'information sur le Tiers Monde (RITIMO)
Reseau Jeunes Solidaires
Survie
Gabon:
Les Amis du Pangolin
Georgia:
Sakartvelos Mtsvaneta Mozraoba/Friends of the Earth Georgia
Germany:
Aktionszentrum 3. Welt e.V.
Berliner Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft Umwelt und Entwicklung (Blue 21)
EarthLink/The People & Nature Network
ECOROPA Europe
EURONATUR
Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung
IMBAS
Institute of Interdisciplinary Study and Research (IfSF)
Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) e.V.,
Rettet den Regenwald e.V.
Society for Threatened Peoples
Umwelt-AG der Anne-Frank-Gesamtschule
Urgewald
Weltwirtschaft, Oekologie & Entwicklung e.V. (WEED)
Guatamala:
Maya Pedal (Guatamala and Canada)
Tropico Verde
Honduras:
Comité para la Defensa y Desarrollo de la Flora y Fauna del Golfo de Fonseca (CODDEFFAGOLF)
India:
Adivasi Mahila Manch/Indigenous Women's Platform
Bindrai Institute for Research Study & Action
Environment Support Group
Jharkhandis Organisation Against Radiation (JOAR)
Jharkhandis Organisation for Human Rights (JOHAR)
KALPAVRIKSH
North and North East Mines Minerals & People
South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People
Indonesia:
Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kalbar
Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara
Aliansi Perempuan Adat Nusantara
Bioforum
BP-Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria
debtWATCH Indonesia
Elsam
FOKER LSM PAPUA (Forum Kerjasama LSM Papua)
FPMP-Sulsel
Gabungan Anak Seni Sriwijaya
Gita Pertiwi
ICEL
Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union
Institute Dayakology
Institute of Development and Economic Analysis (IDEA)
Jagat-NTT
JARI Indonesia
Jaringan Kerja Masyarakat Adat
Jaringan Organisasi Independen untuk Penguatan Rakyat(JOIPaRa)
Jatam
Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kemasyarakatan
KSKP Lahat
KSPPM
LBH Palembang Indonesia
Lembaga Advokasi Rakyat
Lembaga Bela Benua Talino
Lembaga Gemawan
Lembaga Konsumen Hijau
Lembaga Olah Hidup
Lembaga Pemetaan Aset Produksi Rakyat
Lembaga Pendukung dan Pemberdayaan Sosial Ekonomi Petani Karet
Leskap
LORIES
NADI
National Development Fund
NGO'S CAFÉ
NRM
Oman Women's Committee
Palembang Legal Aid Institution
PERBBUNI
Persatuan Perempuan Sama/The Women's Union For Equality
PIAR/NTT
Pijar Indonesia
PLASMA
PPSDAK/Yayasan pancur Kasih
Pusat Informasi dan Komunikasi Perempuan (PIKP)
Puti Jaji
RMI - Institute for Forest and Environment
Sahabat Persada Alam
Sarekat Nelayan Sumatra Utara
SEN/LPIST
Serikat Demokrasi Sosial
Solidamor
Solidaritas Perempuan
Telapak
Urban Poor Consortium
Wadah Pengembangan Alternatif Pesisir (WPAP)
Walda
Walhi Aceh
Walhi Jawa Barat
Walhi Jawa Timur
Walhi Kalimantan Tengah
Walhi Sulawesi Selatan
Walhi Sulawesi Tengah
Walhi Sulawesi Utara
Walhi Sultra
Walhi Sumatera Selatan
Walhi Sumatra Utara
WALHI/National Secretariat
WWF Sahul
Yappika
Yascita
Yasinta
Yayasan Asri
Yayasan Bantaya
Yayasan Bina Potensi Desa
Yayasan Gemi Nastiti
Yayasan HAPSARI Perbaungan
Yayasan IMPALM
Yayasan KAPPALA Indonesia
Yayasan Kelola Menado
Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia
Yayasan Pelangi Indonesia
Yayasan pengembangan Masyarakat Desa (Papua)
Yayasan Peran
Yayasan tahanjungan Tarung Palangkaraya
YLK-Sulsel
YPBB
Israel:
GreenAction - for Social Ecological Change
Israeli Association for Earthday Events
Italy:
Amici della Terra
Associazione Nuova Solidarieta/Bottega del Mondo di Finale Ligure
Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale
Centro Internazionale Crocevia
Circolo di San Salvo del Partito della Rifondazione Comunista
COCIS
Coordinamento Lombardo Nord/Sud del Mondo
GEVAM/ONLUS
Operatore nella cooperazione Internazionale
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC)
Rete Italiana botcottaggio Nestle
Rete Romana sul Consumo Critico
Riforma mondiale della SACE
Service Civil International/Branca Italiana
Un Ponte per...
Xaverian Missionaries (Italy and many other countries)
Fausto Bertinotti (Dep. and Member of the European Parliament) PRC
Ugo Boghetta (Dep.), PRC
Franco Bonato (Dep.) PRC
Luca Cangemi (Dep.) PRC
Aurelio Crippa (Sen.) PRC Fausto Co' (Sen.) PRC
Walter De Cesaris (Dep.) PRC
Giuseppe Di Lello Finuoli, Member of European Parliament PRC
Franco Giordano (Dep.) PRC
Maria Lenti (Dep.) PRC
Giorgio Melentacchi (Dep.) PRC
Ramon Mantovani (Dep.) PRC
Luisa Morgantini, Member of European Parliament, PRC
Maria Celeste Nardini (Dep.) PRC
Edo Rossi (Dep.) PRC
Giovanni Russo Spena (Sen.) PRC
Tiziana Valpiana (Dep.) PRC
Nicola Vendola (Dep.) PRC
Luigi Vinci (Capogruppo), Member of European Parliament, PRC
Japan:
A Seed Japan
Campaign for Future of Filipino Children (CFFC)
Friends of the Earth Japan
Green Energy "Law" Network
Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)
Japan NGO Network on Indonesia
Japan Tropical Action Network (JATAN)
Mekong Watch
People's Forum 2001
Society for Creation of Future of Yoshino River
Kenya:
Forest Action Network
Relief and Environmental Care Africa (RECA)
Kyrgyzstan:
Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law
Malayasia:
Centre for Orang Asli Concerns (COAC).
Partners of Community Organisations (PACOS).
Mexico:
Grupo Mesófilo A.C.
Red Mexicana de Accion frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC)
Trasparencia, S.C.
Netherlands:
Both ENDS
Campagne tegen Wapenhandel
Corporate Europe Observatory
Friends of the Earth International
Greenpeace International
Komitee Indonesia
The Northern Alliance for Sustainability
The Transnational Institute
World Information Service on Energy (WISE)
New Zealand:
The Pacific Institute of Resource Management
Nigeria:
African Network for Environmental and Economic Justice
Ecowas Network on Debt and Development (ECONDAD)
The Flood and Erosion Victims Association (FEVA)
Norway:
FIVAS, Association for International Water and Forest Studies
Forum for Environment and Development
Regnskogsfondet/Rainforest Foundation Norway
Pakistan:
Pakistan Network of Rivers, Dams, and People
Papua New Guinea:
NGO Environmental Watch Group
Philippines:
Cordillera Peoples Alliance
Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition
Russia:
Agency for Public Ecological Reviews
Altai State University Ecoclub
Angara-Yenisei Rescue Association
ASMO-Press Association of Young Journalists of Tomsk Region
Baltic Resource and Information Center
Bayangol Ethno-Ecological Center
Bureau for Public Regional Campaigning
Buryat Regional Union for Baikal
ECODEFENSE! Int'l
Fund for 21st Century Altai
Green Light Environmental Center
ISAR-Siberia
Kamchatka League of Endependent Experts
Krasnoyarsk Regional Public Fund for Forest Protection
Magadan Center for the Environment
Public Ecological Center "Dauria"
Public Ecological Charitable Fund "Baikal"
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Center for Ecological Education
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Public Ecological Center
Republic Public Environmental Fund "Baikal"
Sakhalin Environment Watch
Siberian Association for NTFP Use
Siberian Environmental Center
Socio-Ecological Union/Antinuclear Campaign
St. Petersburg Society of Naturalists
Taiga Rangers
Taiga Research and Protection Agency
Tele-radio Company "Katun"
Tomsk Ecological Student Inspection
Toyeon Ecological Center
Transbaikal Center for Biodiversity Conservation
World Information Service on Energy Russia
Slovakia:
Center for Environmental Public Advocacy/Friends of the Earth Slovakia
South Africa:
Alternative Information & Development Centre (AIDC)
Timberwatch Coalition
Sweden:
Fältbiologerna
Miljoefoerbundet Jordens Vaenner/Friends of the Earth Sweden
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation
Peter Söderbaum, Professor i ekonomi med inriktning på ekologisk ekonomi Mälardalens högskola, Sweden
Switzerland:
Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz
Arbeitskreis Tourismus & Entwicklung
Basel Mission
Berne Declaration
Bruecke-Cecotret/Development Agency of Swiss Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
Caritas Switzerland
Green Party Switzerland
Honduras Group Switzerland
Netzwerk für sozial verantwortliche Wirtschaft NSW/RSE
Solifonds
Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations
Swiss Energy Foundation
Swiss Labour Assistance
Swissaid
Taiwan:
Taiwan Environmental Protection Union
Thailand:
EarthRights International
Mangrove Action Project
Northern Development Foundation
Towards Ecological Recovery & Regional Alliance (TERRA)
Yadfon Association
Uganda:
Uganda Debt Network
United Kingdom:
Campaign Against Arms Trade
Centre For Alternative Technology (Wales)
Christian Aid
Down to Earth
Fern/WRM Northern Office
Forest Peoples Programme
Forests Monitor
Friends of the Earth (England, Wales and Northern Ireland)
GLOBE UK All Party Parliamentary Group
Green Party of England & Wales
Ilisu Dam Campaign
Indonesian Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL)
Jubilee 2000UK
Kurdish Human Rights Project
Minewatch
Partizans (People Against Rio Tinto and Subsidiaires)
Rights and Accountability in Development (University of Oxford)
The Corner House
Wales Green Party/Plaid Werdd Cymru
World Development Movement
Jean Lambert MEP, Green Party Member of the European Parliament (London Region)
United States:
50 Years Is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic
Amazon Watch
Center for International Environmental Law
Environmental Defense
First Peoples Worldwide
Friends of the Earth
Global Response
Institute for Policy Studies
International Primate Protection League
International Rivers Network
Leavenworth Audubon Adopt-a-Forest
Mangrove Action Project
Native Forest Council
Natural Resources Defense Council
Oxfam America
Pacific Environmental Resource Center
Preamble Center
Project Underground
Rainforest Action Network
Rainforest Foundation USA
Rainforest Relief
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Worldview, Ltd.
Dennis V. Brutus, Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh
Terence Turner, Professor, Cornell University
Uruguay:
Instituto del Tercer Mundo
World Rainforest Movement
Zimbabwe:
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development

Notes and references

1 Balfour Beatty, "The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders", London, 9 May 2000.

2 Kudat, A, "Ilisu Dam's Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) - Achieving International Best Practice", Working Document, Distributed to ECAs, 16 August 2000. Hereafter: Kudat Report.

3 The GAP project was first launched in 1977, when the DSI drew together all its planned programmes for the Euphrates and Tigris basins under one package. In 1989, the Turkish government established the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAPRDA) to oversee the GAP project and to ensure co-ordination between the agencies and institutions concerned. The GAP Higher Board is the most senior decision-making body of GAPRDA and is responsible for decisions pertaining to planning, design and work programmes. The Board is headed by the Minister of State in charge of the GAP, the Minister of State responsible for the State Planning Organisation and the Minister for Public Works and Reconstruction.

4 Balfour Beatty, "The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders", London, 9 May 2000.

5 Five firms undertook the design for the dam. Of these one was Turkish and four were foreign, including three from the United Kingdom, among them James Williamson and Partners, and Kennedy and Donkin. See: Turkish Embassy, Altinbilek, D., "The Ilisu Dam Project", in Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essay on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.31.

6 McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds, London, 2000, p. 444.

7 The World Bank declined to fund any GAP projects in 1984, reportedly for environmental reasons and because of fears it would increase the danger of cross-border conflict with Turkey's neighbours to the south. The Director General of the DSI also acknowledges that a prime reason why the World Bank (and other multilateral development banks) have fought shy of funding the GAP is the ongoing conflict in the region: "If there is tension in the area, then yes, the World Bank, for example, will not wish to become associated with the project." See: Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essay on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.69.

8 Balfour Beatty, "The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders", London, 9 May 2000.

9 Bosshard, P. "A Test Case of International Policy Coherence: A Case Study of the Ilisu Hydropower Project (Turkey)", Berne Declaration, Zurich, March 1999, p.1.

10 Altinbilek, D., "The Ilisu Dam Project", in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essay on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.31. Also pers. com. between Kate Geary, Ilisu Dam Campaign, and Chris Scott, Binnie Black and Veatch, 1st February 2000.

11 According to Balfour Beatty, "The contract between DSI and the construction consortium is still under negotiation. No construction work will go ahead unless and until negotiations are completed, not only on the contract but also on the environmental mitigation measures required by the project and on the financing ... This is not expected before Spring 2001." Balfour Beatty, "The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders", London, 9 May 2000.

12 Marsh, P., "ABB focuses on 'green' energy to boost revenues", Financial Times, 9 June 2000.

13 See for example: Berne Declaration, High Risk - Low Return? ABB's Hydropower Strategy under Review, February 1998.

14 Ucar, C., "Skanska withdraws from the Ilisu project, saying it will harm both the people and the environment", Kurdish Observer, 30 September 2000.

15 Brown, P., "Swedish firm deals blow to British-backed dam project", The Guardian, 26 September 2000.

16 Sources interviewed by the Fact Finding Mission strongly suggest that the company's decision was prompted by concerns that the project would not be able to meet international standards.

17 Lang, C., Hildyard, N., Geary, K., Grainger, M., Dams Incorporated: The Record of Twelve European Dam Building Companies, A Report by The Corner House, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, Stockholm, 2000.

18 "Fighting Graft: Clear Laws and Firm Enforcement are Essential Weapons", Asia Now - Asia Week. Web site accessed 13 February 2000. See also: Burt, T., "BICC appeals over contracts ban", The Financial Times, 16 February 1996.

19 Balfour Beatty, "The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders", 9 May 2000, p.1.

20 Set up to assist companies to export capital and project-related goods and services, Export Credit Agencies provide companies with government-backed insurance against the main commercial and political risks of operating abroad, in particular, of not being paid by their creditors. To obtain an export credit guarantee, the exporter takes out insurance with an ECA, which undertakes to pay the exporter for the exported goods should the importer default on payment. If it does have to pay up, the ECA passes on any debt that is not covered by the premiums it has received to the government of the importing country, adding it to the stock of bilateral debt owed to the ECA's home government.

21 When the Swiss government approved its guarantee, it requested that resettlement for the project comply with international standards, and be regularly monitored through an independent body. The guarantee was only to be ratified once the Ilisu consortium, the Turkish government and the ECAs involved had agreed on, and established, a mechanism to achieve this. According to a Swiss government spokesperson, the same condition was supported by the German, Swedish and US governments.

22 Export-Import Bank of the United States, "Summary of Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors", 20 January 1999.

23 GAP/UNDP, "GAP - Sustainable Development Programme", Annex 1 - Project 24 "Sustainable Urban Living and Social Development Programmes in Batman", GAP, 1997, p.60.

24 Bosshard, P. "A Test Case of International Policy Coherence: A Case Study of the Ilisu Hydropower Project (Turkey)", Berne Declaration, Zurich, March 1999; Kurdish Human Rights Project, The Ilisu Dam - A Human Rights Disaster in the Making, A report on the implications of the Ilisu Hydro-Electric Power Project, Batman Province, Southeast Turkey, London, November 1999.

25 See for example: International Development Committee (IDC), "ECGD, Developmental Issues and the Ilisu Dam: Report together with Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendix", Sixth Report, House of Commons, Session 1999-2000, The Stationary Office, London - hereafter International Development Committee: Trade and Industry Committee, "Application for support from ECGD for UK participation in the Ilisu Dam Project: Report, together with Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices", House of Commons, Session 1999-2000, The Stationary Office, London, 2000.

26 International Development Committee, "ECGD, Development Issues and the Ilisu Dam", Sixth Report, Session 1999-2000, House of Commons, The Stationary Office, London, July 2000, p.vii. Hereafter: International Development Committee - Sixth Report.

27 Ann Clwyd reported that her visit had left her "disgusted" at the Turkish government's lack of meaningful consultation with the thousands who will be affected by what she called "this miserable dam" and "shocked" at the scale of human misery and suffering that Ilisu would unleash. The dam, she said, would "result in serious human rights abuses for the Kurdish minority, cause environmental havoc and could even spark off war in the region." See: Ann Clwyd, "Stop this Miserable Dam - Ann Clwyd Returns from Turkey", Press Release, 17 July 2000.

28 Report of Journey of the Fact-Finding Mission of the Human Rights Committee of the German parliament to Turkey, 19-26 November 2000.

29 Many have moved to the urban areas: the population of Diyarbakir has grown from 300,000 in 1990 to more than 1.2 million today, bringing a climate of unemployment, currently estimated at 60%, and the development of shanty town areas. Others have moved to western Turkey, and some to join their families in western Europe.

30 See Kurdish Human Rights Project, "Mentes and others v Turkey, a KHRP case report on village destruction in Turkey", September 1998.

31 US State Department, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000: Turkey", February 2001.

32 Insan Haklari Dernegi (IHD), "Human Rights Report on the First Six Months of the Year 2000", p. 3.

33 McDowall, David. "Turkey in Europe: Opportunity for Change?" Kurdish Human Rights Project, London, 2000

34 In February 2000, for example, the Mayor of Hasankeyf was forced to cut short a visit to Europe after receiving anonymous threats. The Mayor had been scheduled to talk to officials of all German ministries responsible for the granting of a Hermes guarantee, several members of the German parliament as well as the Minister responsible for the UK's Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD).

35 International Development Committee, Sixth Report, p.ix

36 International Development Committee, "Exchange of Letter Concerning the Ilisu dam", Fourth Special Report, House of Commons, Session 1999-2000, The Stationary Office, London, July 2000.

37 The nine provinces are: Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, Mardin, Adiyaman, Batman, Kilis, Sirnak and Siirt.

38 According to the GAP administration, just over 50 per cent of this figure will be spent on dams and irrigation infrastructure. As of February 2000 - thirty years after the project was first launched - the Turkish government had raised just 43.3 of the total projected expenditure. See: Olcay Unver, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview", in Turkish Embassy , Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, pp.14-15.

39 Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington DC, www.turkey.org/ Cited in: Sahan, E., Mason, S., Gilli, A., Zogg, A., "Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey - GAP, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, 2000, p.1.

40 The figure of 27 billion kilowatt hours of electricity takes no account of abstraction of water for irrigation. Once this is taken into account, the figure would be reduced. See: Olcay Unver, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview", in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, pp.15-16.

41 Southeastern Anatolia Regional Development Administration www.gap.gov.tr. Cited in: Sahan, E., Mason, S., Gilli, A., Zogg, A., "Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey - GAP, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, 2000.

42 Altinbilek, D., "The Ilisu Dam Project" in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.30.

43 Unver, O, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview" in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.19.

44 Unver, O, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview" in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.16.

45 According to the GAP Administration, "a little over $2 billion has come from international institutions and the equivalent of 1.5 billion is coming from a build, operate and transfer scheme on the Euphrates river from a European consortium".

46 Unver, O, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview" in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.17.

47 "Turkey set to re-examine the GAP", International Water Power and Dam Construction, September 1999.

48 "GAP is causing barrenness of the soil", Ozgur Politika, 28 April 2000

49 In a report on Turkey published by the United nations Development Programme (UNDP) is 1997, the authors noted that the highest poverty rates in Turkey were to be found in the east and south east. See: www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/nhdr97/summary/turkey.htm. See also: Olcay Unver, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Overview", in Turkish Embassy International Water Power and Dam Construction, London, 2000, pp.13-14. See also: "Turkey set to re-examine the GAP", International Water Power and Dam Construction, September 1999.

50 Until 1997, plans to develop the Tigris and Euphrates were not coordinated. In 1977, the State Hydraulics Works brought the various projects planned for the two river basins under a single authority, entitled "GAP".

51 Quoted in ECGD, "Stakeholders' Attitudes to Involuntary Resettlement in the Context of the Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey", Department of Trade and Industry, London, 1999, p.25.

52 Marsh, N., "Wars Downstream", UK Defence Forum, www.ukdf.org.uk/ts5.htm

53 Rugman, J., "Turkish dam tests Cook's ethical vow", The Observer, 8 August 1999.

54 McDowall, D., "Ilisu: the economic and political context", www.ilisu.org.uk

55 Altinbilek, D., "The Ilisu Dam Project" in Turkish Embassy, Water Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP", Lodon, 2000, p.30.

56 Juniper, T., "Stuffing Turkey", The Ecologist, Vol. 30 - No. 6, September 2000, p.52.

57 Kudat, A., "Ilisu Dam's Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) - Achieving International Best Practice", Distributed to Export Credit Agencies 16 August 2000, unpublished - hereafter, Kudat. The total figure of 183 settlements appears on p.18. This would appear to include hamlets: the number of villages affected is given as 56 (p.3).

58 World Bank policy states: "Involuntary resettlement is an integral part of project design and should be dealt with from the earliest stages of project preparation."

59 ECGD, "Stakeholders' Attitudes to Involuntary Resettlement in the Context of the Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey", London, 1999, para. 3.6

60 Ibid, p.19.

61 Ibid, p.29

62 Ibid, p.51.

63 Ibid, "Summary and recommendations", unnumbered.

64 Ibid, p.51.

65 Ibid, p.14, footnote 7.

66 Kudat, p. 27.

67 Kudat, p. 6.

68 World Bank guidelines state: "Involuntary resettlement should be avoided or minimised where feasible, exploring all viable alternative project designs."68 The OECD's Development Assistance Committee guidelines, which the UK government says it will use to assess the project, go further: "Alternatives to displacement and resettlement should be fully considered before decisions on displacement and resettlement are taken... In every case, the alternative to refrain from carrying out the project (the "non-action" alternative) should seriously be considered".

69 Kudat, p.10

70 Richard Caborn letter to Kate Geary, Ilisu Dam Campaign Co-ordinator, 5 December 2000.

71 Balfour Beatty, The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders", 9 May 2000, p.2.

72 Balfour Beatty, "Ilisu dam and hydro-electric power project: project briefing", July 1999.

73 ERM concluded: "The scope of work to date would need to be extended to bring the analysis to international best standards."

74 ECGD, Environmental Review of Ilisu Dam Project: Desk Review of EIA and Associated Documents, Environmental Resources Management, London, 1999, p.13.

75 Ibid, p.13.

76 Ibid, p.14

77 Ibid, p.1

78 For further information on Hasankeyf, see Appendix 3, (Ancient City of Hasankeyf booklet) and the Hasankeyf website http://www.hasankeyf.cjb.net

79 Bosshard, P. "A Test Case of International Policy Coherence: A Case Study of the Ilisu Hydropower Project (Turkey)", Berne Declaration, Zurich, March 1999.

80 Balfour Beatty, "Ilisu dam and hydro-electric power project", July 1999, p.15

81 ibid

82 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage adopted 16 November 1972.

83 Letter from Martin Hall, President of the World Archaeological Congress to Prime Minister Tony Blair, 16 January 2001.

84 WAC notes: "Hundreds of different cultural sites, dating to every period of human history, fall within the total catchment area of the proposed dam reservoir, and are therefore threatened with destruction through inundation, or associated construction and irrigation works. Individual sites of local, regional and international significance include examples dating to the Neolithic, Chalcolithic, Neo-Assyrian, Late Roman, Byzantine and later medieval periods respectively. Many other sites of crucial importance to any adequate understanding of the more recent histories of the local populations in this region, including ancestral graveyards, are also under threat of destruction and/or prevention of access."

85 Young, P., "Hasankeyf - A City in Peril", History Today, November 2000.

86 Quoted in Bosshard, P., "The Ilisu Forum: An NGO Perspective - Vested Interests and Politics", International Water Power and Dam Construction, April 2000, p.36.

87 Asharq Al-Awsat,12 February 2001

88 Turkey had originally announced that the flow would be blocked for 16 days but relented after protests from Syria and Iraq. See: Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London 2000, pp. 68-69.

89 Channel 4, "Thirsting for Water", 30 September 2000, directed by Christopher Mitchell. A higher figure is given by Mohammed AL-Najim of the School of African and Oriental Studies, London: "The water problem of Tigris and Euphrastes rivers is being seriously affected by ... GAP. The emerging effects are that the water volume, at the entrance point on the Syrian border, has now been decreased to half of its original amount". See: AL-Najim, "Tigris-Euphrates Water - Political, Economical and Regional Relations", SOAS, University of London, unpublished.

90 Christopher Walker, "Mubarak acts as Turk move rattles Syria", The Times, 5 October 1998

91 Marsh, N., "Water Wars", UK Defence Forum, p.6 www.ukdf.org.uk/ts5.htm

92 Balfour Beatty, "Ilisu dam and hydro-electric power project", July 1999

93 Juniper, J., "Stuffing Turkey", The Ecologist, Vol.30, No. 6, September 2000, p.53.

94 Friends of the Earth, "In the Matter of an Application Pursuant to Export and Investment Guarantees Act and in the Matter of the Proposed Ilisu Dam", Unpublished Legal Opinion, 2000.

95 Ibid.

96 Turan, I., "International Aspects of Water Issues", in Turkish Embassy, op.cit., p.41.

97 Letter to Friends of the Earth from Nasser Kaddour, Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2000.

98 L.N. AL-Saidi, Iraqi Interests Section, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Letter to Friends of the Earth, 24 March 1999.

99 Dr. Fahmy AL-Qaysi, Director of Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter to Friends of the Earth, 18 August 2000.

100 House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, "Government observations on the Sixth Report from the Trade and Industry Committee (Session 1999-2000)", House of Commons Stationary Office, London, 2000.

101 The conditions do not stipulate the standards against which compliance with this condition will be measured. However, the standards most commonly cited by the ECAs are those of the World Bank and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. For further discussion, see Section 3.

102 The German Ministry of Finance, failing to do an independent assessment of their own, absurdly set the number of people to be resettled at 8,000 as of December 1999.

103 Kudat, A., "Ilisu Dam's Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) - Achieving International Best Practice", Distributed to Export Credit Agencies 16 August 2000, unpublished - hereafter, Kudat, p.26.

104 Ibid, p.24.

105 Altinbilek, D., "The Ilisu Dam Project" in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeastern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.34.

106 Balfour Beatty, The Ilisu Dam Project: Information for Shareholders, 9 May 2000, p.3.

107 Kudat, p.26.

108 Kudat, p.25.

109 Kudat, p.6

110 Balfour Beatty, "Ilisu Hydro-electric Power Plant (HEPP), Turkey", Outline Briefing Paper, June 1999, p.7.

111 Professor Dogan Altinbilek, Director-General of the DSI, told a seminar held at the Turkish Embassy in London in February 2000: "In the course of building 197 large dams, as well as many much smaller, we have never proceeded without first reaching an arrangement with the local people." See: Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeatern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.32.

112 Yasinok, K., "Participatory Resettlement in GAP: A Case Study", in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeatern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.22.

113 This box draws substantially from: Jim Bodgener, "Birecik dam opens BOT floodgates" , Middle East Economic Digest, December 1, 1995

114 "672-MW, $1.6-billion Birecik Project in Turkey reaches financial close" , Independent Power Report, November 17, 1995

115 "Bank of America strikes deals in US and Europe", Petroleum Economist, August 2000

116 Yasinok, K., "Participatory Resettlement in GAP: A Case Study", in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeatern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, pp. 22, 24, 25, 28.

117 Interview, 12 October 2000. Refugees displaced by the war also stressed to the Mission the importance of ancestral graves in their lives. As one woman put it when explaining why she wanted to return to her burned out village: "We want to go back home to the bones of our fathers."

118 Ackermann, W., "Summary and Recommendations" in Ackermann, W. et al., Man-Made Lakes: Their Problems and Environmental Effects, American Geophysical Union, Washington, DC, 1973, p.28.

119 Planners and water bureaucrats tend to view land merely as a commodity, one piece being easily exchanged with another or for cash. They may fail to comprehend its spiritual and emotional significance for many people, both indigenous and non-indigenous. Moving from one piece of land to another is thus seen as unproblematic. For example, Ernest Ravan of the International Institute for Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering notes: "Dams are not planned to submerge highly developed areas. Often the quality of life of the displaced indigenous population was low, and therefore could be an opportunity to improve living standards; the construction of large dams can sometimes prove such an opportunity. If the people prefer, however, to continue living as they have in the past, they can do so by moving upstream in the river valley."

120 Bosshard, P. "A Test Case of International Policy Coherence: A Case Study of the Ilisu Hydropower Project (Turkey)", Berne Declaration, Zurich, March 1999, p.3.

121 Interview - Chamber of Architects, 12 October 2000.

122 Kudat, p.26.

123 World Bank, Operational Directive 4.3(8)

124 World Bank, Operational Directive 4.3(11)

125 World Bank, Operational Directive 4.30

126 Kudat, p.21.

127 World Bank Operational Directive 4.3

128 World Bank Operational Directive 4.3 (4)

129 Kudat, p.31.

130 World Bank Operational Directive 4.3 (3b). The World Bank and the OECD both state: "All involuntary resettlement should be conceived and executed as development programmes, with resettlers provided sufficient investment resources and opportunities to share in project benefits. Displaced persons should be ... assisted in their efforts to improve their former living standards, income earning capacity and production levels, or at least restore them."

131 World Bank, Operational Directive 4.3(18)

132 Kudat, p.7.

133 Kudat, p.16

134 Kudat, p.22.

135 Kudat, p.25

136 Kudat, p.25

137 Kudat, p.25-26.

138 Although most commentators agree that inflation works against those resettled, Professor Dogan Altinbilek, Director-General of DSI, disagrees: "If a person chooses to go to an urban settlement, they are provided with a house and rehabilitated in this new area ... As to repayment, the first five years is a grace period. Without being charged interest, they must then repay for any new houses they are given. In a country where inflation is more than 50 per cent, this is just like a gift, because after 20 years, the original investment is next to nothing." This analysis ignores the fact that the vast majority of those resettled were not making any repayments on the houses they lived in before they were moved. See: Altinbilek, D. "The Ilisu Dam Project", in Turkish Embassy, Water and Development in Southeatern Anatolia: Essays on the Ilisu Dam and GAP, London, 2000, p.33.

139 Kudat, p. 30.

140 Interview with displaced villagers, 11 October 2000

141 Letter to Heinz Lienhard, Sulzer Hydro, from the Berne Declaration and others, 6 October 1999.

142 Environentmental Resources Management, "Environmental Review of Ilisu Dam Project: Desk Review of EIA and Associated Documents", Report commissioned by UK Export Credits Gruarantee Department, December 2000, p. 9.

143 Interview with Chamber of Architects, Diyarbakir, 13 October 2000.

144 Lean, G., "Dam backed by Blair flouts international law, says Syria", The Independent on Sunday, 16 July 2000.

145 See Water Power & Dam Construction, Willington Publishing Ltd., 30 September 2000.

146 Interview with members of Diyarbakir Bar Association, 13 October 2000.

147 Several of those interviewed noted, with irony, that Hasankeyf's protected status was regularly invoked to prevent people from building new houses in the town. This has limited the possibility of tourism, which could provide a valuable source of income for local people.

148 Most of the people of Hasankeyf born before 1967 were born and lived in the caves - this applies to an estimated 80 per cent of Hasankeyf's inhabitants.

149 Arik cited in Young, P., "Hasankeyf: a city in peril", History Today, November 2000, volume 50(11), pp.3-4.

150 There are some grounds for believing thjat the UK government has accepted the wider impacts of Ilisu. In a letter of 21st January 2000, Richard Caborn, the Minister of state responsible for ECGD, states: "We expect that the [Environmental Impact Assessment Review] will include more information on the proposals for the salvage archaeology for Ilisu. You may also be aware of the publication last year of "Salvage Project of the Archaeological Heritage of the Ilisu and Carchemish Dam Reservoirs Activities in 1998" (ISBN 975-429-152-7). Although this concentrates on Carchemish, as this is impounding first, it does make clear that preliminary work on the salvage archaeology associated with Ilisu has commenced and will extend beyond Hasankeyf. We have been told that the report of the activities in 1999 will be published shortly".

151 ICOMOS 2000, Heritage at Risk. ICOMOS World Report 2000 on Monuments and Sites in Danger, K.G. Saur, München, 2000.

152 It is generally understood that the standards referred to are those of the World Bank and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. Other international standards also cover forced resettlement. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights covers the right to adequate standard of living, including the right to adequate housing. There is a very clear General Comment on Forced Evictions which sets out stringent measures that governments (including donors) need to take action to minimise harm to affected groups and individuals. Article 22 of the ICESCR places an obligation on the international community including multilateral and bilateral donors to ensure that development cooperation is "advisable" and does not erode people's rights (in the context of displacement of Kurds at a time of such instability in the region, as ECAs must be aware, the potential for misinterpretations of the resettlement of the population even in optimal circumstances is obvious).

153 Keynote address of Chris Mullin MP, Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for International Development to Institute of Civil Engineers /British Dams Society Seminar, "After the World Commission ... Dams in the Future", 1st February 2001.

154 Ex-Im Bank, "Environmental Procedures and Guidelines", Table 9, Hydropower and Water Resources Management (Dams and Reservoirs) - Draft, unnumbered, Washington, January 2001.

155 A number of international companies, including ABB, Alstom, Atlas Copco, Coyne & Bellier, Enron, Harza, Hydro-Quebec, Lahmeyer, Voith Siemens and Skanska, all assisted the WCD in developing guidelines for the future of water and energy development.

156 World Commission on Dams, : "In the past 30 years resettlement was [only] provided for about 100 families annually.", Earthscan, November 2000, p.279.

157 Ibid, p.217.

158 Ibid, p.218.

159 Ibid, p.279. "The government planning body sponsoring the planned interventions is responsible for initiating the stakeholder analysis leading to the constitution of a forum and will participate in it. The final structure of a stakeholder forum should be decided upon in a consultative process."

160 Ibid, p.271.

161 Ibid, p.280.

162 Ibid, p.280: "Authorities should make available adequate financial resources to enable stakeholder groups who are politically or financially weak, or who lack technical expertise or organised representation to participate effectively in the process."

163 Ibid, p.217.

164 Ibid, p.218.

165 Ibid, p.217.

166 Ibid, p.217.

167 Ibid, p.217.

168 Ibid, p.269 and p. 268: "Meaningful participation in preparatory studies is central to the success of the investigation and the ultimate outcome ... Preliminary negotiations with project-affected people, their community representatives, and other stakeholders are central to the preparatory studies in considering mitigation measures for any unavoidable adverse impacts and investigating benefit sharing plans."

169 Ibid, p.221.

170 Ibid, p.224 (italics added).

171 Export Credits Guarantee Department, "Stakeholders' Attitudes to Involuntary Resettlement in the Context of the Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey", Summary and Recommendations", unnumbered.

172 "Drought causes energy deficit for Turkey", International Water Power and Dam Construction, September 2000.

173 International Energy Agency, Turkey - Update, International Energy Agency, Vienna, 2000.

174 Kudat, A., Ilisu Dam's Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) - Achieving International Best Practice", unpublished, circulated to ECAs, August 2000, p.10.

175 Interview with Chamber of Engineers, Diyarabkir, 13 October 2000.

176 Ibid, p.225.

177 Ibid, p.225.

178 Ibid, p.230.

179 Ibid, pp.225-226. The WCD recommends that such evaluations should "be comprehensive, integrated, cumulative and adaptive" and that they should be participatory. Moreover, "where dams are part of a larger river basin and regional development scheme, the evaluations should take into account basin-level evaluation of all project and programme components linked to the dam that affect the environment and society."

180 As Ayse Kudat points out in her preliminary assessment of the draft resettlement action plan for Ilisu: "There are still a large number of people affected by previously constructed dams who are still waiting to be resettled, sometimes for many years." She also notes: "In the past 30 years resettlement was [only] provided for about 100 families annually."

181 Ibid, p.230.

182 The official figure from GAP authorities is 75,000.

183 Until recently the average yearly inflation ratio in Turkey has reached over 50 per cent.

184 This section draws substantially from John Wicks, "Harnessing the waters", SHZ Publications, Switzerland, September 1992

185 The Hydropower component of the dam was planned to generate 8.9 billion KWh of electricity annually before irrigation started; when the first scheme of irrigation went into operation it was expected to generate about 8.1 billion KWh of energy per year. According to project authorities 882.000 hectares of land would be irrigated by the water of the impounded in the Ataturk reservoir: 476.000 hectares by gravity flow through the 57.8 km long Sanliurfa tunnels system and the remaining 406.000 hectares by pumping.

The 166-meter-high and 1664-meter-long Ataturk Dam created a reservoir which has a surface of 817 square km and a total storage capacity of 48.7 million cubic meters.

The Ataturk dam is the ninth-largest rockfilled dam in the world. Construction work started in 1981 and all the eight hydropower units, totalling 2,400 MW installed capacity, came into operation at the end of 1993.

The dam was built downstream of the 1,800 MW Karayaka Dam, the first water scheme downstream of the old Keban Dam built on the Upper Euphrates under the GAP project which was completed in 1988 and cost US$1.2 billion.

186 Two ABB subsidiaries, Asea Brown Boveri AG from Germany and ABB Tecnomasio from Italy, were also awarded contracts.

187 This section draws on an interview with journalist Mehmet Dikec.

188 The closure followed further exposés by the journalist. In particular, a series of articles called for the closure of an illegal chemical dump in the area. A local MP told the journalist, "Who are you to say that? You don't have the right to call for its shutting down."

189 Section based on interviews with two villagers from the Ataturk area: Mustafa Karael from Ercek, (200 inhabitants) and Ali Isik from Nasreddin (250/300 inhabitants). Both villages were submerged in 1992.

190 Zheng Jiinfa, "Southeastern Anatolian Project - miracle for Turkey", The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, July 4th,1989

191 Turkish National News Agency, 27th August 1990

192 Ibid, p.234.

193 Ibid, p.237.

194 Ibid, p.240.

195 Ibid, p.240.

196 Ibid, p.243.

197 Ibid, p.244.

198 Ibid, p.245.

199 Ibid, p.244.

200 Ibid, p.246.

201 Ibid, p.247.

202 Ibid, p.248.

203 Department for International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century, White Paper on International Development, The Stationary Office, London, November 1997, p.50

204 Killing Secrets, "A Force for Good in the World? Labour's Ethical Policy", Killing Secrets Information paper, killsecrets@msn.com, 1997. Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, has since denied that he was in fact announcing an "ethical foreign policy". In November 1998, he said: "I've given up trying to get this across. I've never used the phrase. I never said there would be an 'ethical foreign policy'. What we have sought to do is put into effect our values."

205 International Development Committee, "ECGD, Developmental Issues and the Ilisu Dam: Report, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendix", House of Commons Session 1999-2000, The Stationary Office, London, 2000, p.xiii.

206 "Members shall evaluate all the information and decide whether to provide official support, and if so, whether this shall involve pre-conditions, eg. Mitigation measures, covenants, monitoring requirements." See: Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, "Draft Agreement on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits Among Members of the Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG)", Confidential Draft, OECD, Paris, 6 December 2000, p.6.

207 Ibid, p.6.

208 Ibid, p.6.

209 ECGD, Business principles, ECGD, London, December 2000.

210 ECGD, "Business Principles", December 2000.